Here is my opinion on digital radio. I am against digital radio for wildfire use.

The best thing about digital is that it is very secure, scanners are made but are expensive. Digital also has the ability to be encrypted to the highest degree easily. Military and law enforcement applications can best use these qualities.

Down sides are battery life, audio quality, and adverse affects from radio interference. Reduced battery life is from increased electronics to decode the radio signal even when used in analog. Audio quality is reduced due to the sampling of speech to reduce it to the lowest amount of data that can be understood. Radio interference, with analog you can hear the interference as background noise or garbled audio, digital interference results in silence.

For fire, you need the most common, reliable, proven method to communicate with. Digital needed to be investigated before the Feds bought into it. It is a non-common radio type that is going to cause big problems.

Analog radio has been refined for decades. Digital radios have only been out for a few years, I feel the BLM, BIA and FS have jumped in too soon.

Due to policies coming from the top levels of government new Federal radio systems have to be digital or they will not be approved and funded.

Here is a couple of stories I have personally witnessed. 

A SRV crew shows up with RACALS to be programmed, told them it would take a half hour to program them, they wanted to check out cache radios since they were heading to the line, they held onto the EPHs until they demobed then traded them back for the Racals.

BLM guys digging out EPHs they did not turn in when issued RACALS when they found out I could repair them. There are a few SAFECOMs about these radios.

Lets hear more stories of trouble with these radios. The more user problems that are heard, the better chance there is of heading off more problems. Strong words for sure, but to me, digital radios are not as great as some people want you to believe they are.

COMT

Due to the importance of this thread on Interagency Communication in the light of emerging technology we are posting it on a separate page as well as on theysaid. Please add to the list of problems with digital radios if you know of any. Any discussion of how technology could be used so fallers could be warned of developing hazards is also welcome. Ab.

"Gretchen Geary, the San Diego County investigator who drafted
the report, said Thursday that it contained errors."

• A discussion of the status and application of the FIRESCOPE and Multi-agency Coordination
  System (MACS) and their role during the fire siege in southern California.
• A discussion of the status and relevant issues surrounding public safety communications and
  interoperability in responding to the southern California wildland fires and other disasters.
• Current and emerging technologies that can be applied to combating wildland fires.
• Recommendations relative to these issues that should be implemented to prevent or combat
  similar fires in the future.

INVITED TESTIMONY
CA Office of Emergency Services
CA Department of Forestry & Fire Protection
U.S. Forest Service
U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security – SAFECOM Program
CA National Guard San Diego County

More information about the CA Blue Ribbon Fire Commission, other meetings and testimony. You
can read what the commission said about wasted airdrops, for example.

SoCal CDF

• “If the fire gets to that point it will do thus.” That identifies a trigger point. 
• “The safety area is good in the morning but not after noontime.” That establishes the time tag.
• Defining the threshold of control: CPS forecasts identify the “when and where” potential for fires to go beyond the threshold of control and when and where the fire will drop within the threshold of control. Forecasting for this specific allows all the behavior beyond the thresholds to be largely avoided because no suppression action will work and no one should attempt the impossible when extreme danger is predicted to exist.

During my time using CPS, I never had my prediction leave anyone in a tight spot nor did they result in causing endangerment. On the contrary, there are many occasions that are cited in our class of situations on the fires of 1987 and 1988, the Dillon fire, the Pony Peak fires of 1994, the Marre Fire, Green Meadow fires of 1993 and as recently the 2003 Piru fire. CPS prediction methods aided in determining the tactics and avoided potentially serious accidents.

Students in CPS classes offer many insights into their successes and so an exchange of learning happens.
There are many firefighters that have enviable track records. These people know wildland fire. I did not invent these things but learned them from some of the best. I simply tried to utilize the body of expert knowledge and to do something with it that could lead to better mitigation measures than were offered me by the management. Until I learned what my mentors knew I was at risk and so were those who were with me. I was lucky to survive until I learned enough to finish up my days without becoming a victim myself.

Other factors that are taught and considered in making predictions using CPS are in part: 

• The stability of the weather, fire danger, condition over the duration of the prediction period, such as frontal passages, diurnal wind changes and the weather that the fire produces. 
• The dominant force causing fire behavior changes. Is it wind, slope, or preheating? 
• When and where will the dominant force become sub-dominate and what force will replace it as the stronger force?
•  What type of fire is it? Wind driven, topography, fuels, or fire on fire? 
• Will the fire change from one type to another type in the forecast period? 
• Do the tactics match the fire behavior potential and type of fire?

