"THEY SAID IT" ARCHIVES
MAY, 2005

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CDF Cedar Fatality Report (pdf)

Cedar Fire MAP

Novato Cedar Fire Report (lg pdf)
5/31 Actually I am not sure They Said is 'technically' BBS, but it sure is the closest I know. Sorry for the use of the acronym, common ff malady as you know.
D

I recall Bulletin Board Systems. Way back, many years ago, there wasn't a public Internet as we know it now. The BBS systems were the precursor to the Internet. They were privately owned and operated computer systems that provided discussion forums, email, chat rooms, software downloads, and much more. It was all DOS based and one had to know or learn a certain amount of text commands to make anything happen. There wasn't any windows based point and click happening. And unless you lived in a select few big cities, you were forced to pay big bucks to the phone company for connecting long distance, not to mention the monthly fees the BBS charged. My monthly phone bills were regularly over $250. I didn't consider it a big deal and was happy to be able to reach out and communicate. OriginalAb.

PS: I also know what Trumpet Winsock is.

5/31 Sorry Ab and users: BBS = Bulletin Board System. See even the internet jargon can get in the way of understanding!
*me thinks Ab asked the question to make that point, clever Ab!*
BB
5/31 NW -

The hidsight 20/20 thing can be done all day, of course FF Rucker should not have died, what if he was in the house, what if the burn team called from below, what if he was sick and never went to the fire? It is a tragedy and I believe that only the other 3 people on the engine, or the people in the immediate vicinty can answer that question.

I consider myself a well experienced and trained FF, I admit I have been iin situations that I did not like, and nearly have lost my life to an overzealous firing team, bad communication, and been turned around in the heat and smoke.

There does not have to be a "failure" in leadership for a line of duty death to occur. All of us are aware of the x-factor. I believe that no amount of training, no amount of equipment, even the most experienced of personnel will be bitten by the x-factor. I just wanted to point that out - that even the best laid of plans can get buggered.

eric

5/31 Ab -

Here's one for the A-76 Competitive Sourcing crowd:

"New guidance from the Office of Management and Budget on exemptions of federal jobs from competitive sourcing efforts promises greater scrutiny of agency decisions:

http://www.fcw.com/article88992-05-27-05-Web "

I especially like the part saying "...Exemption should be granted only if its loss to the private sector would result 'in substantial risk to the agency’s ability' to accomplish its mission, the memo states."Makes me feel really good about my tax dollars and the goals of "our" government. Nothing like a government striving to high ideals.

Be safe- -out there

PS - By the way, for those interested in following government policy news from non-government sources, both FCW (www.fcw.com/) and GovExec (www.govexec.com/) are pretty informative and you can sign up to get
daily news by subject.Also, for more IT and homeland security news, government security news and the ANSER Institute for Homeland Security have some good stuff.
5/31 Mellie and All Others,

I have been reading this site of and on for about 3 years now. Some people have come and gone, but I don’t believe I have ever posted any comments.

I would recommend that everyone reads Amanda Ripley’s article “How to Get Out Alive” in the May 2, 2005 edition of Time magazine. The article hits upon some of the same points as Kelly Close’s paper regarding the Cramer burnover. I am not making an assumption, nor am I implying any correlation to the Cedar fire, but I believe that we as a community need to understand some potential human factors that come in to play during an emergency and we seem to be on that thread right now.

I work with lifeguards and others in EMS and Fire, and am starting to conduct some research with a doctorial friend of mine involving “high trait anxiety”. This is a measurable personality trait that can make some individuals more prone to panic or other undesirable behavior during an emergency. This trait can explain why SFFs remove their SCBA during training in their first smoke house after their quarter service alarm starts and they “can’t breathe”, even though they still have air; or why, as the Time article states, unharmed passengers, in a burning airliner, sitting on a runway, merely sat in the seats to burn instead of using the emergency escapes. We need to understand these character traits better and hopefully develop tactics to train through the trait. Identifying this trait, or other similar traits will hopefully allow us to develop training techniques to guide these individuals through an emergency.

Before anyone jumps on me about “new training”, hang on. I’m not saying we need to be taught different material. Just present the material in a different format. We may also just need to focus more training on certain individuals. Draw this parallel: some of us enter the fire service with little upper body strength, but we focus on weights on push ups until we can hold our own. Same with non-runners developing the leg and cardio capacity to accomplish our jobs.

Mellie, would you get my email from Ab and send me any references you have on your adrenaline table? I would love to hear from any of you with other resources or references regarding this issue, off of the They Said page.

PSUForest
5/31 Does anyone know what the average seasonal cost for an IH crew, and a type 2 crew is ?
Including vehicles, housing, training, overhead, etc ? What does it cost to fund these crews
for a season ?

C.J.
Single Resource Boss
Ellensburg, WA.
5/31 Old Fire DOG-

Amen brother- we need more like you out there!

Technology (GIS, GPS) is amazing. This coming year the entire state will be
flown at 1 meter resolution (good enough to find a roof) and the data will
be public domain spring 2006! By the way, this is HUGE.

The Dept. of Homeland Security has flown a number of urban areas of
interest (going slightly into the WUI) around the state at 1 foot
resolution- but unless someone processes the data it's a bit hard to use on
a large fire area. The data is free and is being processed in various ways
across the state.
Available urban area imagery:
http://nationalmap.gov and click "Go to Viewer"

The problem with CDF data is that most of the aerial photos have licensing
issues (only for CDF use under X, Y, Z programs). I believe the data was
bought by the California Fire Plan which is not directly linked to incident
support. I don't work for CDF so I can't say I understand the issues- I
only know that I have been told it is licensed for only CDF due to $$$
(which is normal and understandable).

There are a lot of things that COULD be done for operations. Most of it is
that you, as ops folks, need to start a dialog discussing what you want,
need, expect, and how we can help you on an incident. I have found over 35
documents (GAO, NWCG, FIRESCOPE, articles, etc) citing expectations of GIS
on incidents and only 1 was written by an operations person- the rest were
GIS types trying to understand what was wanted of us. I live in the land of
fire and so I'm getting better at guessing. Not everyone is lucky enough to
work for fire :-)

Stepping off the soapbox,
GISgirl
5/31 The death of Steve Rucker is again a topic on this site.

We can "what if" all we want about physical condition of firefighters, did or did not a firing operation cause a death, if we had good photos and maps, what the supervisors were doing when and 100 other reasons not yet speculated upon for Rucker's demise.

Having been at the scene, I can tell you that the structure the Novato engine was parked at was in a saddle at the top of a major drainage (San Diego River). The fire burned through the saddle destroying the house and other structures in the saddle while no damage was done to the structures on either side of the saddle. Basic topographical and weather driven fire behavior, up slope and up drainage, was exhibited at the time of the fatality. That portion of the fire was picked up by going direct within hours after the incident by IHC crews, engines and dozers.

The decision to retreat into the structure should only have been used as a last resort measure same as if you were deploying a fire shelter. The actual Safety Zone was the grazed off pasture 100 yards from the fatality site. No fire ever spotted into that field. Waiting until the last minute to try to escape an advancing fire front is the cause of too many fire fatalities and injuries.

This fatality happened in the same drainage and only a couple of miles away from the Inaja fire in that killed several firefighters in 1956 under somewhat similar conditions.

Give yourselves and your crews the extra 5 minutes of that will save you, them and your families the grief that too many of us have experienced in our careers.

Backburnfs
5/31 Hey Ab,

What's the average cost per day of a Type 1 helicopter on an active fire assignment?

-ex-groundpounder
5/31 Why do you continually preach that deploying shelters as heat shields
is a viable tactic? If you are taking refuge in an engine or a house
or whatever and are deploying shelters for whatever reason, you have
already failed as a leader. Instead of focusing on the how to survive
the entrapment, we should be focusing on how to avoid the entrapment
entirely. Entrapment avoidance should be the lesson here, what do we
need to do to avoid this situation in the future? A simple breakdown
in LCES greatly contributed to yet another fatality. Your first
priority as a leader is to recognize these potentially hazardous
situations and avoid them or take steps to mitigate the dangers
within.

Additionally, I think it is very fortunate that we are only reading
about one fatality. There were other "entrapments" that day on
Orchard Lane that were caused by the "firing team." Additional
engines, dozers, and a hotshot crew were all put in additional danger
by the firing. It seems the only resource that followed LCES that
day, and mitigated the hazards that were continually changing, was the
hotshot crew. Their supervisor recognized the hazards and disengaged
his crew to the safety zone.

I agree that leadership failed, but it was on a number of fronts,
first and foremost the experienced FC who was conducting the rogue
firing.

The need for physical testing and higher physical fitness standards is
evident, throughout the fire services. It should start with each
supervisor at the module level.

