We'll think about weather. Ab.

Lobotomy, I agree.

Mellie

Still Out There as an AD

Thanks for the reminder. Our tribute to Paul. Ab.

For example, the Phase III report identifies discrepancies in typical management characterizations of the 10/18. For example, using the Storm King Mountain investigation document (USFS, 1994), the Phase III report shows how management tends to characterize the 10/18 as “situational awareness and risk assessment” tools (Tri-Data, 1998, pp. 4-17), yet actually invokes them in practice “as a yardstick against which performance is measured when tragedy strikes” (pp. 4-18). The report further supports this claim by quoting a statement issued by the secretaries of Agriculture and Interior in the wake of Storm King Mountain fire, who had commanded, “the Ten Standard Fire Orders are firm. We don’t break them; we don’t bend them” (pp. 4-18). Thus, the Phase III report showed how management tends to describe the 10/18 as though they were guidelines, but tends to enforce them as though they were orders. To challenge this yardstick approach, the report noted that at any given moment, firefighters are expected to remember and apply up to 156 pieces of information, yet compares this to “Miller’s Law,” which says that “the human mind can comprehend just seven (plus or minus two) concepts when engaged in a task” (USFS, 1999, pp. 4-18). The discussion (Tri-Data, 1998) concluded that

It is unlikely that the Ten Standard Fire Orders, 18 Watchouts, and
other tactical references provide effective guidance to firefighters,
since their overwhelming number precludes their use as concise,
memorable and sequential guides. (pp. 4-18)

I couldn't get the link to take you directly to the pdf document, but if you click on the link below and then click on "Automatic Download" on the left side, it will download the pdf document. Here's the link:

http://mcq.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/17/3/319 (Ab note: clicking on this automatically downloaded a pdf file for me.)

On a related subject, it is really sad to see that our Forest Service senior managers (I refuse to call them leaders until they start acting like leaders) are willing to settle for large budget reductions, and to not hire ANY temporary seasonal firefighters in some regions, without raising a red flag. Maybe they are following the same strategy as some of the MANAGERS in R6 who got fat cash awards for replacing Forest Service initial attack resources with contract resources. I wonder how much it pays to sell your soul to the present government-hating administration, enough to buy a new boat or big screen HDTV? What a deal.

This is another favorite quote of mine:

"Training is expensive. Good training is more expensive. No training is most expensive".

Training, and being personally "burned" on too many occasions by poor performance of contract resources, is why I am so adamantly opposed to turning much of the wildland firefighting arena over to contractors. I don't dislike contract firefighters per se, I just don't think that a hodge-podge of companies that are based on making a profit will ever be able to develop the kind of safety culture and dedication to training that our occupation so desperately needs.

To make wildland firefighting safer, we need MANY more PFT fire positions, we need to invest heavily in simulator-type training facilities, and we need to train, train, train throughout the year using Recognition Primed Decisionmaking principles when not fighting fires. This will take a good deal of money, and leaders with the courage to tell Congress that this is what it will really take to make wildland firefighting safer. And we need them to tell Congress that one or two slow fire seasons is no reason to gut our budgets if long-term firefighter safety and organizational viability is the real goal.

I once heard Alice Forbes, who I happen to admire and respect, address a meeting of fire managers with the admonishment "if you're not serving the people who do the work on the ground, then you're not doing your jobs".

In old times in Japan, when Samurais were forced to choose between betraying their people or being considered honorable, they would slit their abdomens and literally spill their guts onto the ground. I would be willing to settle for a senior LEADER who would be willing to figuratively spill their guts to Congress and the press, and tell them why we are setting ourselves up for many more unnecessary deaths of firefighters because of the present shortsighted approach to wildland fire management. The LEADER who does this will long be remembered by Forest Service rank-and-file firefighters as a HERO (or HEROINE), unlike the many other nameless egg-suckers who will soon be forgotten.

This administration expects our fire organization to perform like a Ferrari, but they want to run it on Model T wood spoke wheels with bald tires and dozens of patches on the inner tubes. And to top it off, they only want to put gas in the gas tank when they need to go somewhere, and then only enough gas to get to the next destination. What we really need today is for our Ferrari to be outfitted with some nice alloy wheels, some fat Michelin racing tires, and a gas tank that never goes empty.

Kevin J, Great post.
Casey Judd, Good on ya, keep fighting the good fight.
Oliver, You old gummer, you are one bad honcho. I'm like a rat, if I don't keep chewing, my teef will grow through my brain.
Mellie, I haven't read Deep Survival yet but I am going to Barnes and Noble today, thanks for the recommendation.

Misery Whip

Ab Reminder... if you buy books thru Amazon (button on our books page), it helps pay our bills. Of course I understand if you have to have it right now.

Order from Amazon: Deep Survival by Laurence Gonzales

I've gotten word that Laurence will speak at the R5 Chief Officer's meeting next week.

MU

"Survivors seem to be able to use hot cognitions (emotion) to inform reason and reason to moderate emotion so as to adapt more quickly to new environmental circumstances, optimizing their potential for survival."

What does this mean? In my mind the message is clear...train, drill, train, drill and then train and drill some more...

I was in no way insinuating that the anyone at the higher levels in the Forest Service would knowingly shift blame. I was merely attempting to point out that in MY view, it will take more than an individual telling me that all will be ok. Actions, one might use the Cramer Incident as an example, speak louder than words.....

You are correct...Sundays should be taken off!

yactaK

Thanks to Ab for the opportunity to share this vital information.
Good dialog.
Doug C.

Deep Survival -- of the life-threatening hazards of bureaucracies -- now there's a concept. Who lives, who dies and why? I would say that places such as theysaid can illuminate the problems and perhaps suggest - no, demand - changes in policy. This is particularly true in a democratic government such as ours that has more than one way to affect change -- via three different branches. Ab.

yactac,
Clarification: I am certain those at higher levels are not saying "let's blame so-and-so" when something goes wrong. What Deep Survival reinforces is the limitations of our perceptual systems in our various environments. The higher level fire leaders are simply focused at their level of perception and understanding as are OIG, Congress, etc.

Lobotomy, Casey, OFG...
Similarly, human perspective plays into the current political struggles. Please keep in mind that our fire leaders in Boise and Washington are caught between a rock and a hard place regarding budget -- with a boss demanding one thing and reason (from my perspective, not hiring seasonals in some regions??!!is NOT reasonable) demanding another. Just think how decisions in all of that must be complicated when you also have a hispanic settlement cop breathing down your neck just waiting for you not to call back those seasonal hispanic employees. I feel for our leaders. I hope they will remember the bigger picture and be courageous in standing up to their boss demanding that we once again do more with less and compromise safety.

I guess I feel more like we're all in this together trying to keep firefighter SAFETY foremost in our minds, rather than at war and losing a larger focus.

I would ask all of you to take a moment to reflect today and ask yourselves "WHAT IS RIGHT?" and "WHAT CAN I DO?" connected with every issue you can think that's important to you in fire. I know some of you will say "Yes but....." ... this is all we can expect, it's the way it's always been, in keeping with my belief we can "make do", is only one slice of the Swiss cheese, there's only so much money, it doesn't matter to me because I'm not retired yet (or am just a GS3, or am just a contractor, an AD, or am working in the WO and don't have that option, blah blah blah excuses).

I challenge YOU at all levels of our organizations to become an agent of change.
ACT - make firefighting safer. We live in times of BIG change. Participate!

It's Sunday. Having thrown that out there, I'm going to choose to have a day of rest today.

Perhaps I'll see some of you this coming week.

Mellie

I've added Joe Millar to the list of other notables on the Awards page. My congrats to Joe also. Ab.

As I and my other children remember Matt, we will hold a special place in our hearts for the folks who worked on fire with him. What a brotherhood. 

Thank you, be safe, and God bless you and your families.

Nancy Larson

You're family. Ab.

One slight mental tangent into stress-producing implications the criminal outfall from Cramer has wrought- one paragraph mid-book that jumped out at me is a description Gonzales uses that comes from Paul Fussell:

Paul Fussell, in his book Wartime, describes the stages of enlightenment that beset a soldier as he progresses from green recruit to combat veteran. First he thinks. ' It can't happen to me.' Then he sees action and it becomes, ' It can happen to me, and I'd better be more careful.' And finally he sees enough of his fellows die to realize, 'It is going to happen to me, and only my not being there is going to prevent it.'

I have been trying to explain to friends why ICs are having such a hard time post-Cramer. It boils down to the paragraph above in the context of the human factors Gonzales describes in his book - and the fact that OIG/DOJ and others in their rule-bound, black&white system don't get it. Not only does sh*t happen in firefighters' emotional/cognitive survival-based human system, sh*t happens with fire (a force of nature), and sh*t happens with the "make do" organizational/agency system. As Gonzales elaborates, all kinds of sh*t are inevitable in the human and natural environment interface - the wildland firefighting environment we work in.

Read this book, and consider what you don't yet know about how human beings function and how you can potentially think like a survivor. Some cognitive processes occur within our awareness. However many hot and cold cognitive processes occur outside of conscious awareness and control. Under stress, the human organism clicks into self-preservation mode. Recognition Primed Decision Making may often be more about the emotional charge on those slides in your slidebox than about reason. The first set of neural paths via the amygdala (hot-cognition, emotional, hair on the back of the neck) are a split-second faster than the second set of neural paths that go to reasoning centers in the brain (cold-cognition). Survivors seem to be able to use hot cognitions (emotion) to inform reason and reason to moderate emotion so as to adapt more quickly to new environmental circumstances, optimizing their potential for survival.

Misery Whip, have you read this book yet? Nerd, you'd love this! Thanks for suggesting it Yactac and Doug C.

Mellie

PS. I'm told that a FS legal beagle will be at the Chief Officers' Meeting in Reno next week to explain why ICT3s do not need to be so fearful of agency abandonment. I would hope that those legal dudes would read this book too and then see if they can offer the same reassurances. Although this book is not all about firefighting, it provides amazing insight into cognitive processes wildland firefighters demonstrate under stress.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Region 6, VHF P25 Field Test

Overview

Region 6 was planning a large investment in P25 equipment, but had no  first-hand experience with the equipment or its operation. We had heard many, often conflicting, stories of coverage and audio differences, and had a strong desire to see for ourselves what the differences were in the field. This was discussed with Douglas Bigrigg of Daniels at the USDA/DOI meeting in Las Vegas, and he offered his assistance in providing a repeater for the purpose of conducting a field test.

Test Participants

Mike Schone, Region 6 Radio Systems Manager
Mike Andler, Region 6, Customer Service Area 5, Telecommunications Manager
Howard Banks, Electronics Technician, Wenatchee , WA
Dan Long, Electronics Technician (STEP), Wenatchee WA
Douglas Jacobs, Electronics Technician (SCEP), Colville, WA
Dave Riddle, Electronics Technician, Wenatchee WA (His first day on the job)

Support Acknowledgements
Jim Shelton, Region 6 Telecommunications Program Manager who suggested the test to Daniels and supported its completion.
Kim Torp-Pederson, Alster Communications who provided the DPH radios
Douglas Bigrigg, Daniels Electronics, who made it possible for Daniels to participate
Ken Parks, Daniels Electronics, who facilitated the delivery of the test repeater and provided lots of technical information on P25.
Customer service personnel at both Daniels and Relm who assisted in programming and setting up the equipment.

Disclaimer

This document does not attempt to portray the results of an exhaustive  scientific test. It simply documents a series of tests, made in the field, where the results were simply recorded on either a subjective signal quality scale of 1 to 5 or as a series of numbers heard or missed during a test count. The results we observed may not be repeatable, and at best, only apply to that specific location, time and situation.

Location

One of the goals of this test, was to compare the coverage difference  between an analog system and a P25 system under the conditions of both weak (fringe) signal conditions and conditions of multi-path. The specific location chosen to perform the test was in the vicinity of the town of Leavenworth, Washington. Leavenworth is a Bavarian style town, popular with tourists that sits in the Cascade mountains about 15 miles west of the town of Wenatchee. The Leavenworth Ranger District of the Wenatchee National Forest is located there.

Near Leavenworth, are two long, narrow, windy and rocky canyons: one is called the Icicle Canyon as the Icicle River runs through it; and one is known as the Tumwater Canyon which the Wenatchee River runs through. Both of these canyons have historically presented a challenge to providing two-way communications as a result of their length, topography and geology. They are characterized by both weak signal and multi-path conditions.

Test Procedures:

The team met at the Forest Service Radio Shop located in East Wenatchee on Monday, July 14 and planned the field exercises. The field tests were conducted the next day, Tuesday, July 15, 2003.

For the purpose of these tests, two Daniels repeaters were installed at an FS repeater site just North and West of Wenatchee, called Burch Mountain. One of the repeaters was a Daniels Analog and one was a Daniels P25. Both were equipped with 30 watt Power Amplifiers and each had an FS provided duplexer. A 1.3 Ghz rated antenna switch was utilized to manually switch each repeater onto the same antenna for the various tests.

Two BK DPH portable radios were utilized as the field units. Each had one analog and one digital channel programmed.

There were three separate and distinct test procedures utilized during this exercise. On each of the tests, there was a fixed ‘control’ station that was located close to the repeater and a mobile station that roamed around the country side. Each station recorded the results of each of the tests. Each test was assigned a serial number and the serial number was passed as part of the test message to ensure that test results were recorded in sync.

Single Point Test

For the single point test, the roaming DPH portable would be placed in a  single location and a test count transmitted in both analog and digital mode and the results recorded at the control station. The test would then be repeated with the control station making a test count in both modes and the roaming station recording the results. The results from this test were essentially identical for analog and digital.

Walking Circle Test

In the walking circle test, the roaming portable would be held and a test count would be transmitted while the user walked in a circle. The control station would record the overall signal quality and any numbers missed in the test count. The test was then repeated in the opposite direction, with the field unit in receive mode. The results of this test showed an advantage to analog in the ability to communicate further from the repeater.

Driving Test

In the driving test, a section of road was driven while a test count was transmitted in analog mode. The control station recorded the overall signal quality and any numbers in the test count that were missed. Then, the vehicle returned to the start and drove the same stretch of road, at the same speed and transmitted the same test count in digital mode. Again, the control station recorded the overall signal quality and any missed test count numbers. The results of this test showed a significant advantage for the analog signal.