I sure hope that I have answered your questions. This response is so long that maybe you should just give me a grade and tell the folks if I passed or not. This paper is not a good substitute for a class in CPS.

Thanks again Mellie
Best regards to all wildland firefighters.
Doug Campbell

"P. S. A final, personal note: a worker at KSC (Kennedy Space Center) told me that they haven't heard any NASA managers admit to being at fault for the loss of Columbia. I cannot speak for others but let me set my record straight: I am at fault. If you need a scapegoat, start with me. I had the opportunity and the information and I failed to make use of it. I don't know what an inquest or a court of law would say, but I stand condemned in the court of my own conscience to be guilty of not preventing the Columbia disaster. We could discuss the particulars: inattention, incompetence, distraction, lack of conviction, lack of understanding, a lack of backbone, laziness. The bottom line is that I failed to understand what I was being told; I failed to stand up and be counted. Therefore look no further; I am guilty of allowing Columbia to crash.

"As you consider continuing in this program, or any other high risk program, weigh the cost. You, too, could be convicted in the court of your conscience if you are ever party to cutting corners, believing something life and death is not your responsibility, or simply not paying attention. The penalty is heavy, you can never completely repay it.

"Do good work. Pay attention. Question everything. Be thorough. Don't end up with regrets."

This much I know. We can't separate 'who' from 'what' went wrong.
vfd cap'n

• One was a commendation for the DIVS on one of the far northeastern CA fires in 2002 who pulled people off the fire because he felt the fire behavior and situation had moved beyond his level of experience.
• The other case was also in 2002, I think (in Montana or Idaho or one of those inland western states) when the fire manager on the road was out of communication range, got back in range, heard the situation and immediately pulled people off the fire that then blew up.

Is there a way that such reports could be written up more routinely than is done today and kept on file for others to learn from? Maybe the Lessons Learned Center could be a repository of such reports - A case of learning from what went right rather than only from what went wrong.

On a slightly different aspect of risk and analysis...

Doug Campbell,

You have done a lot of "Finding a Solution" for the different historical fires that have killed people.
Not to be in your face, but I could argue that what you're doing is a little like monday-morning-quarterbacking. In building predictive models in science, the first step is to use data to create the best model to fit the what is observed. The second step is that the model is validated or used a priori (ahead of time) to actually predict the outcome. As I understand it, your first choice for making a prediction for fire behavior is to find another place that has burned that is similar to the new location where you want to predict the fire behavior. This becomes the "Fire Signature" for the new location. If no such example is available, you say you have to guess (use intuition, experience, I don't remember your exact words). That's where slope, aspect, time of day (solar pre-drying conditions that you used to call pre-heat), alignment of forces, time-tagging, etc come in.

Can you describe when you have used the Fire Signature Prediction Method to make decisions that resulted in actions that succeeded or failed. Have you ever actually used it in that way? What was success? Did your prediction ever fail? In science the failures go in the bottom desk drawer and rarely see the light of day. We call it the "Bottom Drawer Phenomenon". Do you have any failed predictions in your bottom drawer?

The success of a model of a complex event is that it provides some order for looking at the multiple predictive variables and that the model better predicts the outcome than the unweighted variables. Good models simplify. Similarly our brains want a way to simplify complex events -- put them in categories that help us survive and function better. (This is why Bayesian probabilities/ analysis has gained popularity in statistics. They're about conditional probability, for example, what is the probability of this outcome occurring given that this other event preceded it? Preceding events are our experiences, knowledge structures, assumptions. Still gotta read that NY Times article...)

The benefit I see in your model, is that it is a way to begin to logically organize and account for complex variables, looking first at what experienced firefighters consider the most important... but keeping in mind the other variables that might be important at some time. So Doug, what other fire behavior factors might need to be considered beyond those most important variables in your model - slope, aspect, time of day? ...Like a cold front coming through, wind-driven fire behavior. What else? How do you account for them?