NW

5/31 Howdy AB...greetings from Colorado.

I came across your website wildlandfire.com in an effort to locate some written history about smokejumpers and specifically about smokejumpers or forest fire fighters wives...and widows. I am trying to find some specific accounts of wives and widows of fire fighters and their stories, preferably from the earlier years of the Forest Service, that I can use to write a couple songs for a friend of mine in the Forest Service who is also working on this project.

Your website was very interesting to go through, and it was also very interesting to read the emails from today's wives (in familysaid) about their lives going on while their husbands and boyfriends are out on the firelines. I am certain that the communications between wives in the days before email probably read pretty much the same, with the concerns for the safety of their loved ones and the joys and tribulations of having babies and raising families without their loved ones around, plus all the other news, like the wives health issues, sharing recipes, talking about where their partners are working, etc etc....

If anyone in your 'family' there has any information they would care to share with me or any info on books or reference material I can get my hands on in regards to stories of wives or widows of forest fire fighters, I would be most obliged. Please feel free to email me at pattyclayton@msn.com.

Thanks for your time!

Patty Clayton ~ Performing Songwriter
Female Performer of the Year for the Western Music Assoc.
website: www.cimarronwind.com
5/31 Yes, there are many lessons to be learned in reading the Novato Fire and CDF Cedar Fire Reports. I hope that my postings will not put a damper on your communications. Keep up the good work and be very aware of your situation when you are on the fire line.

Adrenaline - perhaps. It is my belief that Steve's airway had been burned when he was taking refuge behind the engine. This makes sense to me because his last words to Captain McDonald were "I'm burning up!" as he fell up on the cement patio.

and to FC180 - what's with the statement "we all need to be prepared for other firefighters to do unpredictable things" (regarding the reactions of the 6162 crew)? The crew of 6162 was in survival mode, and it is fortunate that 3 of the 4 did survive. Let's shift the blame where it needs to be pointed. The CDF FC violated command structure, was not in communication with the crews on Orchard Lane, and had no water supply - all while setting backfires. If that's not unpredictable - and totally reckless behavior - then I don't know what is. If you do one day fight fire with the FC in question, I hope that it will be on a deserted island so that others will not be affected. I wonder if you will feel the same way after you have seen the video tape.

Cathy Rucker
5/31 You raise some interesting points and concerns about the tragedy in the Cedar Fire. But I find it interesting that you challenge the answers ("publish the unvarnished truth") provided, when you don't provide the truth/facts.

First Novato is not all flat. The Fire District is 71 square miles, which is about one third urban (Novato FD website). That one third is fairly flat, the rest (which is wildland and interface land) is at least as sloped as the burn over site, if not greater. Remember the slope at the burn over site was 20-40% (pg 70 of the report). Novato has brush and grassy/oak woodlands as it's primary fuel types, with heavy timber is some wetter areas. Marin is as close to the Pacific Ocean as San Diego is. Of course the weather patterns are different in San Diego, but we get the severe "transition days" as badly as San Diego did the day of the burnover. In fact, a common statement in Marin is we could have the Oakland Hills fire all over again, on a normal weather day. (Oakland Hills was on a extreme east wind day. But, viejo would lead you to believe we don't get that sort of experience in Marin, or in the Bay Area. Again, the "unvarnished truth".)

As to crew experience. We all want to go to fires, and many of us don't get to as many fires as we would like. That being said, do we not send personnel to a 500 acre (Class E is 300-1000 acres) because they haven't been to one before? Do we not send personnel to a 10,000 acre fire if they haven't seen that big a fire before? That would have meant there would have been very few (particularly in light of the other large fires burning at the time) people with viejo's required experience to go to Cedar, as it finished at over 280,000 acres.

Last year, engines from Marin went to at least 6 5000 acre or better fires that leap to my feeble memory without any digging into written records. Of course none were in Marin. Experience in Lake, Sonoma, Napa, Shasta and other areas counts, doesn't it?

There are some valid issues that can be documented in this report. The report said nothing I saw about the "experience" of the crew, as far as I can see. This is strictly a judgment call on viejo's part to attack the crew of E6162, and I am not sure where he got his "facts". The report mentioned all training at the engine company level was current and appropriate.

Is that "unvarnished truth"?

bluezebra
5/30 Both the CDF and the Novato FPD reports are very well done and both departments should be commended for making the reports available for the public (wildland fire community) to review for lessons learned.

Novato FPD also has another version of the report titled "Investigation Analysis of the Cedar Fire Incident" at www.novatofire.org/cedar.pdf. Please take a look at page 71 of the report regarding carbon monoxide exposure levels and the differences specifically on page 71 between the two Novato reports.

I understand that the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) was also doing an investigation of the Cedar fire fatality and had some preliminary information (Novato F.P.D, Cedar Fire Incident Recovery Report, p. 71).

Will NIOSH release the preliminary report and will they also be releasing a final report?

NIOSH conducts third party independent fire investigations of line of duty deaths that result from traumatic and cardiac related events.

www.cdc.gov/niosh/firehome.html

Lobotomy

See Cathy Rucker's post below regarding the timeframe of the NIOSH Report.

Those doing the report probably had something new on carbon monoxide brought to their attention and they added it. It's not like some info was left out of the most recent report on the Novato website. Good info was added.

I downloaded the first Novato report last May. I should update that one on the server here to include the carbon monoxide information. Ab.

5/30 Dear Viejo,

I am Cathy Rucker, widow of Novato Firefighter Steven Rucker. I would like to point out a few facts:

1. You mention that the engine should have been used for shelter because it was relatively undamaged. Does that mean that it had breathable air in the cab and that the air was not too hot? I would like to show you Steve's melted duffel bag, which was located inside the cab.

2. The NIOSH report will be released soon. In it you will read that Steve had a physical exam in August 2003 and that he was cleared for duty without restrictions. Yes, he had allergy-induced asthma. It is estimated that 5-8% of the population has it - that would most likely include your fellow firefighters

3. What's the sense in deploying heat shield when the temperature is too great? The crew of 6162 were literally running for their lives. I suggest you go back and read the reports to realize the short amount of time they had to react. If they had stayed by their hoselines, there would have been four fatalities.

4. Novato, CA is completely surrounded by urban-wildland interface. Their fires stay small because they use mutual aid and aircraft, when necessary. Steve was an experienced wildland firefighter with two seasons with the CDF as a young man. I have heard many seasoned firefighters say over and over that they had never seen fires like they did in Southern California in 2003. My point is that no amount of experience can prepare someone for a fire storm - until they have lived through one.

And dear Gizmo

Amen!! There was a change of CDF Administrators in July 2004 - that's one excuse.

Cathy

Welcome Cathy, sorry for your loss. I hope you know it's not our intention to inflict more pain. Firefighters just have to hash things out to see what can be learned. Ab.

5/30 vieho

<chuckle>
I thought the reason we went to training was so we would use it afterwards. I put up all the possible topics to encourage people to think about possible issues.

Sometimes I just can't help myself...

Mellie

PS Engineer Rucker's failure to go to the house is a puzzle we may never have the answer to. One simple possible human factors explanation comes from the "fight or flight" adrenalin and heart rate research. When we get charged up with adrenalin, it affects our whole body. Our heart rate increases automatically and lots of other human factors come into play. Ab could you please put up this quick Table of how adrenalin affects heart rate and other human functions. Fire sights, sounds, smell, heat overwhelm the senses, triggering massive adrenalin release. Engineer Rucker could simply have had an extreme adrenalin release and a heart rate increase into the red zone that made him confused, and be unable to run. There are individual differences in how people respond to that kind of stress.

5/30 Weirdness of Internet Communication:

So, the Cedar Fire Report is the latest catalyst to controversy and discussion. That is what this site was put together for (correct me if I am wrong Ab). And so far there has been some provocative ideas put forth. Again, that is what the site is for, right?

But, it appears that some feathers have been ruffled and some offense has been taken. Cooler heads, like Mellie and others have tried to get folks to focus on what we can learn from and avoid 'pointing fingers'. I applaud those efforts even though and precisely because I have been perceived to be abrasive and out of line at times. Sometimes it has been for a purpose, to be provocative, others it was misguided attempts at humor.

A respected colleague of mine reads They Said but never responds because he feels that too many folks just use this site to spout off with out having any real insight, he may have a point, but I wish he would contribute, he has some great ideals... and ideas.

One of the problems with a BBS (Bulletin Board System) is that it relies on the written word which is inherently limited. Readers cannot hear inflection, see body language and sense other cues that give clues to intent and emphasis. Don't get me wrong, this place is a great resource and has contributed greatly to the availability of info, and chance for discussion, I am just pointing out one of its limitations. Trust me I understand them better since certain communications produced an unintended misunderstanding.