Results Discussion

The results that were observed during these tests were both expected and  surprising. The single point and walking circle test pretty much produced the results we expected, based on comments heard from users familiar with this equipment. The driving test produced a big surprise. The following briefly summarizes the results:
· P25 really works
· The audio quality of the digital signal (when working), was ALWAYS better than the analog.
· Analog coverage always extended beyond the digital coverage area.
· The difference in coverage area between Analog and Digital was quite small, except:.
· In the case of the driving test, the coverage difference was significant.

In general, the audio quality was always better with the digital signal then the analog signal. It also was much louder. I’ve heard other digital signals at trade shows that didn’t sound as good. This just plain sounded good. As expected, there was no noise, even under weak signal conditions. However, if one party was transmitting, but not talking, background sounds had a definite DSP quality to them, kind of like the phased music that was popular years ago.

We could create a situation where the digital signal would be in that zone  where it was between working and not working and you would hear lots of noise and cutting in and out. But to make that occur required a lot of effort in locating the exact spot and holding the radio in just the right position. It didn’t seem like it would actually happen very often.

The area of coverage where Analog continued to work and was copyable, but with lots of noise, and digital ceased to work definitely existed, but was quite narrow. The coverage difference is estimated to be approximately 5% of the total coverage area, measured radially from the repeater.

The big surprise was in the driving test. During this test, the Analog signal was quite noisy and exhibited classical VHF picket fencing, however all of the numbers during the test count were copyable. Performing the same test in Digital mode resulted in a 50% LOSS in test numbers! This is one area that needs some further testing to document the behavior differences.

Other Observations:

Delay Time

For some reason, which we did not investigate and identify, one of the DPH radios required the operator to delay his speech (up to 2 seconds) before talking or syllables or even words would be lost. The other DPH exhibited no delay at all.

CW

1. What makes a competent ST/TFL?
2. What advice would you give a newly trained ST/TFL?

I realize there are big issues happening right now, if you all could take a minute
and respond, I know the students would appreciate you looking out for them.

Thanks,
sting

Folks, please provide some input here. Ab.

I wanted to submit this wage comparison fact sheet regarding HR 408, The Federal Wildland Firefighters Emergency Response Compensation Act of 2005.

In the document, you will find some completed comparisons and a rebuttal to recent agency statements that folks above GS-7 would "lose money".

In a recent discussions, there seems to be some concern with the agencies.... specifically GS-9 Hotshot Supt.'s. The Agency argument that I keep hearing is that GS-9 Supt.'s will "max out" after 8 14-day fire assignments. THE AGENCY SHOULD BE MORE CONCERNED ABOUT WHY THEY ARE HAVING THEIR HOTSHOT CREWS WORK 112 DAYS ON FIRES IN A 120-130 FIRE SEASON..... I hope they open up their eyes and begin to focus on SAFETY.... They should also ask some of the Superintendents if they are concerned with hitting the GS15/10 "max out" or would they just be happy with a better pay system that didn't force them to take 8 14-day fire assignments but still have a competitive pay structure. If there isn't a culture shift towards safety, then the Agency should be willing to pay for the sacrifices ALL of the wildland firefighters and their families make.

A culture shift towards proper pay, benefits, working conditions, and accountability at all levels is how you start the grassroots stage on making things safer for the wildland firefighting community.

Lobotomy

R1 State Guy

You need to take a giant step back in history to when you were a sophomore in high school and took "Civics 101": it's all about the division of power in the US Government!

The USFS and all the Interior Agencies work for the President/Administration. The Congress is another branch of the Government. People who work for the Prez pitch the Party Line to Congress, or get fired. They are not allowed by law to lobby Congress.

However, when the folks from the USFS go and testify to Congress and pitch the Party line, they are also legally required to honestly answer questions asked of them. So, why has your Congressman (and mine) failed to ask the right questions? Maybe because you and I haven't filled them in on the specifics about budget cuts and the upcoming fire season?? Especially about the risks in their home districts and States?

So, what is the next step??

Aberdeen

We were also informed of the Fed staffing shortages (around 50%). No new hires for the summer, we were told. However, we were informed of about 9 heavy air tankers available, along with our SEAT and Helo support. Our local FDs might get some extra work this summer assisting the state and Feds.

Be safe!

AZfirefighter

There are many young firefighters who care. Glad you're one of them. Ab.

Anyone else from other regions want to weigh in with info on this topic? Who is not hiring the usual seasonal firefighters? What kind of reductions in force and equipment are we looking at for your region? BLM? NPS? FWS? BIA? How compromised might we be, worst case scenario? Will we fight fire this summer at all? Ab.

What are the two completely funded functions within the Forest Service?
Cost Pools and 
Fire, but fire is 25 million dollars in the red just in California...

Mellie

There are approximately 3400 permanent fire positions in R5. Of 
these, 2500 are new or have promoted once in the last 2 years, that's 
70% of the permanent employees that are newbie rookies or rookies. 
Over 600 have promoted twice.

Are these proportions similar in other regions?

Please be safe out there.
Mellie

Now I am told we are not going to hire seasonal firefighters this year! I still have huge prescribed fire targets and 1.2 million acres of land to provide fire management on, with a 3 year average of 109 wildfires per year. Are there only a few of us pounding our fist on the desk? This is wrong, where is the outcry? I voiced my strong opinions about effectiveness and safety and I was told to "be creative", Oh yah, that's safe!!!

The problem that FS FAM is experiencing is that there are two conflicting directives being issued by government. On the one hand, the House and the Senate have clearly told FAM to maintain the same level of firefighting resource capability as 2004. On the other hand, the WO Fire group has said something to the effect that you will balance the Wildland Fire Management Fire Preparedness (WFPR) by the end of the year. Both things can't be done.

Tell your boss that your forest or region should follow Congressional directive. It only makes sense.

Young in R1
There are temporary seasonal jobs being advertised in some regions whose leaders have concern for the public, concern for public lands, concern for firefighter safety and the guts to provide leadership. They are following Congress' directive.

My two Bucks

Forestfire

Reading some of the recent postings about S-290 and where it should be on the "required/prerequisite" training list is reminiscent of where the old S-390 needed to fit in. Back then/when "intermediate fire behavior" was usually taught to crew boss types. Then it was given (NWCG?) an "S" designation and held that it was only required for the 300 level classes. So it became required for sector bosses (LFO term for you youngies) and above. So, there was nothing between 190 and 390 for quite awhile, if memory serves. Kind of ironic since there was always bunches more crew bosses out on the line than sector bosses and not near the number of working radios like today.

Many seasoned ffs in that period felt the old intermediate fire behavior course, which addressed key fire behavior information with tactical applications, should have been taught at the crew boss level. It was hoped at that time the old intermediate FB class would be the new S-290. Didn't happen. So new S-390 kept the meat and they added predictive stuff to it. S-290 info was watered way down. Least that's how I recall it. So the first line supervisors still were not getting the level of FB training they really needed. Not sure it they are getting it now either. Crew bosses didn't need the predictive stuff so much.

So it looks like the issue of FB training still lingers out there. Based on the track record of the folks dictating the system requirements, it really won't be addressed formally. Hopefully I'm wrong. Guess the point I'm trying to make is that the more one knows about the dragon the easier it is to make the right decisions. There is nothing but $$$, and most likely time, stopping anyone from exceeding requirements. Talk about a ramble
pin phlare

My condolences go out to you, your crew and Matt's family and other friends. Ab.

There is a gray area between what is viewed as "internal legislative discussion" and political activity. When "internal legislative discussion" is PRESENTED in the official capacity to folks as the position of the Government, then is is almost black and white. Political activity is strictly prohibited as seen below:

§ 734.306 Participation in political activities while on duty, in uniform, in any room or building occupied in the discharge of official duties, or using a Federal vehicle.

(a) An employee may not participate in political activities subject to the provisions of subpart E of this part:

(1) While he or she is on duty;
(2) While he or she is wearing a uniform, badge, insignia, or other similar item that identifies the employing agency or instrumentality or the position of the employee;
(3) While he or she is in any room or building occupied in the discharge of official duties by an individual employed or holding office in the Government of the United States or any agency or instrumentality thereof; or
(4) While using a Government-owned or leased vehicle or while using a privately-owned vehicle in the discharge of official duties

Lobotomy

"Conversely, a lack of rain and snow in the interior Northwest has led to extremely dry conditions that could mean a severe fire season in eastern Washington and Oregon, as well as northern Idaho and western Montana, Rey said. Fires in the Northwest are not expected to begin until late July or August."

And then I read this article contributed by doc brown R6: 
Weekend Brush Fires: A Sign Of Things To Come?

Whoopsie. Mr. Rey might want to recalibrate his forecast a bit. Tillamook Burn, anyone?
This quote from Mr. Rey was fun too. It shows how statistics can be used to prove or disprove nearly anything.

"'Federal agencies filled in with more single-engine air tankers -- crop dusters used to spray fire retardant -- and heavy and medium helicopters. The 99.1 percent success rate at stopping fires while they were still small -- known as initial attack -- exceeded the 98.3 percent success rate in 2003,' Rey said."

Rey told the House Resources forestry subcommittee that the Forest Service again will rely on smaller planes and heavy helicopters to help fight wildfires across the West, after the Forest Service cut back on its use of big air tankers last year for safety reasons.

""We actually achieved a higher rate of success on initial attack with the reconfigured fleet we used last year than we had in previous years,' Rey said."

Hmmm. Was it just me, or was last year, excluding Alaska, a relatively slow year? So I went to the NIFC annual stats at www.nifc.gov/news/2004_statssumm/2004Stats&Summ.html 

According to the NIFC stats, 2004 was well below both the 5 and 10 year averages for numbers of ignitions, numbers of airtankers ordered, and numbers of type 1 & 2 helicopters ordered. So maybe a slow fire season was the real reason we had a whopping .08 percentage success increase in 2004. Isn't math fun?

And how many SEATs and helicopters supporting wildland fire suppression crashed last year? I doubt if the families of the dead pilots would consider 2004 a "success".

Todd,
You win the rubber duck for your response in your 2/17 post. A am gratified that you recognize this problem too. You said: 

"More important though. There is no serious training in tactical on-the-ground fire behavior for newbee or almost newbee F/F. The basics are all a jumble of fire details and a list of rules from memory where you have to know fire behavior but you don't realize that when you're a newbee".

Shari Downhill,
Thanks for posting Bill Miller's interview with Ted Putnam. Someday, I hope, the wildland firefighting community will give Ted the credit he deserves for starting us on the path to real wildland firefighting safety. It is shameful that he was treated so poorly by the USFS, but I guess that is the price that people with "radical" philosophies must sometimes pay to effect cultural change. Ted is one of my heroes.

Kevin Moses,
Wow. What a wonderful tribute to our fallen friends. You definitely "get it".

Lobotomy,
Thanks for the reality check. I'm gonna sign up for Colorado Burgercamp as soon as I can locate my hairnet PPE.

Young & Dumb in R1,
You need a new name, you are obviously too smart for your present moniker. Here's another piece of advice; book learning is important, but the lessons that YOU will use the most when you are an old fire dog are the ones you learn from dragging a driptorch around the woods and suppressing fires. That's where your Recognition Primed Decisionmaking slides come from.

Misery Whip 

S-230 Crew Boss was being taught in at least FS Region in 1975 to meet one of their Safety First mandates for having training classes documented to move up or keep "red card" ratings. The first (I was told so at that time) national S-course was the Crew Boss class and it was nationally published thru BIFC in the spring of 1976. It was modeled after an FS R5 program which probably did not lend itself well to national distribution. It was said to have worked well in R5 with hundreds of people taking the class in a 5 year period to meet Safety First.

Safety First was started in R5 as a result of the 5 burnover fatalities experienced in the fall of 1971. It was led by Regional Forester Doug Leitz and involved most, if not all, the Forest Supervisors in the Region as well as the fire management personnel. The commitment of all levels at the time is what led to its success. All phases of Fire were touched by the program. Many items were eventually accepted as standards nationally and with other agencies, probably pushed by some of their own tragedies in a few cases. Saying "no" was a common occurrence in R5 even before Safety First started and was even more common after it hit the ground.

Safety First hit the ground running along with the impacts of the 1972 Fire Planning that were funded in 1974. There may have been some stuff implemented earlier in the helicopter arena, but I don't recall (an age thing). 1974 was a benchmark as the FS greatly expanded its fire forces (more hotshots, helicopters, engines, fpts) and upgrades for supervisors as well as year-long employment. This program succeeded because it was driven and supported by line officers. Hard to believe, huh? This was a big asset in getting action items institutionalized. Fire was totally immersed in the formulation of the actions that eventually became reality. Safety First set the standard. And in many case, the program took on a life of its own and was credited for things that were not actually part of the program.

Safety First was declared successful by virtue of having met all of its action items in 1987. By RF letter, the program was formally "put to bed". It still lives on today in the hearts and minds of many of the FFs from/in R5. The abysmal record FS R5 had compiled up to that time -- with numerous burnover fatalities (64) going back to 1953 with the Rattlesnake fire through 1971 -- was effectively curtailed. There's been only one FS R5 burnover fatality since 1971. Something must have worked and left its mark. I think the FS recognizes there is still work to be done in other areas that still have tragic impacts in the wildland fire environment.

Some of other Regions/Agencies didn't always like what Safety First wrought when the R5 FFs took it with them to other Regions. But to the firefighters from R5, the policy generated in that program was akin to law.

Now throw in Firescope and the start of the ICS in the fire environment in 1975...
pin phlare

Do you know when S-290 was first taught? Ab.

Isn't it a violation of the Hatch Act for a FS employee to "dis" a piece
of legislation (HR 408) when speaking in an official capacity even if its teaching
us contractors? I was shocked they didnt get it that it was not right...

Flyboy

Folks, doesn't matter if it's for or against, when discussing legislation do it only on your own time. Somebody clue that person in please. Ab.

Just a quick top of the head answer to your Q about the U of Idaho certificate... I think you're talking about the requirements to fulfill the IFPM 401 Series Stds. In the move to a professional firefighting series, the powers that be have come up with having everyone be a biologist plus (opm series 0401) by 10/1/2009. Fed employees currently in positions designated after the Storm King Incident in '94 (14 key positions) now have to get up to speed in the transition to professional fire manager -> biologist + fire. The fed agencies are working with UIdaho to help people find online courses to fulfill their bio degree and fire requirements.