Mellie

Here is a link to a NASA site, NASA Microgravity Combustion Science, that directs readers to the Pope et al. Lung, Cardiopulmonary Mortality, and Long term exposure to fine particulate air pollution article. http://microgravity.grc.nasa.gov/combustion/web/jama_soot.htm

Readers, I still urge you to contact your congress people regarding Senate Bill 459 Hometown Heroes Survivors Benefit Act of 2003 that doesn't go far enough in providing benefits to firefighters suffering from fire-related illness. If you scroll down to my poston 1/22 you'll see the mock up letter you could send to legislators.

Thanks,
Richard

And from a few days to a week ago, I didn't see these links posted:

Great promise in innovations for firefighting
(except for the 747 flying the fire)

Calif. fire agency director says 'cosmetic' air drops made during San Diego wildfire

SoCal CDF

Those did come up on the Fire News page. Ab.

"Tuttle also said that it was very difficult for the forestry and fire department to work in San Diego County because there was no unified county fire department, and that fire protection was provided by dozens of fire districts."

JPL Weather Expert Predicts More Drought in
Western States 01/23/2004 18:42:20

(Los Angeles, CA) -- The weather experts at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory in Pasadena say another drought may be in the works for the West. The JPL's Bill Patzert said, "We're dry as a bone here in the West." He said looking into the next decade, "We see a large scale shift in the Pacific that has really dried out the South West and we're probably in for, on average, another decade of drought." Patzert urged residents to conserve water now to help stave off future shortages.

The west's fuels will surely continue to undergo massive die-off from drought and related problems like bark battle infestation with this bad news. Massive die back is readily apparent to me from my travels in the pine and chaparral forests of Southern California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Southern Utah. Firefighters who encountered the mega-fires of Southern California this last fall will no longer refer to them as the worst in history, rather they may become the norm! This problem has similar implications for the entire Southwest. This also means the rookies you are hiring today will have a career like no other as they endure the fire behavior that climate change will bring. Lots of implications here from fire behavior, training, and preparedness perspectives. Just think, no fuel model even exists that adequately predicts fire behavior in the 100% dead standing mixed fuels like we are seeing. >From experience, we also know this ratchets up the interface fire problem incredibly. Hang on to your hard hats ladies and gentlemen, the interesting days still lie ahead!

Contract County Guy

Thanks to Doug Campbell for posting the solution. I have tried to explain his method to friends who have not taken his class. the ppt speaks a thousand words. Doug, you don't know how many people I have told to read your post to see what I was talking about. Do you mind if we copy the solution and pass it on? I know it costs you money and understand if you say no.

Re the S190, 290, etc. There is good info in them like Dave and Nerd and others say. But I have found them inadequate on tactics, especially after Doug's class. (I had it from Will Spirson (sp?) who works for the Forest Service and teaches most of the classes I think) Will didn't bash the S-290/290/390 classes and I'm not either, exactly. I do think with declining experience in our leaders we need different tools about fire behavior to be more responsible for our own selves. I don't think that threatens chain of command.

After learning Doug's Fire Signature Prediction method (I call it CPS) I felt like my head was rearranged. I had a framework to look at fire, consider if I would be safe and for how long if I kept doing my task.

I'm not bashing FBANs either. They have an important job. But they are usually not on the ground pounding dirt, clearing line.

Todd

There is always talk in CDF about some overhead (some foresters and director's) lack of fire experience and that this needs to change. Organizational structure change, sure, many of us press for it. We feel it unfair that CDF is the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection. The Forestry rankles. We would rather be the California Department of Fire Protection, as we consider ourselves California's Fire Department and Professional. We have many similar problems as you feds do and we grouse about it just as much, maybe more, but we don't have a theysaid forum that is this active and productive on our political issues. Unlike you feds, we have a union that has helped us become more professional and appear more professional to the public.

I think if you fed firefighters had your own OPM fire series it would help with perceptions of professionalism, both as you view yourselves and as the public views you. Just my opinion.

SoCal CDF

• Many States have presumptive heart/lung, cancer and infectious disease laws on the books. It is only fair that the federal government also acknowledge the occupational hazards attributed to fire fighting.
• Current law requires a federal employee to specify the exact employment incident which causes a disease in order to qualify for disability benefits. Under this law, it is nearly impossible for federal fire fighters, suffering from occupational diseases, to receive fair and just compensation and or retirement benefits.
• It is only fair that the federal government should provide parity for federal fire fighters who are exposed to the same occupational hazards as other professional fire fighters.