But it is all worth it for such a provocative site, right?

Provocative: Function: adjective: serving or tending to provoke , excite, or stimulate

{Merriam-Webster Online}

BB

5/30 Thought I'd pass this along. IAFC calls for "stand down" June 21 for firefighter safety

It's time for all of us to sit back and look at what we do and how we do it. As firefighters, both structural and wildland, we need to watch our 'Can do' attitude and sometimes say: "Let's look at this a little closer." A fire may burn a little more structure or acreage, but is it worth a firefighter?
www.iafc.org/home/index.asp

Hickman
5/30 There are good aerial photos and sketch maps of the incident in the Novato FPD report on the incident which is available in the archives. (Ab note: Also a link is available above in the header. Maps are pages 22, 25 & 27)

I suggest everyone read both the CDF report and the Novato report. The Novato report hints at a physical condition undisclosed in the CDF report, i.e. that Engineer Rucker was at the time using prescription meds for asthma. The report also goes into detail about the need for physical testing and performance standards for wildland assignments. Is there an unsaid statement in those remarks?

In a recent post, FC-180 makes a strong case for the crew not to abandon the engine. That's what I was taught and I concur. The facts seem to bear this out, since the engine was relatively undamaged.

I find Mellie's 5/29 post interesting. She is apparently trying to fit this scenario into all of that high level training she's been attending and reading about this winter. You know, Swiss cheese models, proximal cause, latent cause, and so forth. To be very blunt here, the leadership failed and the crew panicked. They did not stick together, did not deploy shelters as heat shields and abandoned their hoselines. The first thing a crew leader must do is keep control of his crew and when the situation turns bad you keep them close.

To say that this was an experienced crew is a misnomer. Novato is a medium large town (city to most of us), population 50,000 in the north of Marin County. It is relatively flat ground with little expanse of wildland. The county is subjected to a wet marine influence and rarely experiences a Class E or larger fire. Very little of the Marin County experience would prepare any crew for a wind driven San Diego County fire.

There are lessons to be learned here. Its too bad the parent agencies can't or won't publish the unvarnished truth. 

viejo
5/30 The Jobs Page and Series 0462 (Forestry Technician) & Series 0455 (Range Technician) jobs pages and Series 0401 ("professional" Biologist) are updated.

The State of Idaho Department of Lands is recruiting for two full time positions of Lands Resource Managers - Fire. One entry level, one Senior position. The application period closes June 17th, see the Jobs Page for more info.

Ab.

5/29 Ab,

I found the Cedar Fire Fatality Report much easier to understand and to draw lessons from, when I had an air photo of the area for reference. I'm attaching two labeled air photo of the accident area that I tossed together. They are the same picture:
JPEG (smaller
, but not so good when zoomed)
Tiff (bigger, better detail).

The air photo is a DOQ from USGS via www.terraserver.microsoft.com
There are no copyright issues with the image. The image is dated 05/28/02. If you want a broader view, go get it from this website.

I got the address information to label the structure from San Diego County.
Parcel data online at www.sangis.org/SangisInteractive/viewer/viewer.asp.

Now my two cents.

Too bad the STL, the FC, the DIVS etc. didn't have air photos. Lot's of things might have been done differently. As the report correctly points out: Accidents happen at the end of chains of events. Therefore there are lots of places that accidents can be stopped.

Good Incident Intelligence is integral to Incident Safety. Don't settle for less than you can get.

CDF does have very good, recent color photography of much of the urban interface in the state. It would be a big change in the approach to fire intelligence/situational awareness if Ops folks left their briefings with an air or satellite image. Those days are not far away.

If Ops folks start to ask for photos, as well as maps, it will happen sooner rather than later. I suggest folks go to the Sit Unit with a USB data key and ask nicely for an image of their Division. Any laptop and some PDAs will be able to display the JPEG or Tiff you will get. Heck if you are staying in a hotel, chances are you will have free internet access. Go to Terraserver and get yourself a DOQ or two.

Make use of all your senses out there, including good old common sense.

-Old Fire DOG

Thanks Old Fire DOG. Another piece for looking at the puzzle. Ab.

5/29 Just a note to tell you what a lovely Family Day we had, the Wildland Firefighter 
Foundation did an excellent job. Some great speakers also. I think the most
touching was the releasing of the doves and the bagpiper. Of course Vicki, Burk
and Melissa really went all out for us. How can we ever thank the wff enough?
Please remember to join the 52 club.

KB

5/29 Robert Cunningham please email Ab. Someone has expressed interest in buying your Davis Plume photo.
(Dave Lockwood, do you have contact info?)

Thanks, Ab.

5/29 Am I reading something wrong in the CDF Cedar Fire Review Report.

In the report, it says "The Review Report, supporting data, and
supplemental information were provided to the Agency Administrator
on March 10, 2004."

If the report had such valuable lessons to be learned, why was the report
not made public until 14 months after it was provided to the Agency
Administrator?

Gizmo
5/29 AB,

The lesson is that if you are unassigned to the incident let alone that
division, and apparently did not know the weather or fire behavior, you
should not be conducting unplanned firing operations. What the heck was
the thought process that prompted the firing and resulting maelstrom? It
is unbelievable. As I read the report and realized the consequences of
those two tragically firing along the lane, I stopped reading and put my
hands over my eyes and slowly shook my head. They did not even stop
after a helicopter begin dropping on what they fired. Simply
unbelievable!! It was individual action not department plan that
resulted in tragedy. The dept is culpable only if they allow that no one
is culpable and it was the fates of fire behavior that caused it.

Take Care,
Dave
5/29 Contributors, let's make Steve Rucker's death count for something. We can do that by having a meaningful dialog on lessons learned from this tragedy.

What happened? (Read about it.) What are the unanswered questions in your minds? Here are some things I thought of as I read along. I would like to hear anyone's thoughts on any and all of the following that is not clear in the report:

  • Was there an up-to-date plan? Large plan (IAP?). Small plan: saving the house safely? Was the plan accomplished? If there was no plan, why not? If the plan failed, why?
  • What led to entrapment? Were standard procedures followed pre-entrapment? Which ones were not? Why not?
  • After entrapment, were standard procedures followed? Which ones were not? Why not? Why did some survive, but not Engineer Rucker?
  • If we use the Swiss Cheese Model of causality, what was the " proximal cause"? What were the "latent causes"? What holes in the Swiss Cheese lined up? Where are agency and fire organization strengths? All agencies/organizations? Where are agency and fire organization weaknesses? All fire agencies/organizations?
  • We're interagency in this day and age; we need to communicate better and better. How can we do that?
  • Training. At a minimum do we need training standards like CICCS or 310-1 or something more like FSH 5109.17. What about physical training and physical fitness standards? How might we bring all cooperators up to speed on training? Do we need to do that?
  • A good leader knows the "team member" strengths and weaknesses and uses them appropriately. Would it be better to match agencies/organization's current training, experience and job (structure vs wildland) with assignment? Can we track that with technology?
  • What part did human factors play in this tragedy? How might knowledge of human factors help firefighters make better choices? Would this help at all? (Aside: Did the hotshield masks that Rucker and McDonald wore have any effect? Do they off-gas at high temps?)
  • What part did leadership play? How might formal leadership skills help us make better choices? What impact did human factors have on leadership decisions?
  • Experience. How is experience with wildland fire documented in each organization? How do we keep those with not enough experience out of leadership roles?
  • Competence. How do we make sure that firefighters at every level are competent to perform their job as safely as possible? How do we fire those who are not competent? Is it easier for fire departments to fire incompetent firefighters than for land use agencies to fire incompetent firefighters? Measurable standards?

Readers, the political wrangling and infighting following the 2003 Cedar Fire After Action Review was sad. It had lots of potential that was not realized. Let's do better than that. Please, let's educate each other.

Mellie

5/29 I found this in the old archives after the Cedar fire. A little funny now in light of the new CDF report.

<snip, a theysaid post November 11/9/04>

It is in my hopes that the CDF heads will not turn a blind eye as they have done in the past. They need to make public now that it does not end with this report and that they are investigating further actions. Regardless of the agency, accountability must be up held.

R5 Dirtminer

I think the release of this report makes the burnout information public. Ab.

5/29 I am sure we can all agree that "Dave" jumps to conclusion when he unequivocally states that the CDF FC "put the fire on the ground that killed Rucker". I wish I lived in such a black and white fire behavior world. Being a firefighter would be so much easier.

Let me say that I have worked with the FC in question, he is a skilled and experienced firefighter. He has many years of service in a county that gets more than its share of dangerous fires, and has fought fire all over the west, not just San Diego. I have fought fire shoulder to shoulder with him and would do so again and probably will.