For more info, look here: U of Idaho info on IFPM 401 series requirements
For online courses click the first link on the left under Courses. <downloadable excel spreadsheet file>
For more answers and explanations, go down to Agency Employee FAQ at the bottom left. <downloadable word doc>
or look at the NIFC Frequently Asked IFPM Questions site: www.ifpm.nifc.gov/

Todd

Todd, I think there are certificates that can be earned by those in school now -- in addition to or separate from the IFPM 401 "professional" retro-fit. I don't understand what the "certificates" refer to (TFM?) or whether someone newly hired with a degree in a major like forestry, range, wildlife, resource management would also have to do additional classes (certification) to then become professional "biologists plus". Perhaps MP or someone reading who knows could fill us in.

Since there have been ongoing questions about IFPM online courses, I added a question on IFPM Series 0401 and those links to our FAQ page. Ab.

SAL

I've updated the Jobs page and Series 0462 (Forestry Technician) & Series 0455 (Range Technician) jobs pages and Series 0401 ("professional" Biologist).

Ab.

I just wanted to tell you that I believe what you are doing is very beneficial. I came to my current position with a degree and regardless of what degree you pursue, you know you have the ability to follow something through. When the 401 series hit the street and now the IFPM, several people that I work with basically said that any education beyond taking S courses was a waste of time. I hope that the future is full of employees like yourself, because an education will help make a more professional workforce. My last thought is this. Try to find a forest/district that has good leadership. If you have the right folks above you, you will get the well rounded experiences you need to become a good leader yourself. Fire experience is a huge asset, but lets not forget RX opportunities and the skill of leadership that gets developed through mentoring etc..

IdahoBLMGuy

Interesting that JW2 is only suggesting education as a Forester or something else (biologist anyone???) as an alternative for if something goes wrong with a firefighting career.

I don't mean to sound harsh, but what about
getting an education because wildland firefighting these days requires being able to:

• communicate,
• read and write in English,
• operate a computer,
• think critically,
• think creatively,
• understand fire behavior,
• work with a diverse group of people,
• demonstrate leadership,
• keep yourself in shape physically with healthy habits,
• understand human factors,
• manage people and apparatus in a technically complex high stress
  environment with a huge number of cooperators and resources???

Oh yeah, I remember, firefighters aren't really professionals, they're just grunt labor. Something to do until you get a blown out knee and can get a real professional job for which you had to get educated. Does anyone not get this subtle message? I know a lot of wildland firefighting professionals with a wealth of training and experience in fire but let's... KEEP THEM IN THAT grunt BOX. Let's tell the pups that this is what they have to look forward to...

(Added afterwards: On reading back over this, Sorry, Ab and my apologies to you too JW2, I am probably misinterpreting your post. Clearly what I think you implied hits a hot button for me. In all fairness JW2, I don't think you meant the post the way I read it; I think you probably offering encouragement to someone to get that education, any education so as to keep options open. Even so, the wording of your post hints at a basic belief that many people have that wildland firefighters are not educated professionals (no wildland fire (fighting) degree) and can never be fire professionals, not really.)

Unless you are an expert wildland firefighter, it's hard to envision and create the steps from novice to professional -- hard to put together what should be the optimal college requirements and the consistent set of training and experience standards. How do we consciously build to a professional wildland firefighting force, one for new needs in these new times? What exactly is required? What is the clearest educational/experiential/training path? What would a college education look like that sets the trajectory for creating expert wildland firefighters? What would A Wildland Firefighter Major look like?

I believe that it's important to have a standard for wildland firefighters: education, plus training, plus fire experience. It's no longer ok -  as was done in the early days of the FS - to simply have people show up on a fire or grab them out of bars or off the streets. Formal college education has its place. Today a College degree is like a High School degree used to be 25 years ago: we've experienced "education inflation" simultaneously with the "fire job creep" in expected responsibilities that John Wendt described. But I don't think a major in Forestry or Biology is that desirable as the standard for helping a novice accelerate toward becoming a professional wildland firefighter. (Some group does need to do Doctrinal Review for Fire - go through the exercise if thinking about Mission, Doctrine, Principles, Policy - Diagram of Doctrinal Review. We need to have a clear image of what this is for federal agencies and cooperators so it can inform professional education/training/experience standards.)

Professionalism, human factors and safety:
Well, this is a big one. Belief in your own professionalism is key to striving to become ever more expert, recognizing your professional path, living your priorities, seeking the steps to gain expertise in your field. One major recommendation of the TriDat Study for a safe organization is that those involved in it view themselves as professionals. It helps if others also view you as professional. In my opinion, many of you who write in and read here ARE already wildland firefighting PROFESSIONALS. Many if not most of you know yourselves as professionals and are busy educating those who would assume otherwise. I salute you!

People who extol college education, please, let's be careful how we might limit the upcoming firepups with our own beliefs and limitations. We don't want the message (however subtle) to be: you'll be grunt labor until you blow out a knee and then you'll have to become a professional.

Young and Smart in Region One-
You're already on your educational way. More power to you. Make it your mission to become a professional wildland firefighter (expert). Get your degree in whatever seems reasonable to you now, but maybe throw in a management class and a human factors class (psychology with an emphasis on how people might behave under stress and why) and a business class or two. Often some of these are alternatives under your first two years "general education" requirements.

Plan your summers to optimize your fire behavior, leadership and people experiences. Find a forest that sees LOTS of fire. If you can't get hired on a crew that fights lots of fire because of school restrictions, consider doing an "experiential fire semester", an inter-term away from the hardcore academics. On the fireground pay attention to: slope, aspect, time of day, wind, fuel preheat; crew cohesion, leadership skills of your supt and squaddies; study those who have emotional intelligence and those who do not and check out your own; practice situational awareness perhaps even explore mindfulness meditation (as Ted Putnam would suggest). Pump your leaders for information. Keep your values and priorities straight. Your hotshot supts are equally important resources for what you need to learn as your professors are! Your life may depend on pumping them for their knowledge and wisdom. Go back to school when your field semester is over, but integrate the fire-people-etc experiences you've had.

Avoid the 180 Club if you possibly can - at least long enough to finish your firefighter college requirements. Take it from there.

You are entering a proud profession, one that will demand much. Heads up. Create your best future.

Mellie

CDF considering cuts to air tanker fleet
www.chicoer.com

'CDF in their infinite wisdom has decided that they
are going to cut the air tanker fleet by 15 percent...
air tankers will only be staffed six days a week.'

Forest Service low-flying pilot exercises
www.bend.com

Deschutes National Forest’s Green Ridge on the
Sisters Ranger District might see low-flying airplanes
February 22 to 25.

Florida Fire Danger
www.nbc6.net

Dry weather since hurricanes could cause severe wildfires
Risk could peak in Florida this Spring, experts say

Get that education. What if you're seriously injured at 25 (even a badly blown out knee) or decide at 45 you don't want to haul it up the hill anymore? In fact, add a minor to your degree so you're not one of the thousands of forestry majors out there trying to get on with the Forest Service.

I suspect college folks might run into trouble because of the season-starting and ending dates. Some crews start up as early as February. End dates can be extended if extra severity dollars or other sources of funding come along. I've known plenty of crews with students, but they can't risk being short if their season goes into the academic year.

Glad you're trying to get a fire-booted foot in the door.

JW2

I've seen the statement 'Contractors get paid for sleep time' or some variation of this over the past few months. I guess I must be missing something because, as a contractor, I only get paid for the hours I have equipment/personnel working. Should I be filing for back payments for the past 5 years? Am I eligible for Hazard Pay (NO!)? Do I GET overtime (NO, but I pay it)?

Face it. We all agree the HOME OFFICE gets too much and the people doing the work don't get enough money for the work they do. But PLEASE don't lump contractors anymore than you already do. My head is getting to lumpy (and I gotta beat a new contract out of the Forest).

Steve LCES

My name is Emma, I am 7 and have just finished a school project on
Natural Disasters. I chose Wildland Fires for my topic and found your
website great.

Thanks for teaching me so much - I love the way you are all one big
family.

Keep safe all of you.
From Emma.

Hi Emma. Glad you stopped by, all the way from New Zealand. Come again. Hope you earned an A! Abercrombie.

Welcome. Nothing against gen-x-ers, especially those with fire experience. We're gonna need a lot'ta good new blood before this is said and done. Ab.

www.nifc.gov/reports/state.pdf (small pdf file)

in 1966 on the Angeles we lost 12 on a fed crew (El Cariso HS, Loop Fire);
in 1971 on the Los Padres we lost 4 (was that a FS handcrew? what fire?);
(in 1977 we lost 3, Vandenberg AFB not affected by Safety First Committee).

in 1981 on the Angeles we lost 1, Elizabeth Lake Fire (memorials page: www.wildlandfire.com/docs/memorials.htm)

Check further here for other wlf accidents of all types across the country: www.nifc.gov/reports/index.html

There used to be an older nifc accident list in an antique pdf somewhere.

When did the Safety First Committee begin, exactly, the 30+ years ago?

SAL

Looking for Info

Sure looking forward to the 2005 Fire Season up here in the Pacific Northwest Area again. With our snow pack at 19% of Normal it might be a nasty year for fires!! Lets all be safe fighting fires this season so we can all do it in 2006 again.

Looking forward to meeting you guys on the fires. Look for the GMC Red & White Tender with the Water Cannon and Hose Reel on top!

Region 6 Type III Tender Operator

401 K Program:                Yes
Paid Vacations:               Yes
Free Meals:                   Yes
Comprehensive Training:       Yes
Medical Insurance:            Yes
Dental Insurance:             Yes
Vision Insurance:             Yes
Life Insurance:               Yes
Get to Go Home Every Night:   Yes
Threat of loss of livelihood: No
Threat of loss of Career:     No
Extremely Hazardous?:         No
Promotional Opportunities:    Yes
Store Manager -               just shy of $100,000 per year.
Second Manager -              $50,000 per year.
Third Manager -               $41,000 per year.
Fourth Manager -              $33,000 per year.
Additional Manager Perks: 
1) Defined Contribution Profit Sharing Plan, 
2) Performance based incentive wages, 
3) Tuition reimbursement (2nd Manager and above).

Starting Pay: GS-2 $8.63 per hour, GS-3 $9.41 per hour.
401 K Program:                No
Paid Vacations:               Yes(Annual Leave)
Free Meals:                   No (Except on fire assignments)
Comprehensive Training:       Yes 
Medical Insurance:            No
Dental Insurance:             No
Vision Insurance:             No
Life Insurance:               No (But are eligible for PSOBenefits)
Get to Go Home Every Night:   No
Threat of loss of livelihood: Yes
Threat of loss of Career:     Yes
Extremely Hazardous?:         Yes
Promotional Opportunities: Depends on experience and, NOW, EDUCATION.
See IFPM Standards and OPM Rates of Pay.

We have several snaptanks, pumpkins, and fold-a-tanks. The snaptanks are easy to set up and break down but I would be hard pressed to do so in four minutes. The snaptank takes up less room than a pumpkin or fold-a-tank of equal size. It takes some practice to get all the parts back in the bag. I prefer the pumpkins for their simplicity but they do take up more room on an engine. I hope this helps in your decision...

Stay safe, Arlo

JG

"The Cramer Fire was difficult for all of us in many ways. Each time a new report is issued it focuses our memories. I know we introspectively pause to ponder some fundamental questions about our commitment to our firefighters. This OIG report should be considered carefully. We should each ask ourselves about our leadership role as the 2005 fire season approaches."

"Gross negligence, a lack of due caution and circumspection, and a wanton disregard for human life - these are legal terms whose application to our profession can only be banished by our adherence to reasonable and prudent standards of care -- on every fire, every time -- in every mission we undertake."

"I'm convinced we have the ability and determination to build a new and stronger foundation for the future. Our foundation will be built on
healthier, less volatile forests. Our conduct will reflect a greater understanding of fundamentals. Our results will engender confidence."

"Take care - "

"Tom Harbour"

To me, it sounds like the intended message is; if you do everything perfectly, and if everyone else who is working for you on your fire also performs flawlessly, then you don't have to worry about being charged with "gross negligence, a lack of due caution and circumspection, and a wanton disregard for human life". If that is indeed the case, then I'll quote a line from Charlie Sheen in Platoon as a response; "You just don't f***ing get it".

The sad thing to me about this message is that it reflects a fundamental lack of understanding of human behavior and the relationship of organizations to the causes of accidents. If our top agency managers do not understand that they have perhaps THE MOST IMPORTANT ROLES in preventing future Cramers, then things will probably continue to get worse. No matter how much you wish it weren't so, human beings always have been, and always will be, susceptible to errors in judgment. An error-free wildland fire work environment is not possible to achieve; that is why behavioral scientists refer to the art of reducing catastrophic errors in complex, dangerous occupations as Error Management.

This is what people who really understand human behavior say about Error Management. From Crew Resource Management: A Positive Change for the Fire Service:

www.iafc.org/downloads/CRM%20Manual.pdf

"human behavior patterns suggest that the most well intentioned, best-trained, consistently performing individuals and work groups commit errors. Some of these errors are miniscule in scope and have little or no impact on events. Others are calamitous".

Was Alan Hackett a "best trained, consistently performing individual"? I don't know. But that is a moot point as far as I am concerned. He was working within a system that allowed him to perform as a Type III IC, and if you don't put the focus on that system, you are not going to learn the most important lessons that Cramer has to offer.

I think there is a way to tie together Tom Harbour's note and some of the threads that have been running through They Said recently. Call it a unified theory, or whatever you want, we are all talking about different parts of the same problem. What we are facing in wildland fire management today is similar in many respects to the crisis that the Union Pacific Railroad endured in the mid-nineties.

In Chapter 1 of "Managing the Unexpected: Assuring High Performance in an Age of Complexity", authors Weick and Sutcliffe describe the meltdown of Union Pacific Railroad operations after a merger with the Southern Pacific Railroad. As they describe it, "not long after the formal acquisition on September 11, 1996, the vaunted "expertise" of the UP began to unravel. Unexpected events came in waves. And the responses only made it worse". Because the CEO of UP was a "self-proclaimed operations guy", UP management couldn't understand why things were so messed up, and they blamed it on nearly everything else but themselves. As Managing the Unexpected says; "executives often manage the unexpected by blaming it on someone, usually someone else".

Look at the agency response after Cramer. We took some great new teaching tools (new to us), simulations and sand table exercises, and turned them into pass-fail tests for existing Type III ICs. Some Type III ICs had never even been exposed to this type of training/evaluation tool before, but the agency threw them into the meat grinder with everyone else and expected filet mignon to come out the other end.