I need your support to include Federal Firefighters that have strokes, cardio-vascular disease, certain cancers and infectious diseases are presumed to be job related for purposes of workers compensation and disability retirement unless the fire fighter’s employer can prove otherwise.

Sincerely,
<your name>
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

For information on the effects of stroke, please visit www.aphasia.org/.

9:43 – Allen and Heath arrived at H-2 to do what an unidentified person had been “…estimating that it would take one hour to clear the helispot”

between 10:30 and 11:00 - “…maybe 45 minutes to 1 hour to complete the job.”

between 12:30 and 13:00 - “Allen said that things were going fine and they would be another 30-45 minutes.”

shortly after 13:26 - “…maybe another 15 or 20 minutes and they would be done.”

between 14:43 and 14:47 - “…they needed another 40-45 minutes.”

15:05 - “Allen notified helibase they were ready to be picked up from H-2.”

15:24 – “Allen, calling in an excited voice and breathing heavily, asked, ‘Could I get a helicopter up right now?’ ”

Mollysboy has a point about how the investigation pendulum has swung between the South Canyon and now.

vfd cap'n

To a helitack, the relying on the aircraft may be psychologically akin to the chainsaw that doesn't get dropped.
At Storm King apparently Rob Browning and Rich Tyler were heading back to their original helicopter drop zone when the fire overran them. I doubt that they spent much time discussing it. My guess is that it's what their bodies did almost automatically.

Brings me to another related question.
How do you train people to step out of their automatic responses when those highly practiced responses become life threatening? How do you train for the rare and unknown life threatening event? That's a hard one. As everyone knows, personal experience and a larger view/ repertoire of responses can help you or your supervisor identify that the event is coming and may provide some help in determining appropriate behavior. You can get some of this via training, slides, ppt presentations, talking with others, participating in a staff ride at a burnover or fatality site. You can individually practice some life-saving behaviors in timed and simulated exercises. Your crew can practice together. Maybe computer training is in the offing. Anything else?

You can rely on your overhead and your FBAN and on your own knowledge of fire behavior. What if you're relying on somewhat inexperienced overhead? Hmmm, and who is the FBAN on IA? The Firefighter? (Those of you Supts and DIVS and Branch and OPS and FBAN people who know me, know that I am not slamming you or supervisors in general. I admire you all greatly. However, many of our experienced people have retired, are retiring, or will retire soon.)

Or maybe you're only two somewhat inexperienced guys who are focused on clearing a LZ -- while maintaining LookOut, Communications, reviewing your EscapeRoute and keeping your SafetyZone in mind and reevaluating the 10 and 18, etc, given changing fire behavior?

I have been admonished on this forum by Old Fire Guy, Pulaski, FireWolf, Original Ab and others that when the fire changes its behavior, firefighting tactics must change so that fire can continue to be fought safely. How does a wildland firefighter recognize when the fire is going to change behavior? I sure didn't learn much about that in S-190 which was a pretty academic class. Is S-290 or the higher classes any more situationally oriented? (What are nomograms anyway?)

In my experience, a person can maintain all the "situational awareness" in the world, but if they don't have a knowledge of the risk (in this case fire behavior and how it might change), will that do them any good?

Mellie

"Some of the folks that have posted regarding "Cramer" seem to me to be using it as a vehicle to forward their own agenda: specifically, it would not have happened if we had a wildland fire series of full time professionals in the Federal services. I strongly disagree!"

..."The players involved in the "Cramer" fatalities were experienced and knowledgeable in Fire management; many were full time in fire management, and others had significant part-time experiences and responsibilities in fire."

..."Does a full-time fire organization guarantee a fire-safe operation?"

Your Statement #1: The "direct" players in the Cramer fatalities were experienced and knowledgeable in fire management. The investigation says that "everyone" was qualified under current standards. What were the "qualifications, experience, and education" of the line officers who were providing program oversight? If you know the background, you will understand wildland firefighter concerns about program oversight...... Line officer experience and oversight WILL come into play.

Statement #2: Does a full time fire organization guarantee a fire safe operation?

No it doesn't, but i