The main thing that stands out in the Green Sheet and the detailed report that was uncharacteristically released to the public (an entire subject for discussion on its own) is the fact that they drove the engine away from the scene of the fatality, and all four of the Novato firefighters fled from the engine to the house. Now I agree that a house can often be an excellent refuge since there is a delay in the ignition from the initial fire passage, but I teach my crew that the engine should ALWAYS be your first refuge. Despite the unintentionally misleading information in the MTDC video from a few years ago denigrating the engine as a refuge, encouraging people to leave the engine and deploy a fire shelter. Nonsense. Inside your engine you have water, A/C maybe, Breathing apparatus maybe, shelter of steel and glass, and with a fire shelter open against the windows, a fairly comfortable refuge. Look at the Crank Fire entrapment video from 1987. The 3 engine crews retreated to the engines in a CROWN fire. That is proof in the pudding for me. Even though they eventually had to leave the engines and deploy tents on the ground, the peak fire intensity had passed.

Imagine how different the outcome of the Cedar fire fatality would be if the crew had gone directly into their engine (they were already all together there), rode out the worst (shut the pump down to prevent loss of water), got out when the heat had passed and put the structure fire out and gone to the next one.

I also believe that if you read between the lines, there was an underlying medical emergency that resulted in Rucker's confused behavior and falling. He either had a massive heart attack or a stroke or something. The Novato Captain should have been able to drag Rucker into the house if he had stayed on his feet and contributed to his own escape. This is just my opinion, and we will never know the truth even if the investigation team knows something. Health Information Privacy Act, you know.

We all need to be prepared for other firefighters to do unpredictable things. Doesn't one of the kids interviewed in the "Your Fire Shelter" video say just that?

FC180

There are alternative explanations for Engineer Rucker's behavior in my opinion. Ab.

5/29 SoCal FF:

Who said I worked for the USFS and what difference does that make anyway? Maybe I work for CDF! Take your blinders off and examine the report critically, you might see some of the same issues I raised. Not sure how much time you have in the saddle, but by your quick defensiveness, I’m thinking not much.

NOW GET OUT OF YOUR F@$^&*& LAWN CHAIR BEFORE I THROW YOU OUT OF IT! (from the report?)

Doesn’t feel (or read) very good does it?

AB-You are exactly right, my intent is to not bash CDF, but to further debate the material and hopefully learn from it.

Sign me “Sad for those involved, but grateful for the information”
5/29 Lets stop bashing the name CDF it may have been the dept. that employed that company officer but CDF didn't burn Rucker the Company officer who gave the order to put fire on the ground. I have had the opportunity to work for both agencies Forest service as an FEO and currently work for CDF in a contract city. All those who are bashing CDF who work for the Forest Service you should know better because there are many folks who work for the forest service who have done the same thing or similar that compromise your safety or others safety and what happen to them, promoted or put in training, dispatch and better yet an LEO position with F---ing gun.

I guess my point is that look we do a dangerous job and anywhere you go, There is know to avoid these people NO MATTER who's dept. you work for. So please stay safe watch your crew's ass and yours this year. Stay SAFE!

SOCAL FF

I took out the repeated reference to CDF in the post with the 19 points. I can see how you might interpret it as CDF bashing. Knowing the poster, I know that was not the poster's intent. FYI, there has been CDF input on this thread, so this isn't simply a case of non-CDF firefighters ganging up on CDF.

That said, Firefighters, let's remember to focus on "the what, not the who" for the best lessons learned. I appreciate that CDF has released the report and commend them. We can all learn from it. We will have interface fires in the future. We should be more ready. Ab.

5/29 Ab, a few comments on the Cedar Fire Fatality Report. It's good to read it and have the chance to discuss it.
  • First let me say we all were doing the best we could during the Cedar Firestorm, especially for the first few days. Resources were committed to the firestorms to our north. We were short. We were watching communities go up in smoke. We knew some people were loosing their lives. Day1 we were all acting fairly independently as we tried to get the organizations and coordination up to speed. By Day2-3 we were doing better but anyone who was there can tell you we were in combat mode the whole time. Some more experienced firefighters more than others. Willing structure firefighters who wanted to help were rolling in. By Day5 there was still a sense of urgency. Adrenalin was way too high. We need to guard against that in the future if we can.
  • Communications. We need to do better. If you can't communicate, pull back.
  • Fire training. We need to do better for firefighters not well trained or experienced in wildland. Grass fires are not the same as the conflagration we faced on the Cedar. Structure training is very different than wildland. It's hard if not impossible to be trained and experienced in both. When push comes to shove we go back to our training. We need to recognize our strengths and weaknesses and the strengths and weaknesses of our brothers/sisters. We need to place them on tasks they can accomplish successfully and safely. If/when we have a terrorist HAZMAT situation we will need to recognize that the situation will be way beyond the training and experience of many of our wildland firefighters. We will need those trained in hazmat to consider our training and inexperience.
  • Escape Routes/Safety Zones: When you have a hammer all you see is nails. When you're a structure firefighter experienced with small grass fires, you see a structure as a safety zone, instead of seeing it as just another fuel type.
  • Dedicated Lookout: Hard to remember this one when you're focused on structure. Harder yet to find someone that can really see and read the fire behavior. Saddle anyone? Smoke from several directions?
  • When people see something they've never seen before, they often don't make good choices. Whose fault is that? When firefighters don't know what they don't know, most will think they know how to handle it and they try. It's in our nature to try.
  • Finally. Most firefighters will assume those around them have a similar level of experience and can take care of themselves. We can't afford to make that assumption on the interface with interagency resources.

That's my twobits for a start.

Sign me socal CDF (Another one)

5/29 AB: RE-Cedar Fire Report

I couldn’t help but look back in your archives and re-read “Fire it Up!” from a few years back. Paragraph 7:

“I must say to be fair though, some of this effectiveness is also due to the inexperience of DIVS and other overhead not being very creative in how to use them, so it is not entirely the fault of the OES strike team. This is why you see reference to the "Lawn Chair" syndrome. Even the OES strike team leaders are getting a little more savvy to this and are trying to be a bit more discrete in the use of the dreaded chair and find meaningful work for their team. It's even covered now in I-330 STL class as a no-no!”

I can’t help but think that this lawn chair culture somehow had a part in all this. Local, state, and federal resources approach these fires differently. State and federal approach this work as another day on the job whether that is on forest, off forest, or in county or out of county. To local government, an out of district response is something rare and afforded to the few. It is a party, a chance to “get out” and go have some fun and see some big fire and play with the big dogs. Probably sounds harsh and arrogant, but it is a reality.

I am glad to see the CDF finally release something more than one of their standard 2-3 page “green sheet” on a major accident investigation. As much as some of these things must sting to those involved, there are valuable training lessons here to be learned that would never have been brought to light. I wonder though if this was an intentional release, there is nothing official about internally from the Sacramento office about it. Go to the CDF website and find it if you can without the link provided on They Said It.

Questions or thoughts generated in my mind after a first time read:

  1. Was the DIVS local, state or federal? Does that matter? Maybe so.
  2. Was the CDF Captain an experienced hand that saw something inevitable coming and reacted deliberately (independent action vs free lancing) to it, knowing full well he was operating in a manner inconsistent with accepted risks for when things don’t work out (“Stud vs Pud”)?
  3. Why was the FC so adamant earlier about an aggressive tactical plan? Were things so stagnant that he felt he needed to take the world by the balls?
  4. Would he have acted this way with CDF resources around him? Would those resources have understood the situation differently? Would the captains on those resources “kicked his F@$%*&^ ass” for doing what he did or proposed to do?
  5. Did the local government people understand what they were seeing from the fire and what the fire effects were about to be from the main fire?
  6. Lawn chair syndrome (again) by local government and the party is on, we get to go on the road again yippee!
  7. No common communications between forces at a critical time when everyone needs to be on the same channel (or at least the DIVS and STL’s).
  8. It looks like the only guy who really sized up the whole thing was the El Cariso Supt-things got weird and he re-grouped.
  9. Did the Novato engineer listen to what the Novato captain was telling him to do?
  10. How can the Novato FF not have had a hose pack and yet there is a burned up pile of hose next to him. Somebody was trying to fight fire with more hose.
  11. Reaction time of the Novato crew vs rate of spread.
  12. Why was the engine spotted where it was in the first place-between the main head fire and the house? And how come it is the only thing that didn’t burn to the ground? If it didn’t burn then that means there was an opportunity for something else to not burn. Something isn’t adding up here at all.
  13. Could the engine have been parked down the driveway somewhere and hose laid back up the driveway?
  14. Why was the crew trying to force a door at a critical time and why were they doing from the fire side of the house? Did anyone look first to see if the doors were unlocked or open one first long before the fire got to them if they intended to stay? Why didn’t they run around the lee side of the house and get in there? No doors?
  15. Did they understand what the Captain and engineer were doing? Sounds like it was a parallel operation trying to hold back the inevitable.
  16. Why were the FIREFIGHTERS taking PICTURES on fire impinging on them instead of fighting fire, etc….
  17. Why do the agencies (state or fed) put local government resources in these positions during critical fire weather, fuels and behavior alone without agency resources? We don’t put private dozers alone any more for this very reason.
  18. There is NOTHING new that needs to be created in the training world to mitigate this incident. It all exists now. This should be the case study for the L-180 through L380 series. Perfect fit.
  19. Don’t burden us with more rules and restrictions as a result of this, most can see the problems here and will use this report to revisit them.