Now, don't get me wrong, the military uses STEX as a training and evaluation tool for officers. But they allow them to become familiar with the training medium through dozens of exercises, gradually expose them to more and more complex scenarios, carefully evaluate and discuss performance, and suggest alternative actions/outcomes throughout the process. This is a far cry from what we did to our Type III ICs. Should it be a surprise that many Type III ICs resent how they were singled out and treated after Cramer?

Look at some of the other important issues being discussed on They Said recently. Consolidation of forests and ranger districts, collateral duties for fire management officers, centralization of important functions, mistreatment of temporary employees, reductions in fire workforce, reductions in budgets, reductions in AD wages, new technological gizmos every week, increased civil and criminal liability, increasing reliance on poorly trained contract resources, increased targets for prescribed fire, and on, and on. All of these things reflect a lack of understanding on management's part that they are unintentionally (at least I think they are unintentional) crippling our ability to fight fire safely.

We are entering a decidedly interesting phase in the history of wildland fire management. A Fireline Leadership (L-380) instructor told me that a recent extended attack scenario exercise that takes firefighters in most regions less than an hour to engage took R6 employees over 3 hours to engage the incident, mainly because of all the checklists and post-Thirtymile abatement crap. Is this progress?

Right now, our main problem is that we are in the midst of a slow moving paradigm shift, and we may not really recognize it. Ted Putnam's efforts after South Canyon started the shift, Thirtymile & Cramer muddied up the waters, but we are still transitioning into an organization that has a much better appreciation of human factors than we had ten years ago. And that is also part of the problem; we have a few energetic visionaries like Jim Cook in positions of influence, but many of our upper managers still "don't f***ing get it". That doesn't make them bad people; I don't know Tom Harbour personally, but I have heard many good things about him from people who do know him. Alice Forbes is tops in my book, and I'm pretty sure the Chief is a good person, too. But who is giving them advice on critical decisions that affect firefighters on the ground? Is it the right kind of advice?

Why is it that ten years after the first Human Factors Workshop, we still have not wholeheartedly adopted Crew Resource Management training for everyone from the bottom up? If 70-90% of accidents are based in human behavior, why don't we place as much emphasis on this area as fire behavior? Why don't we use tried and true Recognition Primed Decisionmaking techniques to train our firefighting workforce instead of continuing to insist the "the 10 & 18 are firm, we don't break them, we don't bend them"?

I would respectfully offer to Tom Harbour that, instead of basing our foundation for future success on "healthier, less volatile forests", our foundation for the future should be based on an all-encompassing Dryden Report-style organizational/human factors investigation of the way we do business today, and acceptance that we need to enlist the best minds in the world to help us figure out how to fix our present ORGANIZATIONAL problems. We need people like Karl Weick, Kathleen Sutcliffe, Daniel Maurino, James Reason, and others to help us find our way out of this mess.

Domaque, I enjoyed reading your thoughtful and accurate post, it reflects the way many of us feel today. What is it that we are supposed to know that we don't presently know that we should watch out for? I'd like to know the answer to that question too.

Oliver & BLM Bob, you guys are wussies. At least you had boots. And we didn't even have tools to make our gravel breakfast, we just chewed it right off the boulders.

Misery Whip

The Cramer Fire was difficult for all of us in many ways. Each time a new
report is issued it focuses our memories. I know we introspectively pause
to ponder some fundamental questions about our commitment to our
firefighters. This OIG report should be considered carefully. We should
each ask ourselves about our leadership role as the 2005 fire season
approaches.

Gross negligence, a lack of due caution and circumspection, and a wanton
disregard for human life - these are legal terms whose application to our
profession can only be banished by our adherence to reasonable and prudent
standards of care -- on every fire, every time -- in every mission we
undertake.

I'm convinced we have the ability and determination to build a new and
stronger foundation for the future. Our foundation will be built on
healthier, less volatile forests. Our conduct will reflect a greater
understanding of fundamentals. Our results will engender confidence.

Take care -

Tom Harbour

I asked Ed Hollenshead about Doctrine and here's what I got back:

I've received any number of great questions regarding doctrinal review...
what it is and what it means.

Following is a stab at briefly describing the purpose and process of
doctrinal review....

Doctrine is the body of principles that guides an organization in the
accomplishment of its mission; in our case, fire suppression. The
mission (described in enabling legislation for federal wildland fire
agencies) and the moral ethos of the culture combine to form guiding
principles (moral/ethical a operational), the basic tenets upon which
judgment, decision-making, and behaviors depend. Combined, these
principles form doctrine. Doctrine, then, provides the framework
within which policy, tools and techniques, performance expectations,
and measures of success are derived. It looks something like this...

Diagram of Doctrinal Review with relationships between mission,
principles, doctrine, policy, etc.

 The purpose of our (FS) doctrinal review is to perform a self
examination. We need to ensure what we think are our guiding
principles are indeed our guiding principles within the environment
we now operate. Current national differences in operational
philosophy (demonstrated by the debate surrounding firefighter safety
and mission accomplishment) lead me to believe we do not have a
common, well understood, foundational doctrine... that we have no
collective agreement as to what it is we are about in the fire
suppression mission. This effort is proposed to get us to that
point.

Once we agree to a foundational doctrine we have a uniform measure to
evaluate the appropriateness of a behavior, a plan, an action, an
outcome, a policy, and all other aspects of the fire suppression
mission.

He requests any input.

I'd be really curious to hear what anyone thinks. I agree with him that we need to have a clear image of what we're about. This is an interagency process.

Mellie

Protection
Fully Knowing The Hazards —

September-October of this past year was another difficult time for the Park Service family, particularly rangers and firefighters. Once again, we had to bury two of our own . . . two of our finest. Yet another sobering reminder that our jobs often place us in harm's way.

Ranger Suzi Roberts was killed in the line of duty Sept. 14 by falling rock in Haleakala while she was clearing a previous rockslide's debris from Hana Road. She was 36 years old.

Barely two weeks later, on Oct. 2, Arrowhead Hotshot Daniel Holmes was also killed in the line of duty. During a prescribed burn in Kings Canyon, Danny was struck by a burning treetop as it fell to the ground. His fellow crew members were there by his side when it happened. Some saw it happen. Danny was 26.

Two more of our best and brightest are gone. Gone in their youth, in their prime.

At least in both of these cases there are no accusatory fingers to point. There is no one to blame. Nobody did anything wrong this time. What happened to Suzi and Danny could have happened to any one of us. They died doing the jobs we all do every day. Somewhere in our national parks a rock or a tree falls every day, and there is no preventing that. It just so happened that on these two days, a ranger and a firefighter were standing in the fall line.

Some will surely ask, "How can we prevent this from happening again?" The answer is we cannot — unless we quit going to work, and neither Suzi nor Danny would approve of that. The hard reality is as long as we carry out the rigorous duties that we do amidst the magnificent — but wild — landscapes of national parks, we shall continue to be in harm's way.

Suzi and Danny knew this, and the telling thing is that they went to work anyway. Just as we do every day. They accepted the risks, "fully knowing the hazards of our chosen profession," to paraphrase the U.S. Army Ranger Creed. Just as we do every day.

This is exactly why we should all congratulate every retired law enforcement officer, firefighter and other emergency services worker we meet. We should congratulate them not just for a successful career, but for living through it.

It's quite the wake-up call to realize that living through our careers — and for that matter, our next shift — is not at all a given. If it was, we would not have walls all over our country memorializing those who have fallen in action, especially those with blank space waiting for new names.

But that's precisely what makes what we do for a living such a beautiful and sacred thing —we band together in answering a higher calling that often tempers our bonds amidst difficult circumstances. We don our uniforms every day and radio 10-8 in a line of work that requires us to answer harrowing calls, to face the fiery dragon's breath, to give of ourselves oftentimes "that others may live."

And on many occasions, we place our own welfare in the hands of our brothers and sisters. We enjoy in our line of work a rare and sweet camaraderie that can only be forged through shared adversity. We are a band of brothers and sisters, and the glue that holds our band together is the ever-present knowledge that we have all "been there, done that." We have all responded to some pretty hairy calls, and we know that any given shift could be our last. In short, we can relate to one another the way no one else can.

In a profession historically punctuated with line-of-duty-deaths, we are mindful to never take for granted the time we have with our brothers and sisters. Again, that gold watch and pension are not a given for us. Suzi and Danny remind us of that. Of course we do all we can to work safely — we look up, look down, look all around, but we can never remove the dangers 100 percent. If we did, it wouldn't be rangering. It wouldn't be firefighting.

I'm not saying we should acquiesce, throw caution to the wind and surrender ourselves to the attitude of "if we die today, oh well, then we die today." Of course not. I'm simply saying we cannot send firefighters, law enforcement officers and rescue professionals into their respective arenas and expect that line-of-duty deaths will never happen. Sooner or later, they will. And when they do, we remember our fallen. We pay tribute to them. We honor them.

We most recently sought to honor Suzi and Danny. We graced their caskets with our national colors, we rendered crisp salutes as they passed by one last time, we played sorrowful ballads on the pipes, and we shall engrave their names on our walls.

But we can honor them best by picking up their rifle, by picking up their Pulaski and carrying on where they left off. We go back to work doing the same work that snuffed out their light so tragically early. And we do it because we know they would have done the same for us. They were our sister and our brother.

Suzi and Danny died doing what they loved. They died serving their country. And they died with their boots on.

~ Kevin Moses, Big South Fork

Registration isn't open yet. I believe that in the past acceptance has been on a first come first served basis (it was when I went) so if it is important to you to get a spot in a hard to get class you may want to check everyday at www.mufrti.org  for the catalog and registration to appear for the Summer Fire School and Midwest Wildfire Academy. Good luck.

It's almost fire season in central Missouri. We get mainly grass fires that then spread into the woods (it would be an insult to you western folks for me to call it forests). Anymore the escaped prescribed burns from the quail "farmers" with their CRP fields of warm season grasses have caused a significant increase in our fire calls. Does anybody in other areas of the country have this problem?

Shep

There are lots of fed jobs out there folks, especially in the GS-9 to GS-11 categories. During MEL buildup OPM had many jobs listed across GS ratings but especially at the lower and mid range. Seems to me we're seeing lots more this season at the upper end. Guess I shouldn't be surprised, what with retirements. Soon we'll have a predominantly Generation X fire world.

Ab.

Does anyone know if a Civil Rights Impact Analysis (CRIA) was completed
for the implementation of the IFPM/401 stuff? If so, do you know where I
can get a copy?

Are you wondering about how special salary rate will be affected by changing
from Series 0462 that has the special rate to Series 0401 that doesn't? Lots of
us have been wondering about that. I'd like to see a CRIA too.

Tahoe Terrie

PS thanks for fleshing out the teaching requirements, SRJS.

JG

Excellent questions, excellently written. We'd all like the answers. Respectfully. Ab.

I like what this rep has to say.

Green Gestapo

www.gao.gov/new.items/d05147.pdf

SITL

Lobotomy sent in this link the other day, I believe, but it's worth posting again. I need to read it myself. Ab.

Thanks Chad

Hi Chad, this gives me a chance to point you and others who are looking for wildland firefighting jobs to our newly updated FAQ (Frequently Asked Questions) page. Just yesterday Dick Mangan, who has been DownUnda often, sent in the very answer to your question. Prospects for an "Endless Summer" of firefighting and getting paid for it are slim to none. But read what Dick says. Ab.

http://maps.google.com/maps

Run a test by putting in your home address. Then navigate
to some distant and remote fire site real or imagined. Gives
details and distances.

R3 Dispatcher

I added it to the Links page under geographic. Thanks to Jim at the Supply Cache for sponsoring our links page. Ab.

I too take ibuprophin pre-shift (3), but I am proud to say I also paint over any blister with nu-skin,
put a moleskin on it and wrap it in the white duck tape stuff I order special with little pink redcrosses
on it. Creates a stir in camp too when I disrobe my footsies. Remember, with the ibuprophin in your
system, do not cut yourself while on-shift as you will be a bit prone to extra bleeding.

Three (3) ibuprophin before bed after tipping a few in the off season is also a good idea, or if you think you
can't remember to take them then, take them before drinking. Not acetominophin (tylenol).
Combined with alcohol tylenol fries your liver. Again, if you expect to cut yourself while drinking, it's
better to have a fuzzy head in the morning than take the ibuprophin. Plan ahead!

I really like silk sox and I go for Nicks - boots, that is.

Sally the EMT (pronounced sallie) <laughing>

My question for the folks who feel that blame [of individuals] is deserved, what training program was used to train the people on the Cramer fire to assess what we now all recognize in hindsight?

Remember, at the time Jeff and Shane rappelled, fire behavior was subdued and did not appear to be an imminent threat. So how did the people on Cramer learn how to assess, from an aircraft no less, what a reasonable safety zone was for the given fuel and terrain conditions, and how the fire might behave under drier and windier conditions hours later?

I know what the answer is, I'm just curious if the people who want to affix blame on the Cramer participants know the answer.

All I can think of is that first off there is no serious training in human factors altho leadership courses get at some aspects of it.

More important though. There is no serious training in tactical on-the-ground fire behavior for newbee or almost newbee F/F. The basics are all a jumble of fire details and a list of rules from memory where you have to know fire behavior but you don't realize that when you're a newbee.

There's no common shared fire behavior logic or language outside of Campbell's Prediction Method training for flammability curve, alignment of forces, "tracks", trigger points, etc, etc. Some of his terms have crept into the training mix like hot and cold slope and trigger point, but the complete logic of CPS is missing. What if we all were on the same page and the helo crew could raise the flag if the IC missed it and the helitack could be looking for a logical reassessment at a logical time???

It was good to see the FS Cramer ppt... they got some of it close, why not all of it???... To have vfd capt suggest inserting Campbell's PPT with it, good idea! I don't understand why Campbell's method is not taught to everyone??? How can we expect F/F to assess LCES & 10 &18 if they don't know what the fire is doing or going to do?

The professional military newbee is not so ill prepared coming out of boot camp. Is our training really focused on crew safety?

Todd

Many new firefighters today are from cities and don't understand the differences in drying on north and south aspect. We no longer have BD crews to provide accelerated fire experience on the ground. Ab.

"Silk sock liners do just about everything the new
high tech ones do, and are safer since they are a
natural fiber; i.e., you can be in helicopters with
these."

When I did helicopter work, we always chuckled at
this. While I understand the importance of wearing
natural fiber undergarments, but --

If the helicopter fire burns through the leather boots
you are wearing and is still hot enough to melt your
sock liner, you've got bigger problems.