I feel for the FC, he has a long road of scorn ahead of him, but then again, it is all about choices (#2 above). In a way it’s kind of like driving drunk and somebody hits you. Well, maybe.

Sign me “Sad for those involved, but grateful for the information”

Links to the Novato Cedar Incident Report and the CDF Cedar Incident Report are on the Documents Worth Reading list on the Archives page and on the Site Map.

5/29 Lobotomy,
This is my recommendation for California stakeholders.

A Guide to the California Public Records Act
www.thefirstamendment.org/capra.html

NK

5/29 Lobotomy:

A quick search brought up a site with FAQ which stated that the FOIA itself is applicable only to the federal government. However, most states have their own versions of the act. Another search of the California Code of Regulations mentions a California Public Records Act, which is probably the animal you're looking for. How to use it, I don't know. A newspaper reporter is probably the best source to start for this activity. Good luck

EvanC
5/29 Al,

Forest Service Apprentices sign a service agreement that states that
they will work for the federal government (they could work for the FS, the
IRS or any other Federal Agency) for three times the length of the training
period after completing the Program and conversion to a permanent position.
If they take a permanent job before completing the program the time starts
counting down when they start that job. The length of their training period
is between 2000 and 4000 hours, depending on how much experience they came
into the program with. I don't have the exact number here, but for each
year they work they are credited a little over 2000 hours. This means that
the length of the service agreement is between 3 and 6 years. People in
other programs, such as TFM also sign service agreements. If you would like
to look at the WFAP's service agreement it is posted on our web page, just
look under region 5 forms. (www.wfap.net/forms.html#r5)

-Cara
5/29 Strider and yactak, the SAFENET system is a joke.

On 5/17/2004... SAFENET ID # 6CNVYZSAFE was entered into the system.

The SAFENET addresses some real time safety problems with the new shelters. Nearly two weeks later.... no action has been taken even though folks are fighting fires and not knowing if the new shelters have the handles to deploy them properly.

Since the implementation of the SAFENET system, there have been some good corrective actions taken.... but many corrective actions have been ignored due to budgets. Safety should never be reliant upon budgets.

I plan on contacting my Forest FMO tomorrow and letting him know about the problems that have been addressed on the SAFENET page and the problems that yactak talks about.. my fix would be to pull the shelters from the field as a recall since there is an obvious problem.

Rogue Rivers

P.S. - how do all the USDI folks love your new radios and the lack of action in replacing them with something that works?
5/29 SoCal EMT-FF,

Yes there are many risks in both firefighting and EMT work, but the question was about haz pay for stopping bleeding of a fellow fire fighter. Each incident and area are different and has to be taken into consideration. Maybe in Southern California getting someone to medical treatment is not as hard as it is here in Montana.

You spoke of All Risks, do you mean other then the blood, the fire, the terrain, and possible wind shifts? Believe me I can go on for awhile about other risks. It is nothing everybody does not already know.

If you really think about it you alone has to make a choice on that fire line if you are going to help stop the flow of blood from a severe injury. That is why I suggested to get a set of rubber gloves and gauze and put them in the day pack.

Cris
5/28 SteveM,

I think that I agree with you on the Captains responsibilities. If their head is in the dirt and spraying water... they are not protecting their crews.

About ten years ago, our district used to have Captains on the nozzle of a hoselay. District fire management changed that policy and said it was the responsibility of the Captain to lead and direct the safe operations of his or her crew.... not to be fighting fire and having his or her head down and concentrating on putting the wet stuff on the red stuff. It was probably the first time I can remember when situational awareness was being implemented as a district policy.... the intent was to limit the distractions so that situational awareness (we called it fire environment back then) can be focused upon by the module leader. Now, some old timers remain and the people who made that policy are now gone. The new captains are going back to the "captain on the nozzle" version.

Gizmo
5/28 Since it was not in the version of the CDF report I read, does anyone have a copy of the Cedar Fire IAP (Incident Action Plan) for the division on the day of the incident that shows the 27:1 span of control ratio?

I believe the entire report and documentation is over one thousand pages long and only 81 pages were released to the folks who need the info most. According to the report, the IAP is in Tab Sections 204,205; Item # 36,37.

Also, does anyone know if California is subject to the rules of the Freedom of Information Act or does it only apply to the federal agencies?

Lobotomy
5/28 AB,

In reference to the recent Cedar Fire report, seems to me there is very
little question that those two rogue firemen from hell, put the fire on
the ground that killed Rucker. These men should be charged or
investigated or whatever it takes. CDF wouldn't say it but I will. There
can be no excuse for their actions that day assigned or unassigned. The
can be no excuse for a DIVS span of control to be 27 to 1, either.
I have to complain about SoCal County fftr's reference to a 'cowboy' FC.
That FC did not have an ounce of cowboy in him.

Take Care,
Dave
5/28 I think one problem all agencies have is that it's hard to terminate incompetent
people who put us at risk. As someone pointed out people who are incompetent
are incompetent at seeing their own incompetence. We need to show and tell them
and if they don't "get" it and change their behavior, fire them before they contribute
to killing someone. With all the HR and union involvement, it's all about
documenting documenting documenting the unprofessional situations so you can
show a pattern.

It is every leader's responsibility to give the tough feedback and demand training,
quals, OJT, and performance standards be met.

If you can't get it up the chain of command, file a SAFENET.

Strider

5/28 In CDF, here's the Fire Captain's (FC) duties

FC: an experienced and trained company officer and fire station manager. Well-qualified to train, mentor & and supervise groups of subordinates. Directs and oversees the emergency and non-emergency activities and duties of a fire company.

My-gawd. Why hasn't the cowboy FC on the Cedar Fire been terminated by CDF or at least stood down? Where's the discipline??? He was out of line running around doing what he was doing outside of the chain of command and it sounds like he doesn't have a clue. CDF must think his behavior is OK if they've done nothing. Are they afraid of having to bear some responsibility for Steve Rucker's death if they discipline him?

As an exercise, take the death out of the story, the FCs behavior is unacceptable.

SoCal County Firefighter

5/28 Music Man,

Good drop. We'll see if you know the next clip I send in.

Ab, as far as music, 12 bar blues tracks (preferably instrumental) work very well for the fire clips. It doesn't have to be a cover song, original music works fine. What has worked well is a long (12-15 minute) live jam with ups and downs, seems to match the tempo of the fire footage. The important thing is the "feel", thats why Blues works so well. Thanks to all who sent in suggestions for tracks, If I ever get time, i'll pick one out and add it.

TP

5/28 More on the thread of Wildfire Smoke and Your Health: www.nmenv.state.nm.us

NM Firefighter

5/28 It's my understanding that someone who completes the Apprenticeship
Academy has to serve in the Forest Service for a certain amount of time
once they're done. Does anyone know what that timeframe is?

How about people being trained to meet IFPM standards? What are
their payback requirements? IFPM training is happening on a priority
basis with the highest up getting the education slots first?

AL

5/28 Just tripping down memory lane and caught a link to some postings from '03 regarding "Just one more time"

As a retired rapper I got my just one more time dream (or at least close) During the 2003 fire season in British Columbia things got really heavy with many more lives and homes on the line than I had seen in all of my active years. Long story short a group of us old guys got a call from the service to recert and look after some rookies down on the coast were things were not quite as bad. Did not get any action just some public relations stuff and a few patrols.

Feeling depressed about the whole thing I got back into my normal routine just as the season was ending and on the drive home after a long business trip, there it was. A new start, it it was moving fast (after 4:00PM with a good wind) did not get a chance to rappel but spent a few hours on the ground, swinging and slinging and chocking on the smoke. Finished off the evening in a 212 as a spotter.

I would not give up the day reliving the past but sometimes I think it was a bad thing because it just got my blood pumping all over again, I guess this proves it 2 years later.

Rustic

Keep your Pulaski sharp, your lid on and watch out for those FNGs.
5/28 Today, 5/28/05 is the last working day before the retirement of a special man.

Pat Boss, of the San Jacinto Ranger District, San Bernardino National Forest, will put in a full day today doing his best to serve the public and his fellow employees. He has done so for many years, starting in the early 60's as a seasonal firefighter on the very same district. He also served his community, Idyllwild in many valuable capacities over the years. One important one was to use his standing and trust in the community to reassure them that his employer, and colleagues had their best interest at heart in an aggressive prescribed burning program. He was instrumental in the success of this program and will be missed. (His program has become a model for the forest, in this regard.)

Pat also has had a huge impact in the wildland fire world, from providing the logistics to get hungry firefighters fed, to keeping local press informed, to being the Information Officer on a very active IMT. I am honored to have known and worked with him and wish to share his accomplishments with the Firefighting community at large.

An admirer.
5/28 To all that have responded about the 'proper' procedure for hose lays,

There is not any ONE proper procedure for a hose lay! Any one that tells you different does not know squat! Each fire, area, region, fuel type, situation requires a certain response. Firefighters are not cooks, that can NOT rely on a recipe, we are professionals that adapt to diverse and changing conditions on the fly! That is why they pay us the big bucks... hehe...

To AXE and Just Another Engine Guy:

I will assume that your comments are tongue in cheek. since they obviously show no recognition of reality what so ever.

Many of us engine folks in SoCal resisted the 'Captain, Battalion Chief, Division Chief' nomenclature, but have come to realize that in this complex interagency environment it is helpful, efficient and even necessary for a smooth and safe operation in our environment.

I would not presume to speak to what is best in your 'neck of the woods' but I have come to realize (reluctantly... kicking and screaming) that it works here.

Which brings us back to the hose lay thread....

What ever works best in a given situation is the way you should do it.

Respectfully,

BB
5/27 I just finished reading the CDF's final report on the Cedar Fire Fatality, and I have to say I am disappointed in CDF's lack of candor and guts to face the truth in this investigation. While the report makes clear that independent actions by two of its employees occurred to conduct uncoordinated firing, and identifies that the firing was lit so as to place the Novato firefighters between the main fire and the back fire, the report only finds these actions as secondary or contributing "minor" factors to the burnover. The report fails to condemn the utter inappropriateness of its employees conducting freelance firing, nor does it condemn the fact that they were unassigned to the fire yet directing and interacting with resources on the line without authority. These activities should have been listed as primary factors in this incident. The witness statements even indicate that the freelancers "badgered" the DIVS to get a chance to lay fire on the ground and never got authorization to do anything that they did. Other causal factors of less importance were also apparent and highlighted, but the fact that CDF took over a year and a half to publicly acknowledge this and then failed to clean up its own house is an insult to the memory of FAE Steve Rucker and all firefighters who place their lives on the California fireline. Shame!

Contract County Guy

CDF Cedar Incident Report, 05 (2749K pdf file)

5/27 GH-

Lauder Fire Bullet Points (1987)
  • Loss of Life: One firefighter died in the deployment area.
  • Injuries: Several burned in the deployment area.
  • Situation:
    • Early morning start in the middle of the 1987 “siege”.
    • Two copters and fly crews dispatched with ground resources and fixed wing
      ordered.
    • The fire was situated in a basically E-W drainage.
    • The fire was making narrow strip runs from the valley floor to the
      ridgeline at @0700.
    • Fuel was old brushy logging re-growth with considerable heavy dead and
      down component.
  • Events:
    • Ground crews were flanking the fire with hose lays and hand lines.
    • The first fly crew got out on the ridgeline and was holding the ridge.
    • The second fly crew chose not to commit to the ridgeline and committed to
      the right flank supporting a direct hose lay attack. They were ahead of
      the hose lay punching a hole through the brush.
    • About 1000 hours the fly crew on the ridgeline asked if the lower fly
      crew could bump up to their location to provide support to the holding
      action. Airtankers were working the fire by this time.
    • The lower fly crew decided to advance ahead of the direct attack hose lay
      thinking they were over half way to the ridgeline.
  • What happened:
    • The fly crew trying to hike up hill through the brush found
      very tough travel in the heavy growth and down material. They were only
      about one-third of the way to the ridgeline.

A normal weather cycle that was not anticipated or identified caught the
crew. Since sun-up the fire aspect was in solar heating evidenced by the
perpendicular narrow strip runs on the S-SW slope. As the morning
progressed, the drainage started to develop normal up drainage air movement.
The right flank (E) was beginning to vector to the east with the air
movement. When the fly crew started up the hill they took a perpendicular
path looking for the shortest distance to the ridgeline. The fire made a
run with an up canyon vector that outflanked the fly crew putting them in a
head too wide and intense for them to relocate and escape based on their
inability to move rapidly.

This is a bare bones account. As with all fatality and near miss situations
there are always a myriad of contributing factors having causal or
contributing affects. This was not the “mother of all fires”, it was a very
normal wildland fire. Guards were down for a numbers of reasons.

J.Watt

5/27 For Kvtwitt A.K.A. Cracker

Here is the website for Wolf Pack: www.wolfpackgear.com/

We currently don't carry their gear, but always happy to help anyone find
what they want or need!

Jim Felix
5/27 We have two fires burning south of Phoenix:
the Verkol Fire near Stanfield (7000+ acres),
the Greene Fire 20 mi south of Casa Grande (1000+ acres).

We appreciate the air tanker support.

www.eastvalleytribune.com

MM

5/27 ATs we're glad you're back... Firefighting tools are GOOD.

Grounded forest air tanker fleet reactivated

Firefighting aircraft ready for duty in northeast Valley (AZ)

Scottsdale (AZ) lands wildfire tanker

Neptune Aviation Cleared for Takeoff (Missoula MT)

AZ F/F

PS thanx Ab for making my links good

Yer welcome. Be safe. Ab.

5/27 AXE

Here is the rest of the problem, but going in the opposite direction......If the ENGB is much to important to help extinguish the fire, what about the ENOP? He must be too busy fiddling with all those knobs and watching those gauge things on the engine to help put out the fire.

That would leave the FFT1 and 0-3 FFT2s that may or may not be left to put out the fire. But wait.....The FFT1 would be way too busy supervising the 0-3 FFT2s that may or may not be left to put out the fire.

But wait....There is always the FFT2 who thinks they should be the FFT1 so that may or may not leave 0-2 FFT2s to put out the fire.

But wait...The 0-2 FFT2s that may or may not be left may or may not be rookies so they may or may not know how to put out the fire.

But wait.. that may or may not leave anyone to put out the fire.

Uhhh?? There was one?

Just Another Engine Guy
5/27 In regards to the IC on an Initial attack

I have worked for the Forest Service in 4 states (3 regions) the Park Service and the BLM over the last 14 years. All as an I.A. person.

The first resource on the scene is the I.C. If it is an engineer a van/truck with multiple people, the most qualified person is in charge. As more resources arrive it CAN be turned over to a higher qualified individual if the initial I.C. is not comfortable being in charge or if a supervisor of the initial I.C. tells them to turn it over.

There can be many reasons for them being told to turn it over, ranging from other commitments to taking care of their rookies to getting training opportunities.

The Dispatchers should NEVER be the I.C.!!! That just sends shivers down my spine.

KDL

5/27 Hi Ab(s)

With the upcoming season looming, I would hope that all of our firefighters on this board would remember to use a certain thing that we all have, in our jobs... our brains. You see, we had a "discussion," today a "mandatory, voluntary," one at that. It seems to me that some folks, apparently mostly those in higher level positions have lost touch with reality... and the day to day SOPs of our profession. We are getting bogged down by issues such as "can we go without shirts on P.T. runs... and do we look professional enough?" instead of focusing on issues such as critical, important training, and the necessity of being with our crew EVERY day at least the first two weeks of coming on. I would encourage all, not just those in R-5 but everywhere to focus on the important issues, our safety, our people, and our cohesion... apparently some do not believe these are important attributes to pursue as making sure the Forest Supervisor is "in touch," with their fire folks... Even though they do not even hold a firefighter 2 cert. Sign me...

N.Z. FIRE

5/27 Steve M -- On Captains Laying Hose.

Lol -- and here lies the problems. The Engine Boss
(or captain as you guys in So. Cal need to call them
-- I assume to make you feel better about your job),
is supervising 2-5 firefighters.

The ENGB is much to important to help extinguish the
fire. He must direct the hoselay, etc, talk to air
attach, dispatch, etc.

The STLE is supervising the ENGBs. The STLs can not
put out the fire either, because they have to relay
all of the information from the ENGBs to the DIVS.