-AXE

I kid, I kid…

R2 localyokel

SoCal CDF

Silk sock liners do just about everything the new high tech ones do, and are safer since they are a natural fiber; i.e., you can be in helicopters with these. They also weigh next to nothing. Same's true for the long johns if you're ever stuck out on a mountain at night working a spring fire.

Ol'Timer's perspective:

Thanks, Joe Hill, for the old-timer's perspective. You might be able to remember something that's just beyond my memory since I came into the organization right as ICS was taking hold. It seems like under the old large fire organization, Forest Service line-officer positions were tied to fire boss qualifications. In other words, to be a district ranger, you had to be qualified to command x-sized fire and to be a Forest Supervisor, you had to be able to handle y-sized ones. Does anyone out there remember? This is more than a history lesson and relates to an awful lot of what's been discussed in the forum lately.

Still Out There as an AD

About bureaucratic process: "Even if you're on the right track,
you'll get run over if you just sit there." - Will Rogers

Tahoe Terrie

Tahoe Terrie, I'll send it to you - hardcopy - if you give me your addy. What are they gonna do, put me in jail? It's a good review, looking at it from where I stand, and should be shared for lessons learned. If it's not up on some website by Monday, we'll post it. They said weeks ago it would be out, so I was waiting to let them do their job... Ab.

Firefighter Safety: Calling the Mayday Release
Date: February 15, 2005 Emmitsburg, MD -

The United States Fire Administration (USFA) announces the National Fire Academy (NFA), in partnership with Firehouse.com Training Live, will deliver a free Web cast class titled Firefighter Safety: Calling the Mayday. The Web-based training broadcast will be Wednesday, February 23, 2005 from 3 pm to 4:30 pm EST. "This on-line course regarding the call for a Mayday contributes greatly to our nation's efforts to reduce the loss of firefighters' lives," said U. S. Fire Administrator R. David Paulison. "This effort represents our continued commitment to maximize all available training delivery methods for the fire service. With our 2000 students per day average in our distance learning programs of the USFA, this learning tool developed by Firehouse.com continues to expand the reach of all programs designed to support firefighters, and ensure Everyone Goes Home."

Dr. Burton A. Clark, EFO, CFO, and a Training Specialist at the USFA and Chair of the Management Science Program at the NFA, will conduct the on-line course. Dr. Clark has been researching, writing and lecturing throughout the nation on Mayday Doctrine for more than four years.

This course will be of interest to all fire service levels, from firefighter to command officer to others who enter an Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health (IDLH) environment and are faced with calling a Mayday for themselves.

Students who complete the pre-course reading assignment, participate in the on-line delivery, and pass the on-line exam will receive a NFA Certificate. Go to www.firehouse.com/clark to sign up for this free course offering, today.

Upon completion, participants will be able to:
1. Define Mayday
2. Identify the reasons for failure or delay to call Mayday
3. Identify the Mayday decision-making parameters
4. Identify the process for calling a Mayday
5. Identify Mayday training and drill needs/methods for the fire service

FEMA prepares the nation for all hazards and manages federal response and recovery efforts following any national incident. FEMA also initiates mitigation activities, trains first responders, works with state and local emergency managers, and manages the National Flood Insurance Program and the U.S. Fire Administration. FEMA became part of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security on March 1, 2003.

• Course Description
• Objective
• Target Group
• Minimum Instructor Qualifications
• Lead instructor
• Unit instructors
• Course Prerequisites
• Course Level

SRJS

With all the talk about the right Boots to wear and Fire Fighters mostly only using one type because they are so good -- what about SOCKS? We are on our feet all day and when they hurt you're not much good anymore. With all the Hi Tech types of socks out there and so many different styles what kind do you use? Are they Wool, Cotton, Wick Drys, 2 Pairs - one thin nylon and a thick Wool - etc.

What socks do you prefer to use to keep your feet comfortable all day?

New to these Boots!

People who wrote in last week remember it back in the 1980s. Ab.

Tahoe Terrie

Was that training progression a link on our site or to somewhere else, or was it embedded in the page? I don't see it right away on our server as a separate logically named doc. But some days I am not so logical. Got SA? Nope, not this Ab, not today...

FireBill, no named fire professionals in yer woods either? I think we should demand they rename structure firefighters: Highrise 1 and Highrise 2 or CityTech 0462. Ab.

Also, for all of you that asked--

Information regarding the Nuttall Fire entrapment can be found at www.wildfirelessons.net.  It is a good review, and focuses on what was done right instead of blaming everyone else.  The incident within and incident just goes to proove that we cant always account for everything.

Class C Sagebrush Faller

Taking a little break from the Cramer thread.

I couldn't find the 36 page document that on the front page is entitled "Nuttall Complex Fire Shelter Deployment Review, Factual Report and Management Evaluation Report, December 6, 2004 This document contains materials for internal agency use only and may not be released under the Freedom of Information Act without Office of General Counsel review."

Can anyone provide the link for that? Presumably with the threat removed? Wonder if the threatmaker is the same OGC person who applied whiteout to the Cramer Report. Gimme a break! Let's put some'o'them lawyers on the fireline for a day with their mouths taped shut! They can take their whiteout if they want, but they gotta pack it. Ab.

Dave Otto
Bass Lake Ranger District
57003 Road 225
North Fork, CA. 93643.

Any help with donations and prayers would be appreciated.

Thanks,
Carol Henson

Hi Carol, so sorry to hear that. My thoughts and prayers for Jerry and his family.
Mellie researched a clinical trial going on now that has success for brain cancer. I'll put you in touch.
Was Jerry at Cerro Grande? We should be keeping track of these cancers. Ab.

I thought Scott was waiting for his birthday in April. Ab.

WCT Informed Consent
Health Screen Questionnaire
Health Screen Process Clarification

I see this as CYA for litigation. Another step to
prevent paying out for health benefits by the FS. If
you kick the bucket, you accepted the risk by signing
the form with your Doctor's OK.

Just another example of Management treating the FS as
a business instead of Public Service.

Other FS examples, using temps to avoid paying full
time benefits, using contractors that require their
own insurance, limiting FS liability caused by
firefighter decisions (if found to be negligent).

COMT

17 week workout schedule

Thanks.
Ab.

Rush. NorCal 2 DMOB

SK

I hear what you're saying loud and clear.

Mellie

It would seem that the decision would be based on the Complexity of the
unit's (District) program of work.

If the District has a high complexity, high frequency fire, fuels and other
fire related program - then the DR would probably keep the grade.
However the trend in the agency has been that as some older District
Rangers move on to retirement, attrition, etc - usually the Forest
Leadership Team looks at the District's total work program. Often in these
cases - the District's become consolidated, some fire duties become zoned,
and often the replacement for the District Ranger position is either
downgraded, or recognized as an "Assistant" District Ranger. This is
occurring in Region 6 and has occurred in Region 8, With decision -making
on what once were "District level" NEPA projects - decision making now is often
made by the Forest Supervisor. This is fairly common with consolidation of
ranger districts and with decision making authority on projects bumper up
to the Forest Supervisor level.

- anonymous Jon

I thought there were three ways to get a shirt!! Be one, Do one, or ?. I
will let you figure out the other alternatives. Anyway as you know I have
been approached about the possibilities of writing a book. The only problem
is that its hard for me to put my thoughts and stories on paper. I have
stories for many of the shirts, but there are a few that just have some
history. Anyway the collection has grown to 106 and going strong. Right now
I am concentrating on finding some of the older shirts. Like I said before
they tell the best stories. I will keep you informed of the progress.

Rowdy

Updated t-shirt list
Wildland Firefighter Foundation

Our thoughts are with all who serve our country overseas. Ab.

If it was the case, why has it not affected pay of the CA Dist Rangers on the centralized fire forests? Or has it?

Nice job Lobotomy. Nothing speaks louder than facts.
Nice job Misery Whip. And I couldn't find one grammatical error to ding you on! <just kidding, of course>
Backburnfs, hug to you, m'dear! Thanks for keeping the kidlets safe. I really appreciate your service on all counts.
Goat, I honestly think people higher up in the FS ethers, especially those who have never fought fire, don't believe they bear any responsibility when fire tragedy hits. Most of us do the best we can with the best of intentions most of the time. My guess is that those folks are too removed to perceive they are a part of the decision-making process that led to a problem. I don't think it's a lack of integrity, it's the failure to see the link between their decision made (or avoided) years ago or a week ago and today's outcome.

Mellie

CJ

I think some good people at higher levels are working on suggestions. I hope so. Change is possible. This is the time for each of us to do what we can to foster change and to encourage our leaders to demonstrate their leadership. I am optimistic. Ab.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Wildland Firefighting on a Slippery Slope

In May, 1987 along China's Great Black Dragon River that separates China and Siberia and is known in the West as the Amur River, brush cutter Wang started a wildfire as he was refueling his mechanical brush cutter without waiting for a cool-down period. The fire spread out of control, and burned together with other fires in the area that had been seen by satellites, but not reported to forestry officials. It eventually burned more than 3 million acres, and killed 220 people. The Chinese Red Army was brought in to suppress it, but the General in command was unable to control the fire, and consequentially was relieved of command and sentenced to time in jail for his failure.

The investigation of the 1994 South Canyon Fire in the US State of Colorado that killed 14 firefighters found that local fire managers had failed to follow their own rules and policies, but no one was held accountable, and some even received cash awards for their actions during that fire season.

Australia's "Linton Fire" in December 1998 resulted in the death of 5 volunteer firefighters from Victoria's Country Fire Authority (CFA). A "Coronial Inquest" was held to review all the events and facts (the equivalent of a US Grand Jury Investigation), involving over 100 witnesses, more than 17 lawyers, and thousands of pages of testimony. It was the longest running and largest "Coronial" in Australia's history at that time, but no one was charged with mis-conduct or went to jail.

And then, in July 2003 during the Cramer Fire above Idaho's Salmon River, 2 U.S. Forest Service helicopter rappellers were burned over and died on a "Type III" (Extended Initial Attack) fire on their home forest. Three (3) separate investigations were conducted: one, by the USFS; another by the US Department of Agriculture's Office of Inspector General (parent organization of the USFS); and a third by the US Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), which is required by law to look at any fatality of Federal employees.

As a result of these investigations, the USFS decided to take "administrative actions" against some of their employees, ranging from letters of reprimand to termination of employment. Although it has been more than 18 months since the fatalities, most of those "administrative actions" have not been resolved within the USFS.

OSHA found the USFS liable for 5 Violations ( 3 "Serious", 1 "Willful" and 1 "Repeat").

But in my opinion, the most significant actions resulting from the Cramer Fire fatalities are those taken by the U.S. Attorney in Boise, Idaho: they explored, based on the findings of the 3 investigations as well as information that they had gathered, bringing CRIMINAL charges against the Incident Commander based on his actions, and the resulting deaths of the 2 helicopter rappellers. A news release in early December 2004 announced that a pre-trial agreement had been reached: The IC lost his job with the US Forest Service and would be on Federal Probation for 18 months.

Fighting wildland fires is a curious mix of science and art in a rapidly changing environment, with an often-unknown combination of factors determining what occurs. Since my 1st wildfire suppression action in the mid-1960's, I've never been 100% sure that all my actions and reactions were absolutely correct and "by-the-book". And the "book" keeps getting thicker and more complex every year! It's relatively easy for an outsider, with weeks and months of time, to review the decisions I had to make in seconds or minutes, compare them against the hundreds of pages of direction found in the Fireline Handbook, the "Red Book", the Incident Response Pocket Guide, and various Training Manuals that cover the past 40 years, and find errors in my judgment or decision-making. Does that make my conduct criminal?

Throughout my entire career, I've been blessed to never have a firefighter seriously hurt or killed while working under my direction. But, I'd be a fool to think that this was all the result of nothing but skill, ability and experience: pure, dumb blind luck has kept me, and the firefighters who have worked with me, out of harm's way more than once - and out of the US Attorney's gunsight. For that, I'm eternally grateful!

So, where do the Extended Attack ICs for the 21st Century stand after the actions of the US Attorney in Boise? Are they going to risk their careers, homes and jail time to take charge of fires that are threatening to burn out of control into valuable natural resources and or into residential areas? How about Initial Attack ICs? What about Prescribed Burn bosses who knowingly and willingly light fires in the woods?

I've got this new-found fear that wildland fire has entered onto a "slippery slope" that we won't find it easy to get off of in the coming years, and that the fallout from the Cramer Fire will ripple throughout the wildland fire community world-wide, resulting in fewer and fewer folks willing to take the personal risks required to be an IC on a wildfire or prescribed burn. If that happens, the land and the public that we serve will suffer the consequences.

Maybe a US Attorney will step up and become an IC during a busy fire season.

Safety Summit 2005

Planning efforts are going full steam ahead for this year's 10th Anniversary of the 1995 Human Factors Workshop in Missoula, Montana on April 25-28. More details are being added to our web site daily, so check them out, and get registered right away. Information can be found at www.iawfonline.org.

Strider

Mellie, I'd like to be a fly on the wall when you ask a hotshot that t-shirt question!

I was wondering how you got all those 103 hotshot tee-shirts?! The ones you put on the wall at the Wildland Firefighter Foundation? You musta done a lot of pushups! Good man! Job well done!

I heard to get a hotshot shirt you had to earn them: you had to be one or do one.
Was that one push-up at a time or all 103 at one stretch? Or is it cumulative, the number up to that point each time you ask for another one? I assume someone has to watch?  Hmmmm, I'd guess those hotshots would want you to do more than one pushup, probably it was cumulative...?? ... I need to find a hotshot and ask... I hear you have a story for each tee-shirt. Are the stories about the push-ups? Will there ever be a book coming out of this?

Evidently there's still a lot of the details I have to learn about this wildland firefighting stuff. I'd love to hear those stories.

<ppsssst> <whisper> <I'm curious. Did you make anyone at the Wildland Firefighter Foundation do any push-ups when you had that hanging party and turned those shirts over to them to display for the year? Have you collected all the tee-shirts you were missing by now? Just wondering... More push-ups?>

<snicker>
Mellie

PS Don't forget to renew your 52 Club membership for 2005! I have. Please join me!

www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/01/24/national/main668717.shtml

Fedfire

"A good plan violently executed now is better than a perfect plan later".

Exploiting opportunities is what this quote is about. General Patton felt it was better to take some measured risks in order to exploit the enemy's weaknesses. If you wait until you have developed a perfect plan, you may allow the enemy to become better established and prolong the conflict in the long run.

Isn't this what initial attack wildland firefighters do? We take measured risks in order to prevent fires from becoming larger and exposing more firefighters (and the public) to more risks for a greater length of time. And the benefits are financial as well, keeping fires small prevents them from becoming large, expensive fires.

Sun Tzu is next on the list. I first learned about The Art of War, Sun Tzu's timeless classic, from a buddy of mine who worked for Paul Gleason when Paul was the superintendent of the Zig-Zag Hotshots. Paul introduced many people to this ancient wisdom. My own copy is dog-eared from much use over the years, and I still re-read it from time to time. The Art of War's tactical lessons on warfighting (and wildland firefighting), and the humanistic lessons on leadership, are as pertinent today as they were two thousand years ago. I'll return to Sun Tzu shortly.

Now for the sage grouse. I read an article today about the recent decision of the US Fish & Wildlife Service to not list the sage grouse on the threatened and endangered species list. The article pointed out that the political appointees who presently run the USFWS felt that sufficient protections already existed for the sage grouse, even though scientific evidence points to a steadily declining population of sage grouse. The article also stated that 44% of USFWS biologists who were polled said that they had been subjected to non-scientific (political) pressure in recent years to alter their opinions on biological matters. Similar concerns have been voiced recently by rank and file members of other government agencies such as the Environmental Protection Agency, and our own United States Forest Service.

Which brings me to the Chief. What I am wondering today is, has our Chief caved in to the politicians at the expense of rank and file members of the Forest Service, particularly the grunts on the ground who still fight wildland fire? I can not think of any other reason why there has been such an absolute lack of information about, or even acknowledgement of, the problems that presently confront the USFS wildland fire community. At the same time we are being asked to manage natural disasters (including terrorist incidents), do more prescribed fire, be safer, and keep fire costs lower, our legs, and budgets, are being cut out from underneath us.

My own radar tells me that we are fast approaching what may be an unprecedented fire season. The chickens from Cramer have returned to the roost, and they are in a "fowl" mood. NOT ONE of the Type III ICs I have spoken with in the past six months, except for those who are required by their position descriptions to perform as such, have said they will accept Type III assignments under the present circumstances. This may be the summer when we find the answer to the question, what if they gave an extended attack fire and no Type III ICs came?

Look at the tone of many of the recent posts on They Said. Don't trust anyone you don't know, cover your own ass, incompetent contract crews, watch out for incompetent supervisors on fires. Is this what the "greatest wildland firefighting organization in the world" has come to?

You cannot execute "a good plan violently" with troops who are afraid to engage and ready to disengage at the first hint of trouble. We need help now, not from managers, but leaders. I would be happy to loan the Chief my copy of The Art of War. Here's a freebie from Master Sun:

"So there are three ways in which a civil leadership causes the military (USFS) trouble. When a civil leadership unaware of the facts tells its armies (wildland fire managers) to advance when it should not, or tells its armies to retreat when it should not, this is called tying up the armies. When the civil leadership is ignorant of military affairs but shares equally in the government of the armies, the soldiers (firefighters) get confused. When the civil leadership is ignorant of military maneuvers but shares equally in the command of the armies, the soldiers hesitate. Once the armies are confused and hesitant, trouble comes from competitors (fires). This is called taking away victory by deranging the military".

See the connection now?

Misery Whip

I do. And Original Ab saw the writing-on-the-wall way back when regarding the ICs... Ab.

"6 OIG's investigation determined that the private contracting crews at the Cramer Fire performed poorly. OIG is continuing to work with the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Oregon regarding the investigative findings on the private crews."

And, how is it that this happened???:

"8 Per the advice of his attorney, the Operations Staff Officer declined OIG's request for an interview on the events at the Cramer Fire."
"9 Per the advice of her attorney, the District Ranger declined OIG's request for an interview on the events at the Cramer Fire."

I didn't know you could just say 'no' to OIG.

vfd cap'n

I couldn't get your link to work. Ab.

We've been contacted by the Weather Channel.
Producer of their show, Storm Stories, is looking for any photography and/or video footage of the Bear Fire from August 11th, 2004 and the days that followed. This includes anything of the actual fire and smoke to people around their homes, people evacuating, aftermath of trees, houses, rebuilding, pets being evacuated, pets found after fire, etc..

We've put their producer in touch with people who have contributed Bear Fire photos here, but there may be more of you out there who would like to participate. I don't know about how much $ might be involved, if any. Photographers are on their own for negotiating.

Send Ab an email if you have photos or video footage.

Would someone (Vicki Minor, Melissa) ask Cache Queen (retired) to get in touch with Ab?

Thanks...

County Cooperator

I submit that we can influence all layers of the swiss cheese where we see systemic problems. We have already provided input to the WO policy-makers by speaking our concerns and by educating each other here. Collectively we are a powerful PROFESSIONAL firefighting force to be reconed with.

Groundpounders and managers, it is still true you must remain situationally aware for your own and your crew's safety. Got SA? Ab.

Ab,

After adding (clarifying) some terminology in the structure of the Forest Fire Organization to include non-R5 references, here's what I substituted:

So back to the Cramer Tragedy...
On the Salmon-Challis, the Forest Fire Staff or FFMO position with all its many responsibilities was unfilled (or there was an acting). Alan Hackett, Assistant District FMO was trying to fill the District FMO position (although it's unclear if he was signed off on a FF52). He was doing District FMO duties, interacting with the Line Officer (District Ranger), doing the best he could. The District Ranger had oversight for all people on her district. The Fire Staff or acting Fire Staff (if there was one) and his superior, his Forest Supervisor, also had responsibilities for overall forest functioning including oversight via the fire chain-of-command.

Here you have a relatively low totem-pole person - Hackett - just above Engine Captain or Handcrew Captain in GS rank and experience trying to fill in wearing too many hats on a dysfunctional forest. Could he have refused? Who knows? Then came another hat: the Cramer Fire started. He was the IC Type 3 with too much else going on at a time when fires were going gunnysack all over the forest and all over Idaho/Montana. Complexity rose exponentially.... and then came the tragedy.

What part did having too many responsibilities in several different mental and physical locations play in Alan's decisions leading to the tragedy? Seems to me his tragic failure in oversight was more of a "sin of omission" than a "sin of commission". Human factors of job overload/too many hats/ too many expectations placed on a "journeyman" fire supervisor -- rooted in a FS system  requiring lots of paperwork, communication with the Forest Supervisor with no fire experience, etc, etc. -- all were important.

I have to say, I'm in accord with Misery Whip who cited the importance of both human factors and decision making processes in high complexity organizations and with Rhino who said,

Cramer is a prime example where a dysfunctional forest placed an individual in a position where he tried to do his best and became overwhelmed.

Mellie

Added it. Ab.

Good morning,

I was sent this yesterday, it will be released to the media today. In my mind it pretty much says it all. I have been reading the posts everyday and I have so many thoughts on all of this mess. I hope that at some point I will be able to put it all down in writing that will make some kind of sense to people.

Thanks so much
Jodi Heath

Thanks Jodi. You know how hard this has been for all of us. You and the other members of the families are still in our thoughts and prayers. Ab.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Washington, D.C. 20250
FEB 8 2005

The Honorable Mike Johanns
Secretary of Agriculture
Washington, D.C. 20250

Dear Mr. Secretary:

As required by Public Law 107-203, the Office of Inspector General (DIG) of the Department of
Agriculture (USDA) hereby submits its investigative report of the Forest Service (FS) fatalities
that occurred in the Cramer Fire in the Salmon-Challis National Forest in Idaho on July 22,2003.
This statutory requirement stipulates that whenever an FS fatality is caused by wildfire
entrapment or burnover, OIG shall "conduct an investigation of the fatality. ..completely
independent of: any investigation of the fatality that is conducted by the Forest Service."1 After
completing such an investigation, OIG is required to submit a report containing its investigative
results to the Secretary of Agriculture and the Congress.

The OIG investigative report of the Cramer Fire fatalities is our thiJ;"d work product since
September 2004 related to FS wildland fire activities and programs. On September 23, 2004,
OIG issued two separate reviews. The first was the OIG audit report of the FS Firefighting
Safety Program.2 The audit examined FS procedures to implement safety recommendations and
FS compliance with established firefighting safety practices. On the same day, OIG also issued
an Informational Memorandum to the Chief, Forest Service, which provided an analytical
overview as to whether common factors existed in the three most recent wildland fires involving
FS fatalities.

To place DIG's investigative findings on FS fatalities in the Cramer Fire in a broader context of
how FS flfefighting safety programs and management controls can be improved, brief summaries
of the key findings of DIG's Firefighting Safety Program Audit and its accompanying
Informational Memorandum are contained in the first enclosure (Enclosure 1) to this letter.
DIG's official report to the Congress on our investigation of the fatalities at the Cramer Fire is
provided in the second enclosure (Enclosure 2).

We hope you will find this report informative. Our intention is that the entirety of OIG's work
regarding FS firefighting actions and capabilities in 2004 will assist agency managers in
improving their firefighting training, oversight, and effectiveness. Each year thousands of
FS personnel display dedication and skill in protecting vast areas of public forests and
neighboring communities from devastating forest fires. A thorough examination of the facts and
circumstances surrounding any FS fatalities that occur during these efforts can help agency
officials refine and strengthen their firefighting policies and procedures and, thereby, limit such
tragedies in the future. OIG extends its appreciation to the Chief, Forest Service and FS
officials and regional personnel for their assistance and cooperation as OIG conducted this
investigation.

A similar letter is being sent to The Honorable Richard B. Cheney, President of the Senate, and
The Honorable J. Dennis Hastert, Speaker of the House. Copies will be provided to the
leadership of the congressional committees and subcommittees with oversight for the Forest
Service.

Sincerely,
Phyllis K. Fong
Inspector General

Footnotes:
1 Public Law 107-203, enacted July 24, 2002
2 DIG Audit Report No. 08601-38-SF.

OIG Cramer Enclosures 1 & 2

S-230 came out early to mid 80’s before that it was called “Foremanship”, I will look tomorrow at my copy in the training library. The copy I have has a picture of the Redding IR Crew waking behind Charlie Caldwell with his sleeves rolled up, Filson cruisers vest and no gloves. I also have a video copy of the 1962 “Crew Boss “ movie. I believe they started making the training films such as “Crew Boss” “Sector Boss” etc. as a direct result of the Inaja fire in 1956 same as the 10 Standard Fire Orders. If anyone can find the copies of the other early films I would like to get hold of copies on video or DVD. They are great entertainment and have some good application for us yet today. Kind of like watching old Lassie shows with the old FS rigs, uniforms and all that.

DF

Ab, would you please go back and correct my original post in case sometime in the future an archeologist finds only that artifact? Thanks. I should have caught it amidst all the report redactions.

AC, I apologize for shredding your initials. Typing one fisted as fast as I do, I make mistakes. Acronyms and initials are worst because my spell checker doesn't pick them up. Either that or I had a subliminal desire to change the energy from AC to DC. Either way, please accept my apologies.

Mellie

Corrected it. Ab.

Firestorm Wildland Fire Suppression is advertising for several positions on crews, engines, and equipment.  Many working locations to choose from in California. Check 'em out on the Jobs page.

Ab.

You may already know everything I say below about communication on theysaid, but I need to say it anyway...
If you want to skip this, here's my main message: <cheerleading pompoms in hand>
THANKS CONTRIBUTORS! Also -- thanks for the forum Ab, and thanks to forum supporters/advertisers.

I think the current back-and-forth on the Cramer thread boils down to people having varying points of view, varying points of focus and varying needs. Unrecognized human factors getting in the mix!? Some of us may be looking for closure on our loss, others for an understanding of what we need to do differently to be safe either on the ground or managing the line -- or... something else. Why you're involved, why I'm involved, why someone else writes in -- the reasons differ.

If we're writing in for different reasons seeking our own understanding and resolution, wanting to make our own point, we may be talking past each other on topics that we're passionate about. We assume others are concerned about them too -- issues relating to safety, death, human tragedy and those caught up in it (one ICT3, all ICT3s, etc) who have been blamed or might be blamed next season should tragedy befall (or be created or not mitigated) again. Many of us are trying to make sense of tragedy... again. No wonder it's hot -- it shakes our world every time.

Words... and meaning... communication...
Communication in real life is richer than the printed word. Body language, tone of voice, inflection, facial expression, and gestures contain 70% of message content in face-to-face interactions. They help us clarify, punctuate, and convey our meaning in subtle ways. We don't have any of that here unless we toss in a <tongue in cheek> or a <grin> every once in a while. The <sob> or <cry>  or <tearing up> are a little harder and might be misinterpreted.

Sometimes we know the person posting, but more often not. We may not know where they're coming from or what their issues are, how old or young with what kinds of experience, if they seem like us or really different. Some who write often on the same issues, we kinda know them or would like to... or not...

So on theysaid, one limitation of the medium is that the message is the words. The words usually focus on issues, opinion, information and occasional venting or a quick verbal poke when we feel someone reeeeeaaalllly needs it. The words can perfectly convey the message when the poster is a master of wordcraft. More often for better or worse, the reader fills in some blanks.

For me, it's the trying that counts. I like it that we have folks from all perspectives, all levels of fire, agencies and organizations who are willing to discuss issues, share information, opinions, and persist, albeit sometimes with emotion -- until we feel we've clarified or made our point or agreed to disagree. We educate each other. Sometimes in profound ways. Thanks! Sometimes -- like for me in the last few days -- it's a lot of work just to type all my thoughts down. I've been researching and I wanted to share. Last few days, I've got to add: thank goodness for spell checkers!

I've learned so much here. Thanks EVERYONE for sharing your opinions, your information and insights -- yourselves!

Mellie

ps While I'm in the love and cheerleading mode...
Love ya Original Ab. <smooch> Again, thanks for everything you do to keep this place up and running moving to new servers, etc... Thanks to Ember who moderates Chat and is currently in firefighter training! <hahaha> another one, hooked! 180 club?? Thanks to the other Abs too...

Zimm

"The Budget provides $281 million for USDA’s Forest Service and $211 million for the Department of the Interior for high-priority brush removal and other projects that provide the greatest reduction of risk posed by catastrophic wildfires."

I don't know, but maybe we would actually get that money instead of being absorbed mostly to the Forests.