The DIVS is way too busy making reports to the OSC2 (or
the branch director) and supervising the FOBS and the
IHCs to assist in putting out the fire. The DIVS also
has the big headache of dealing with the IR Tpye 1
Crews who want to be classified as IHCs, as well as
the ENGBs who want to continually do someone elses
job.

-AXE
5/26 Can anyone tell me what happened in the Lauder Fire in 1987? Were there LODD?

GH

5/26 Re: CS's version of extended hoselay,

In many years of working with and around engines, I've never seen a scenario where the Captain has the responsibility to grab the live reel and start squirting water. It's my observation the captain is much too busy scouting and sizing up the fire, providing location and directions to other responders, communicating with dispatch, air attack, and the Duty FMO (who typically wants every little detail), directing the hoselay placement, looking for hazards, determining additional or fewer resources, not to mention putting little check marks on all those lists.

If the captain has their head down and dragging a hose, who is responsible for maintaining Situational Awareness?

SteveM
5/26 Fire Weather outlook for tomorrow in the SouthWest. Heads up!

www.fs.fed.us/r3/fire/swapredictive/swaoutlooks/daily/outlook-daily.htm

R3 FF

5/26 Brandy,
You are correct! I searched also by ID #, Date and agency.... to no avail!

I know the ID #, date and agency are correct as the original printout is sitting
right in front of me.

Nearest I can figure is that the Safenet "sanitizers" have not finished "sanitizing"
it yet.... Good to know that the agency political correctness police are protecting
us from ourselves!

Hopefully they will post it on the Safenet page soon as that is part of what I
thought the Safenet system was all about.... timeliness of info......

If it does not get posted soon we will submit the original version here........

In regards to the yactak question… Not Tibetan or Llama deep, LOL…

I have owned a couple of sit on top ocean kayaks for years…. Ocean fish out of them.
The common “kayak” speak for sneaking up on big, wary calico’s in the kelp or any
fish for that matter, is yaktak…. Shortened from “kayak attack”….

I just changed the spelling to protect the innocent (or because I can’t spell) to “yactak” ….
And now you know the rest of the story!

yactak (think big calico bass!)
5/26 Ab,

I've been lookin' everywhere online for wolfpack web gear.
Do you know if there is a website for this product?

Kvtwitt A.K.A. Cracker
5/26 Is the Cedar Fire Fatality Report the first report (besides
greensheets) that CDF has ever made available on the
internet?

I can't ever remember one.

AL

5/26 Good News- P2V airtankers have been cleared for duty. As soon as pre-hire
inspections can be completed the aircraft will be available, doubling the
number of aircraft. That makes 15 large airtankers: 7 P2V's, 7 P3's, and
one DC-7 (Instrumented for airframe time life data collection). Still far,
far off the 40-odd LAT's number that used to be on contract.

The final factor was a calculation of the time life criteria on the air
frame, now set at 15,000 hours. DC- 4's, 6's, and 7's may become available
if there is a time life set on those airframes. Boeing, now the holder of
the Douglas Aircraft certificates, originally said that there isn't a
maximum airframe hour limit on the Douglas aircraft if maintained according
to the maintenance manual. The push is to create an airframe time life
number in order to have a retirement factor on the aircraft.

J.Watt

Thanks J. Ab.

5/26 Yactac (What does that stand for anyway... You like Tibet? You
attack yac's. Yac cowboy? Some kind of a yac breath mint? I do
not mean any disrespect, you're obviously a person with wisdom...
I prefer llamas or at least TX Longhorn cows!!)

[Oh yeah, now you probably won't answer me... My mouth
has gotten me in trouble before...]

My Q:
I can't find that safenet report. I get to the site and click on the ID
option, but search doesn't work for that ID number. Any
suggestions? I have read some interesting reports...

Brandy

(Thanks Ab>)

5/26 R4 Helitack Guy

There's a difference between where I am and your remote area.

It's not about the flow of blood from a fellow firefighter that's
hazardous, it's all the other All Risk incidents we respond to.

SoCal EMT-FF

5/26 Cris...

Thanks for answering that stumper of a question re: Hazard Pay for Bleeding. I was pondering a response but decided not to go there lol. As for dispatchers assuming the role of IC on IA make me wonder how that could happen since the average disptcher doesn't have eyes on the situation, I don't know but being dumbass from the backwoods here it seems to me that the way its done around here where the first arriving crew boss, engine boss ect is the initial IC seems to be the way to approach the IC delema. The dispatchers here just order up additional resources and co-ordinate those resources after the size up from the IC.

Just A Pondering Thought
R4 Helitack Guy
5/26 Mountaineers Fire Crew is recruiting firefighters, sawyers, squad bosses, and crewbosses for a Type 2 IA Handcrew. They even have a training session with openings available coming up very soon, so'd best hurry if you are interested. See their advertisement on the Jobs Page. Ab.
5/26 Just some closing comments on my questions:

The question about hazard pay for medical emergencies was evidently extensively
discussed in chat last night. (I wasn't there.) Maybe there will be more of that tonight.
(I can't be there, except maybe late...) (Thanks for the email from someone
who was there.)

A second topic last night had to do with training required to be an instructor.

I also heard EMT Scotty popped in from Iraq. Our best to you Scotty. Thanks
for your service, Dude. Be safe.

My question about dispatchers and ICs came up because of an informal break
discussion about outsourcing and whether dispatching as a fire function is
essentially governmental or not. In my estimation, it is. Dispatchers have some
very heavy responsibilities, especially during IA. I can remember having a heavy
discussion with an A-76 specialist couple years ago and trying to describe what
dispatchers did, why it took fire knowledge and how there could be a conflict
of interest if the function was contracted out.

Mellie

5/26 From Firescribe:

Federal Agencies' Aerial Resources Are Ready for 2005 Fire Season (press release)
Preliminary results of a study on P2V airtankers show that they can be used in the upcoming fire season.

5/26 During an Interagency Wildland Urban Interface Drill recently conducted in Central California which twenty agencies participated in, quite a few issues were raised concerning the new fire shelter.

Fire shelter drills were conducted at one of the field drill "stations" with a proctor on site.

The concerns, issues and problems discovered were submitted to the SAFENET system. The Safenet ID number assigned to the safenet is 6CQQR2SAFE.

yactak

SAFENET link is on the Links page under safety. Ab.

5/26 Mellie,

I have not heard of regular firefighters being paid hazard duty to stop the flow of blood from a fellow fire fighter. There are EMT's on the fire line, but in case one is not near you and the bleeding needs to be stopped here's a suggestion. Get yourself a couple of sets of BSI, or better known as rubber gloves they do not cost much and do not weight alot. Also some 4x4 gauze pads work wonders too. Remember, pressure and elevation.

Cris
5/26 Regarding my questions yesterday:

I have just heard that anyone being paid Hazard Pay for an emergency medical firefighter response is an urban legend. It doesn't happen, even in socal.

Regarding my question about dispatchers being de facto ICs on IA. That is the policy for CDF, but not for the Forest Service. The FS duty officer has the responsibility of IC until someone gets on site. The dispatchers check with the duty officer. Even so, the dispatcher function of ordering resources is essentially governmental.

Mellie

5/26 Re music on the video clip:

TP,

That would be
Led Zeppelin,
Dazed and Confused,
The Song Remains the Same-Soundtrack, for the Peak Fire clip.

Music Man

5/26 Hi,

I wanted to drop a quick note to your bulletin board to let you know I
appreciate all of the support and concern that was shown here for my
daughter Gina. I just recently learned of this site and would have posted
sooner would I have known. Gina was a real bright spot in my life and the
lives of others and God knows she is going to be missed intensely. She also
lived for the summer fire crew experience and after 4 years of working on
engine crews and going out on Type II pick-up crews for off-Forest
assignments, she had landed her dream job with the Union IHC. I truly
thank Dan Fiorito for giving her the chance to rookie with him. I so wish
she were there right now doing the runs and push-ups to make the cut. She
had trained very hard for the past couple months and had showed me her
progress charts almost every day. I can proudly say she was a real hard
body and know she would have made the cut. Anyway, I saw a request for a
photo to post and am sending a couple that were taken last year while she was
working on the Ochoco NF engine 3169 crew. Thank you again, fire community,
for the support you have shown and have a safe summer.

Dave Zalunardo

Gina with Saw & Gina's Smile
She is missed. Our best wishes to your family. Ab.