"Arizona Border Control Initiative

In April 2004, DHS announced a joint initiative between Immigration and Customs Enforcement and Customs and Border Protection. The Arizona Border Control Initiative strives to deter illegal crossing, disrupt smuggling organizations that transport illegal aliens into the United States, and reduce the overall number of deaths of migrants crossing the desert into Arizona from Mexico. The President’s Budget includes $50 million for enhanced personnel, technology, and aviation assets."

Just a few thoughts:

* Our own agency ran helicopters, and airtankers instead of contractors, modeled after Border Patrol and Coast Guard.
* Utilizing equipment and possibly manpower during non-fire season to other departments.

Here are the Numbers

Thinking Outside the Box

TEXT

My focus is on Rhino's quote and your comment. All I'm saying is 1) there are human factors at play at more levels than the groundpounder level and 2) the structure of an organization can minimize risk and we should look at that (plus OSHA and OIG if they're looking at anything).We should be looking at EVERYTHING at all levels that can be improved to make the pattern of fighting fire safer.

What I hear you saying is that you're focusing on the groundpounder level: you have to count on yourself for your own safety. You did and you do and you're just fine. OK, I also rely on myself for my own survival. Some have called me a deep survivalist. If you ever meet me in person, you'll know why. That said, I know that good, capable people make judgment calls every day at their own level of understanding, experience and situational awareness and with the intent of taking care of themselves; on occasion they clearly make the wrong call. If we can't ask them what happened, we'll never know for sure what transpired even if they're good friends. However, if you believe the Swiss Cheese Model for looking at accidents is valid, you have to ask why they were there in the first place. It's usually the case that many holes have to line up for a tragedy like Cramer to happen. To break it down, the model looks at

1. Unsafe Acts;
2. Preconditions for Unsafe Acts;
3. Unsafe Supervision; and
4. Organizational Influences.

Go read Hugh Carson's good review of the Swiss Cheese Model on the Docs Worth Reading.

Will you ever find yourself in a really bad spot because you missed something critically important? I hope not. If you do, I hope you don't waste any time in disbelief that it couldn't wouldn't shouldn't really be happening to you because you know you make the right choices. The seconds you remain in that state of denial and disbelief might make the difference between living and dying.

My quote of the day based on experience:
Prepare for the worst, expect the best. When sh*t happens, do the best you can.

AC, I'm sure we agree on many more things than we disagree on. Our focus right now is simply different.

Yahoo, life is great!
Mellie

I don't mean to rehash the Cramer Incident and its the last thing I want to do today to bring this up but I feel I need to respond to Rhino's post and dispel some myths once again:

Rhino states: "Cramer is a prime example where a dysfunctional forest placed an individual in a position where he tried to do his best and became overwhelmed."

This statement is erroneous and it is evident to anyone that reads the investigative report (final or preliminary findings), has fought wildfire in any initial attack or single resource capacity or knew Allen or Heath.

Since you have taken it upon yourself to "dispel myths", you should consider this: I've read the report, I have and still do fight fire, and I agree with Rhino & Mellie. I'm sure there are quite a few other people who would also agree with us, so it appears your assumption, and this statement, is flawed.

And since you saw fit to question my qualifications in your 2/7 post, I might ask the same question of you. I've spent over 25 years in wildland fire, most of that as a smokejumper, rappeller, and, yes, rappel spotter. What's your background?

This statement from your 1/31 post also bears scrutiny. You said:

Ultimately, the final call of safety resides with the firefighter on the ground. I can't begin to tell you how many times I've seen mistakes made on the ground where a firefighter violates or ignores the 10 and 18 and then is surprised when the conditions become adverse. There is no excuse for a bad judgment call and while the finding might find the IC and others on the 'forest' to blame, I know that the rappellers had allowed themselves to become complacent and rely on air support as a potential escape route. This is inexcusable and unfortunately the (sic) paid for it with their lives.

Whether you realize it or not, there are many excusable reasons that people make bad judgment calls. If you have never made one, you are either very exceptional, very lucky, or not very experienced. Or maybe you have made bad judgment calls but just failed to recognize it.

The comment of yours that really caught my attention was "I know that the rappellers had allowed themselves to become complacent and rely on air support as a potential escape route". How can you KNOW that? Were you there with Shane & Jeff? There is a large difference between knowing and assuming. Maybe you just didn't choose your words carefully enough.

I have also been accused of being a "blamer" on this site in the past, but my motives really are aimed at revealing systemic flaws that led to this tragedy. Yes, ultimately, Shane & Jeff were responsible for their own safety once they were on the ground. Saying "they allowed themselves to become complacent" sounds to me, and others, like you are BLAMING them for being careless.

I feel the root causes are based in a system that failed to give them and others the kind of screening and training that would allow the people at Cramer to detect potentially hazardous situations and deteriorating conditions, react correctly, and avoid the burnover that ultimately took Jeff & Shane's lives. Jeff & Shane were victims, just as Alan Hackett and others at Cramer were victims. I would also say that you are probably in the minority if you feel that the dysfunctional conditions on the SCNF did not contribute to this accident.

AC, I'd recommend that you read up on human factors and do some careful personal assessment before you start telling They Said readers how things are. You might find that the world is not as cut and dried as you seem to think it is.

Mellie, As usual, I enjoyed your post today.

Misery Whip

Not necessarily. Read what Concerned is really saying. Ab.

Mellie

Forest Service Fire Organization: Facts, Issues, Suggestions

• Line authority in the Forest Service was congressionally set and is bestowed upon the Chief and delegated to Regional Foresters, Station Directors, Forest Supervisors, and District Rangers.
   
• Staff positions, such as those filled by Fire Management Officers (FMOs), do not possess line authority and act only upon the authority of the line officer.
   
• FMOs may regularly act as Forest Supervisor, and District Fire Management officers (DFMOs) may act as District Rangers and in those capacities exercise line authority, but it is limited to specific delegation by the line officer of record.
   
• The traditional and, in most places, current organization places fire managers under non-fire line officers. Most of the line officers today do not have substantial experience with fire, and there is nothing in place aimed at materially changing this; there is no fixed requirement that one meet any level of familiarity or facility with fire management and operations as a prerequisite to becoming a line officer.
   
• Consequently, the FMO or DFMO has come to BE the unit or subunit fire representative and must attempt to comply with all the existing and emerging standards related to fire operations, qualifications, program management, and supervision while at the same time meeting the needs and wishes of the line officer. There are often conflicting demands made upon fire managers and there is always more to do than time allows, so focus and priority become critical. The principle interest of the line officer may not be on issues related to fire, and fire organizations are not uncommonly viewed as utility work forces that are available for any purpose when not actually fighting fire. In this setting, providing maintenance and developmental training, drilling for proficiency, tending interagency relationships, updating fire management and other plans, preparing and managing budgets, and more -- all become extremely difficult.
   
• It is critical that standards be met, that SOPs are shared and implemented, that fundamentals are taught and reinforced. Under the current decentralized organization, the FMO is responsible for the fire program under an arrangement that, classically, assigns responsibility without authority. FMOs are charged with outcomes, but are not necessarily given the wherewithal to directly effect activities on the Ranger Districts. At minimum, the FFMO must work with and through the District Ranger in order to influence compliance and activities on the Districts.
   
• The subject of vacancies should be aired - even if parenthetically - inasmuch as they commonly occur and impact employees, performance, and outcomes in important ways. When vacancies occur, they are often lengthy, given the timeframes required and the level of human resource support. Remaining employees must attempt to perform the duties of the vacant position along with their own, and there is little recognition of the impacts upon the individual or on the program. The effect of multiple duties on one's attention and performance is a mitigating circumstance that seems to have been "increasingly underappreciated" in recent investigations.
   
• It's not that centralized fire organizations make sense so much as it has become extremely difficult to meet current requirements under the existing organization. This is not a matter of preference. Many of us even in fire would prefer to see the traditional organization continue but, in the command and control environment of emergency response, it hinders more than it facilitates in meeting the realities of fire preparedness.
   
• The District Ranger is a key position, overseeing a large and varied program of work and representing the agency in the community. Some District Rangers, and others, are greatly concerned that centralizing the fire department will exclude them and fracture their workforce.
   
• Many DRs care deeply about fire and some are very capable at it, and they should remain involved, but in a way that aims first to enable the fire manager to direct fire preparedness and operations.
   
• Meaningful District Ranger involvement can occur under a centralized fire organization by their sitting on what is essentially a board of directors, with the Forest Supervisor. The FMO reports to the Forest Supervisor, so the line authority remains on each National Forest. FMOs needn't have line authority; they need to deal with and through others' line authority in reasonable measure.
   
• The liability of District Rangers would be described in the board of director context, and would stand to be more focused, more appropriate to the way the unit does business, and better described. The responsibilities laid upon the Forest would ultimately be borne by the Forest Supervisor, as it now is.
   
• This is not a stove-pipe organization that operates beyond the bounds of the Forest Supervisors' reach. Programs of work and the fire departments' contribution to District activities are subject to Forest Supervisor and District Ranger direction but, in this setting, critical fire program needs can be more cohesively identified and planned for than the current arrangement allows.
   
• The Forest Service should recognize the fact that the fireground has become much more complex and that its employees face greater liabilities than ever before. The Forest Service ought to respond by directing that its fire organization be made more likely to survive and succeed by establishing a fire department that models effective command and control organizations rather than doing what we've always done.

Concerned about the Future

Cramer is a prime example where a dysfunctional forest placed an individual in a position where he tried to do his best and became overwhelmed.

There is a potentially systemic problem in the way the Forest Service administers fire and aviation. In my opinion, the organization structure is outdated and fire managers have too much expected of them -- and this is under the best conditions. I think this  problem was a MUCH BIGGER PROBLEM on the Cramer because of the holes in the fire organization on the Salmon Challis NF. I doubt the OIG investigators even have a clue how big a problem it was/is. In my opinion, Jeff and Shane were victims, as was Allen Hackett. Alan was set up to fall, not intentionally, but set up by the way the system is organized and the way a key position was not filled. Too much was expected of him. When push came to shove and OSHA said "second willful violation", Alan became the scapegoat. When DOJ threatened jail time and fighting that was way beyond his financial means, he cut his losses, as most of us would do.

Let's begin with forest structure, responsibilities, and chain-of-command. The Forest Service is a marriage of many functions, one of which is fire. Right now fire is the cash cow -- the way logging used to be when timber was king. Fire is also the riskiest function -- and therein lies part of the problem. Many other functions are being centralized within the Forest Service putting additional stress on Incident Management Teams, but fire is evidently not being considered for centralization within the FS. To consider alternative structures apparently threatens power, money, egos, tradition. Line Officer (Forest Supervisor and District Ranger) control is sacrosanct and defined by law. I'm just wondering if there's not another better more centralized way that would let line officers retain control while streamlining operational structure for safer Fire operation and absolving Line Officers of threat for litigation.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Some points and issues:
Each National Forest with many districts has a Forest Supervisor at its head. He/she supervises the District Rangers and the Fire and Aviation Program (FAM) and is responsible to the Regional Forester. The Forest Supervisors and District Rangers who "provide oversight" to the Fire Program usually do not themselves have fire experience. When the needs of fire and fire safety come in conflict with other needs on the forest, these non-fire supervisors likely have other priorities and projects.

I have talked many times about the fire budget (formerly MEL) and what Congress budgets for fire resources on the forests (ie, pre-suppression funds). Well, every year Congress designates money for fire, sometimes increasing the budget incrementally over the budget of the year before. By the time the money reaches the ground, there have been rakeoffs at every level of the regional and forest organization. When I ask about that, I'm told, "Well that's just the way it's always been. Fire pays the way for many other functions on the forest like timber used to." This year although money budgeted for fire was increased, money reaching the ground is even LESS than last year. But, I've digressed...

Back to structure and chain-of-command. Consider the Fire and Aviation (FAM) structure on a typical forest (like the Salmon Challis NF), on which fire is not centralized.

Forests that have an active fire program - with lots of complexity, including a great deal of seasonal fire and fuels reduction - typically have the following positions:

• A Forest Fire Management Officer (FFMO, usually referred to as the Forest Fire Staff Officer, member of the Forest Leadership Team or FLT),
• an Assistant FMO (Assistant Fire Staff Officer),
• a Fuels Tech (many used to be old Brush Disposal or BD foremen when timber was king),
• a Fire Planning Specialist who also knows NEPA.
• Each part of the forest, or district has
  • A (District) FMO (FMO, Division Chief in CA) and
  • an Assistant (District) FMO (DFMO (AFMO, Battalion Chief).
  • Each district also has a variety of Module Leaders (Captains):
    • Engine Capts (4-6 per district in my neck'o'the'NorCA'woods), and
    • Handcrew Supts including HS Supts.
  • Can have Fuels Techs at the district level

The Forest FMO or Forest Fire Staff Officer is a critical position, overseeing the whole forest's fire and aviation program, including each district's fire budget, planning, training, safety, aviation, etc. Goodness, the responsibilities are so great I don't know where to start. In addition, either the FFMO or the Assistant Fire Staff Officer performs duties of the Forest Aviation Officer, including contracts, CWN and any fleet, even overseeing flights for bug inspections! Larger aviation programs have a dedicated Forest Aviation Officer.

The FFMO and Assistant Fire Staff at the forest level work for the Forest Supervisor who works for the Regional Forester. The District FMO, Assistant Dist. FMO and those on down the chain who work on the ground work for the District Ranger, NOT for the FFMO Fire Staff Officer. The District Ranger has congressionally delegated line authority for all that fire personnel do on a forest. In other words, the Ranger needs to sign off on it. When there's a large fire on a forest and an IMT is called in, it works at the discretion of the Ranger, as well. Legally, when things go wrong on a fire -- under the current set of rules currently understood by OSHA and OIG/DOJ (10 fire orders are violated leading to burnover, accident or death on a FS Managed fire) -- the Ranger is also at civil and/or criminal risk for some mess-up or oversight on something he or she signed off on that was required under their job description.

As I mentioned before, today Forest Supervisors and Forest Rangers usually have no background in fire. In the olden days when things were simpler and the marriage of functions all pervasive, Supervisors and Rangers had often fought fire seasonally, worked briefly on a BD crew or had been Forestry types and done some timber cruising/pile burning, in other words, they had some woods and fire sense -- sense of hot slope/cold slope and how fire burned on the land. Not many of those old dog Rangers/ranger supervisors remain. (Dave Freeland Ranger on the SQF and Kent Connaughton, R5 Deputy Regional Forester are two wonderful exceptions who come to mind.) As Lobotomy points out, most Rangers and Supervisors today are "ologists" and therefore suspect for not being "fire professionals" when it comes to fire safety. [Aside: By training in one of my prior lives, I am also an 'ologist; and everyone in my family is an 'ologist. Nothing against 'ologists, but they/we have a very different view of the world and a different set of priorities than is needed if you're working for safety as a fire professional on the fireground!]

So back to the Cramer Tragedy... On the Salmon-Challis, the Forest Fire Staff or FFMO position with all its many responsibilities was unfilled (or there was an acting). Alan Hackett, Assistant District FMO was trying to fill the District FMO position (although it's unclear if he was signed off on a FF52). He was doing District FMO duties, interacting with the Line Officer (District Ranger), doing the best he could. The District Ranger had oversight for all people on her district. The Fire Staff or acting Fire Staff (if there was one) and his superior, his Forest Supervisor also had responsibilities for overall forest functioning including oversight via the fire chain-of-command.

Here you have a relatively low totem-pole person - Hackett - just above Engine Captain or Handcrew Captain in GS rank and experience trying to fill in wearing too many hats on a dysfunctional forest. Could he have refused? Who knows? Then came another hat: the Cramer Fire started. He was the IC Type 3 with too much else going on at a time when fires were going gunnysack all over the forest and all over Idaho/Montana. Complexity rose exponentially.... and then came the tragedy.

What part did having too many responsibilities in several different mental and physical locations play in Alan's decisions leading to the tragedy? Seems to me his tragic failure in oversight was more of a "sin of omission" than a "sin of commission". Human factors of job overload/too many hats/ too many expectations placed on a "journeyman" fire supervisor -- rooted in a FS system

I have to say, I'm in accord with Misery Whip who cited the importance of both human factors and decision making processes in high complexity organizations and with Rhino who said,

Cramer is a prime example where a dysfunctional forest placed an individual in a position where he tried to do his best and became overwhelmed.

Mellie

Ab,

Here is an update on Matt Taylor. I was able to see him today. He was in good spirits, laughing and reminiscing about fire stories and getting caught up on people he knows. Heidi B another friend from his Prineville Hotshot days stopped by as well, and with her good nature, kindness and laughing spirit had Matt laughing and remembering stories from firefighting when they were both much younger. We took him out for a walk in his chair, wheeled him around his neighborhood and walked around his old elementary school and in and around the kids. I think he was up for a trip up Pilot Butte, and a wild ride down. <etc, snip on visitation info>

Lance

1) Don't leave your SA behind, even for a minute, in life or on a fire. As soon as you do, life will sneak up on you and bite you in the ass.

2) I'm just lucky that this happened in a parking lot, and not on a fire.

- Class C Sagebrush Faller 2005

Stanley

What many, past and present, seem to be asking of themselves and others... Got SA? Ab.

Currently, 14 states mandate headlight use when wipers are activated: Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Illinois, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Rhode Island, South Carolina and Virginia. Headlights also are mandatory during the day in Canada, Scandinavia and Hungary.

I heard more helibase mgrs have been interested in Campbell's
method. I recommended it to some. It should be taught
more widely to our new less experienced folks in my opinion.

Todd

Anyplace else have this law?

SoCal CDF

You see I have a different take on all of this. I would rather learn from those that I would say identified the risk and made the right decisions, rather than from those that maybe ignored the risk or didnt see it coming. It's hard for me to understand what exactly we get from reading and talking about the risk that no one identified. Especially from those that are not around to share it with us. It seems to me that we should be interviewing and talking with the folks that identified and made the right risk assessment and are around to share it with us. If the military learned what they know about leadership from those that didnt identify or ignored the risk, we wouldnt have any Generals. The same goes for the T-shirts, there's a reason for having old Hotshot T-shirts. One reason is to remind us that there's always an inherent risk with everything we do, but its how we identify it and mitigate it that counts!!!!

Just my Thoughts
Rowdy

Send us a list of t-shirt additions when you get them and we'll update the t-shirt page. (list of shirts) Ab.

Added 'em to the Quotes page. Ab.

I put your quote and the sagebrush faller's quote on the Quotes page. Ab.

Thanks! thanks! Thanks!
Sarah Larson (Matt's mom)

Best wishes to all your family. I'm glad the cards are reaching you. Readers, if you'd like to read the update and access Matt's address to send cards, click HERE. Ab.

Ab.

Doctrine is a precept or principle.

I see using Commander's Intent as a guiding precept or underlying
principle for how fire is fought by professional wildland firefighters
who are trained in leadership, fire behavior and all the other aspects
of their profession. Here's one definition of doctrine.

Time for my kicks. Sunny in my neck-o-the-woods, too. Thanksgiving
for sunshine!

Mellie

PS. Nerd, let me see what I can come up with on Gilmartin's talk.

I was outdoors doing my PT this morning and the thought arose...

NorCal Tom

There was some kind of longline med rescue procedure
under consideration last year. Don't know what became
of that. Anyone?

Bitterroot Ted

firedog

Do you know the communication procedure or the SOP that the
CDF Flight Crew follows as they land and engage fire? Do they
post lookouts? Is their comm SOP similar to what NWRG, JoeBoy,
AC and Class C Sagebrush Faller suggest the FED comm SOP is? It
seems that procedures vary between crews at least a little bit. I wonder
how they differ between federal and state agencies. Do any other
states besides Calif have flight crews?

Do flight crew supts have to size up fire behavior and anticipate how
it might change? Seem like it could be a transition point where chain
of command shifts. Transitions shout watchout. Any thoughts or
comments?

CA guy

I've heard NIMS not only relies on our Incident Management Teams, but also relies on our cache of communications equipment.

This is what the talking points from (All Risk Incident Support Radio) say are requirements

"Provide for Interoperable Radio Communications and Computer support on all risk incidents
o Wildland Fire
o Law Enforcement activities
o Homeland Security and FEMA incidents
      o Terrorist activities or other man made disasters
      o Floods
      o Special events
      o Earthquake
      o Volcano or other natural disasters"

What happens if there's a need in a variety of categories that exceeds resources. Who decides priorities?

Tahoe Terrie

Vehicle fires can hold more dangers

Be Safe,
SoCal CDF

Link to the book is on the Books page. Link to the Fire Leadership web page is on the Links page near the bottom under Safety. Excellent site. Ab.

CDF does not have rappellers.
Our Helitack crews can "Helistep", (a low hover where the firefighters
exit the ship) but the only ropes we use are for our "short haul"
program. Short haul is a process where the rescuer is lowered to the
ground from the helicopter to aid an injured person. After the injured
is assessed for their injuries, they are connected to the helicopter,
(along with the rescuer) and flown a short distance to a better access
point.

Firefly

All Risk Incident Support Radio (html)
IRM Transition Update (pdf file)

If this isn't happening, then there are serious command and control breakdowns that will continue to bite us.

NWRG

I don't have the paper, but check this link to a different Gilmartin article at his website - on police stress.

HYPERVIGILANCE: A LEARNED PERCEPTUAL SET AND ITS CONSEQUENCES ON POLICE STRESS: http://gilmartinharris.com/hypervigilance.htm

He spoke at last years Division Chiefs (or Chief Officers) Conference. Firefighters exhibit the same hypervigilance he describes in police officers. If there's interest, I'd be willing to type up what I remember. It was an excellent talk.

Mellie

CA guy

You wrote:

"As you fly into the Rappel area, you are talking constantly with the spotter and your stickmate about fire behavior, rappel zone, safety zone, etc."

"A. ...So approximately 9:20 I had two rappellers, Shane Heath and Jeff Allen, ready themselves for departure to insert into H2. Once over H2 we took a loop out around and showed them their escape route down the west side and safety zones options in the black on the west ridge or in this old burnt area, provided that the grass in the there -- they knew about the grass. We discussed also the workload on the ground. This is one-way discussion too; it's not two-way. They can hear me but they can't talk to me. You're familiar with that?
Q. Yes.
A. All I can get from them is --
Q. Nods, yes or no?
A. -- we understand. Yeah. We discussed the workload on the ground to be about -- and we all know that things look different from the air than they do when you hit the ground. We discussed it to be about an hour's worth of work. And they looked at the area, you know, they had a good look at everything and just give me the okay. They knew we wanted to get the crew inserted in there. Like I said, the rappellers confirmed to me that they understand. We went to a sterile cockpit for rappel operations...."

"So, let's see, again H2 would require insertion of two rappellers to take out what me and the pilot discussed to be approximately six trees and one short snag in the middle of the opening. We could have landed, like I said, if the snag wasn't there, but if we're going to put folks in there to clean it up to make it a two-way heli-spot we figured there was about six ponderosa that needed to be cut out of there."

Q. One thing I was curious, I know you said when you guys dropped them down, rappelled them down that it was one-way communication. I guess I don't know what that means?
A. No, the heli-spot was a one-way heli-spot.
Q. What does that mean?
A. We like to be able to have a heli-spot where you can fly in; instead of having to back out like this, you can go out this way.
Q. Oh, okay.
GEORGE JACKSON: I think what you're probably referencing to is the fact that when they're in rappel mode --
THE WITNESS: Oh, okay. Yeah.
GEORGE JACKSON: They're not hooked up to hot mikes. All they can do is listen. They don't have --
Q. Yeah, because that's why I was confused there. You said that --
A. When we start rappel operations they could pull down their mike and talk to me, I mean; they're plugged in; they can hear what I'm saying. They could pull down their mike and talk to me but we don't instruct them to do that.
Q. So you can talk to them?
A. Yeah.
Q. They get down --
A. And they can look at me and give me the I understand.

vfd cap'n

www.house.gov/pombo/pomboreport/2005/050203.htm

For more information on these and other issues, please visit my website at www.pombo.house.gov.

Richard W. Pombo

www.wrightandco.com/

RT

During the final days of October and the beginning of November, 2003, thirteen wildfires occurred in Southern California. One of these wildfires occurred in San Bernardino County and named the “OLD FIRE”. The “OLD FIRE” created an I-Zone fire that impacted the residents of Crest Forest, Lake Arrowhead, Running Springs, and the city of San Bernardino. This fire will probable redefine the concept of the wildland urban interface fire. The SBCFCA has suggested there is a difference between a Wildland Urban Fire and a Wildland Conflagration.

In case 2005 is as bad as 2003.

SoCal CDF

It's all here in the FS T-D (Technology and Development) Library.

www.fs.fed.us/t-d/php/library_card.php?p_num=9551%202855

username is t-d; password is t-d.

Ab has the library listed on the Links page in the federal section for future
reference and research.

The Lessons Learned link which also has three of the four parts has a link
in the Safety section of the Links page.

Dick-a-pooh Mangan must be off teaching something or he would have
come up with this first! Ab, no disrespect meant, just getting him back for
the last time!

Mellie

"13. Are personnel only assigned to fireline positions for which they are qualified, as certified by their employing agency?
Some subjective questions about the IC's Task book completed by only one person involving mostly only one fire. However, minimum Forest Service standards appear to have been met."

In a couple other places in the file, there is mention of "pencil-whipping" in regards to both taskbooks and crew performance evaluations.

One thing I've been thinking about the last couple days is the "unsafe supervision" slice. The Indianola helitack foreman wasn't at Cramer that day or with the crew on their previous assignment. He was filling an Air Ops trainee slot on an IMT in Wyoming.

Maybe I'm missing something, but there had to be a lack of crew cohesiveness and leadership in a situation like that. The 310/5109 requirements are a good basis for quals, yet does anybody really think that training only takes place in the NWCG class setting?

vfd cap'n

Anyone know where we can get the other three parts and appendices? Oh, just found Parts 3 and 4 by substituting those numbers. Only Part 2 (and appendices) are missing. Ab.

The assignment Turn down protocol is from the Incident Response Pocket Guide, Page 18 in the 2004 edition,
NFES # 1077, they are the little yellow books all the feds carry, you can order them lots of places, including
the Supply Cache company in Colorado.

Icefire

There is a link to Supply Cache on the Classifieds page and there's a banner at the top of the Links Page. Ab.

Do I need to purchase me some of that thar peace-of-mind insurance? Did we ever hear who's selling that stuff and how many arms and legs its costing? I only have two of each...

Kinda kidding, but maybe not...

Link above. The January calendar photo was one of my favorites. Ooooo, nice one on February, too. Best get yours quickly; I know there aren't too many left. Ab.

To whom it may concern:

Enclosed please find a copy of our Storm King 14 Memorial Endowed Scholarship application. A description of the scholarship selection process is also enclosed and should answer most of your questions. However, please contact our office at 1-800-621-8559 and speak with Carol Brown in the Foundation office should any question arise.

Please make copies of the application as needed and distribute to those eligible (a child of a member of a firefighting unit, an immediate family member of one of the fallen firefighters, or a student interested in pursuing a fire management or natural resource degree or certificate program). The student may attend the college of their choice. Colorado Mountain College Foundation holds the endowment, organizes the selection committee, and awards the scholarship(s).

The application and supporting documents are to be received by the Colorado Mountain College Foundation by March 01.

Storm King 14 Memorial Endowment Scholarship cover letter and application

Scholarship selection process document was not included in the email. Here's the contact email for the Foundation: info@cmcfoundation.org. Ab.

Student of Human Factors

PNWCG Memorandum -Guidance

Pacific NWCG Actions to Improve Quality and Performance of Contract Fire Suppression Resources DRAFT

If you sent in a message during our server switch and haven't seen it here, let us know. I don't think anything got lost, but if something is missing it might have ended up in our spam filter to be deleted. Ab.

For Fire Managers trying to achieve IFPM requirements remotely over the internet, I also added the link for the Series 0401 U of Idaho website. If you click the ON-LINE link mid-page, you can download the Excel spreadsheet that lists IFPM Web-Based Classes. If anyone has questions about this list and does not have Excel, drop me a line. Ab.

Here's the announcement: Apprentice

The shift to our new server went quickly and easily, although that rope change might'a strained the Original's back a little. Tongue firmly in cheek: He's not as young as he used to be and those years on the line take their toll on backs. We're hoping for a speedy recovery. In any case, I'll be updating jobs today. Ab.

Are they beyond accountability?

County Guy

This is in regards to no particular decision, just want to say thanks
and acknowledge how hard our FMOs work to keep us and the
public as safe as possible on our interface laden, tinderbox world
of flashy fuels and complex cooperator relations.

Thanks to your wife too.

Cleveland Claire

You're welcome. Ab.