5/26 Hoselays--

To curious FF,

The #1 FF sitting behind the driver gets out, puts the chalk down, puts on a gazner and hooks up the engine. The captain gets out, puts on his gear, grabs the live rail, and starts fighting fire for the first 100 feet. The # 2 ff and the #3 ff grabs 2 gazners each and a tool each. The #1 FF deploys his gazner pack, has the trunk charged, charges his 1 in. and fights fire for 100 ft. The #2 FF gives his tool to the captain, drops 1 gazner for the #1 FF at the wye. The #2 FF hooks up his #2's pack. The #2 ff deploys his remaining pack, calls for water. The #1 FF charges the trunk. The #2 ff charges his 1 in. and fights fire for 100 ft. The #3 ff drops his tool, and drops one gazner pack for the #2 ff. The #3 ff hooks up his pack. The #3 FF deploys his remaining pack, calls for water and fights fire for 100 ft. The #1 FF passes the #2 FF that is waiting at the wye to be charged. After the #3 ff fights fire for 100ft., he returns to the engine for 2 more gazners packs and a tool. #1 hooks up his gazner pack to the end of #3's trunk. #2 moves up to the next wye and when #1 is ready for the trunk to be charged, #2 ff then charges the trunk. #1 then fights fire for 100ft and returns to the engine for 2 gazners and a tool. #2 ff hooks up a gazner pack, deploys it and hopefully #3 makes it back in time to charge his line. The further out you get, the more you have to improvise for fatigue and lag time.

Also, I wondered if anybody knows the status of the 26-0 upgrade for GS-6s?
Thanks, in advance.

CS
5/26 Ab,

Wow. The CDF report is refreshingly different from other recent investigations. There is no recitation of the 10 & 18 or LCES, although the reader can easily spot their respective violation, non-mitigation and absence in the abundance of detailed facts. Not only are the names of individuals involved un-redacted, the F-word even appears in a quote on page 32, in the context of firefighters sitting in lawnchairs.

If anyone is looking for a case study on freelancing and firing operations, this is it.

As for lessons learned, I pulled out my radio chest harness this morning. Sure enough, the nylon straps easily ignite with a match and self-sustain burning. (The Novato captain lost his Bendix King while trying to help Rucker.) Does anyone make a leather chest harness?

We may have a new structural watch-out in this sentence (from page 62, similar to page 9):

"In order to avoid scratching the paint on Engine 6162, the driveway at 920 Orchard Lane needed to be brushed in order to back the engine up the driveway."

Thanks to CDF for publishing the good, bad, and ugly of this report.

vfd cap'n

5/25 Hey All, I have a couple of questions:

Today at the Six Rivers All Fire Meeting, Spanky and our Gang (of Engine Captains) wanted to know if anyone knew a reference or policy that states that firefighters responding to medical emergencies should get hazard pay. Anyone got that ref? Our guys aren't getting paid that. I'm sure one of you socal folks have the answer... Blood on hands. Sounds like a hazard to me!

Okey dokey artichoke.
How about, where is it written that dispatchers are the ICs until the first firefighter arrives on the scene? Somebody said it might be in the old Fireman's Handbook. (Am I old enough to have that RobMac? Does it go by another name?)
Thanks to our dispatchers. We couldn't do it without ya! (We were told that ICs should remember to keep their dispatchers up to speed. They can help immeasurably if you have a plan and they're clear on your commander's intent.)

I think there were other questions or comments, but need a bit to think of them...

Oh, and excellent job! Some Six Rivers NF Firefighter of the Year Awards - We're proud of you!
Jay Dillon our dozer guy from Mad River RD
Mike Gibbons from Ukonom RD
Jesse Knox from Lower Trinity RD
Paul Zurr from Smith River NRA

Oh yeah, thanks to Mad River Crew 4 for signing up for the Wildland Firefighter Foundation 52 Club. Awesome! I'll have to go see if any other crews are on the 52 Gold list.

Mellie

5/25 Dear Ab,
I just received a call from someone in the Oregon Dept. of Forestry wanting to
know how to send flowers for Family Day to be placed at a fallen firefighter's
marker at NIFC.

I just wanted to share this wonderful idea, if any others want to send flowers.

Call the Boise Best ( Flower Shop) at 208-342-4885
You can have Boise Best send them here to the Foundation at
2049 Airport Way,
Boise ID83705
and we will take them over and place them at the person's marker.

Vicki Minor

5/25 Latest Cedar report is at:

www.novatofire.org/cedar.pdf (link doesn't work; see Ab note below)

Aerial view using google maps, looks to be post-burn but hard to tell. Zooming in and lets you try and draw some conclusions.

http://maps.google.com/

The large map from ESRI shows that the fatality area was the nearly the very last edge of the fire.

www.esri.com/jicfire/fireinfo/cedarfire.html

Hope people can and will take lessons from this. . .

SS

Here's the report that was posted on the Novato FD server. Novato FD Cedar Report (5895K, 90 pages, very large). All of us linking to it last year may have overloaded their system. Ab.

5/25 Here is the link to the CDF Cedar Fire Fatality Report, it's large and takes a little while to load:

www.fire.ca.gov/php/fire_er_content/downloads/CSAR2%20_05.pdf (2749K, 81 pages with photos)

It is very sad because it appears somebody was a little overzealous with the firing and somebody else overestimated their ability to protect an unsaveable home. We can all learn from reading this report........

Alann Smithee

I also posted it here in case the CDF server gets overloaded or the report is removed. CDF Cedar Incident Report, 05. Ab.

5/25 Redding IHC move and possible rename,

I feel that if they do rename them they should be named "McClellan IHC"

X-Hotshot

5/25 We're very pleased to announce that we have a new sponsor for the Links Page -- Thielson Wildland Firefighting Equipment -- another good company with line and EMS gear, etc for the wildland firefighter. Check out their banner and their website.

Ab.

5/25 HC:

I go out as a single resource, through my department, if that is what you are looking for.
My department does only structural protection assignments, but I go out with other
departments and resources, if that is what you are looking for.

AZfirefighter
5/25 For those who fought the Cedar fire and for those who didn't, here's a good description of what it was like:

Fighting the Biggest Fire in CA History
Notes from the Cedar Fire
by Colin Wilson

I would like to see the Cedar Fire Incident report.

SoCal CDF

5/25 Ab, I just found this site, so help me if I don't get this right.

Wildland Firefighter Foundation, thanks for giving a wildland firefighter
statue to Steve Rucker's parents. You do so much to heal the hurt.

Resident

Resident, you did that just right. Here's another picture from last year. The Wildland Firefighter Foundation rep presenting the bronze statue to members of the Novato Fire Department Station. Ab.

5/25 Bob,

Sorry for the delay in my response to your question. What did I mean to "take it to the field this summer?" Where do I begin.....?

Historically we train our new firefighters in the skills needed to fight in the wildland arena. We lecture on fire behavior in relation to fuels and weather and topography and then send them on their merry way. All after a week or two of training. Then they do their best to learn as they go, getting as much experience as they can as the fire seasons allow, adding to their mental slide tray.

In the paid structure fire arena, new firefighters generally have a fire academy lasting anywhere from 12 to 16 weeks before they even set foot on an engine. Generally that training is followed by another year of probationary time which allows the new firefighter to accumulate some of that experience and add to their training. Quite a contrast - and yet we kill plenty of structure firefighters each year as well.

What we fail to do in both circumstances is to talk about the most important yet most unpredictable factor (including weather) in firefighting. The human factor. It wasn't a lack of physical skill that killed the firefighters in Mann Gulch or Cramer or any of the many fatal fires in between. It was, in my humble opinion, the huge disparity in individual experience and the ability to recognize a developing situation that lead to many of these deaths. Add to that the complex dynamic of group interaction and it can spell disaster. Author Laurence Gonzales pointed out in his book Deep Survival “Only 10-20% of people can stay calm and think in the midst of a survival emergency. They are the ones who can perceive their situation clearly; they can plan and take correct action, all of which are key elements of survival. Confronted with a changing environment, they rapidly adapt.” However, as Kelly Close has pointed out, a statement such as Stay Alert, keep calm, think clearly, act decisively expects 100% of our wildland firefighters to stay calm and think in the midst of these survival emergencies.

So what am I proposing we take to the field? Situational awareness, but not just in what the fire environment is doing. What is the person next to you thinking when things get dicey? What's the crew you were counting on for support thinking / doing when a 60 foot wall of flame is headed towards their position? What are you going to do when the s**t hits the fan? Remember, your comfort level is not necessarily that of your crew or other resources around you. You can't make them feel more comfortable or knowledgeable about a situation anymore than they can do so to you. Be aware of this dynamic over the summer. Communicate. And take note of what goes right on the fires you're on. We can learn just as much, if not more, from these fires than the fatal fires we tend to concentrate on.

I think it's obvious we're not going to get the support we need from the top, so this amounts to a grass roots effort to make changes in the way we do business. In the field - both firefighters and managers alike. We know we don't need more acronyms. We don't need more rules (did you know there have been more than 170 new policies created by the feds since South Canyon?). And I'm not saying more training is the answer....though some additional training might help. With shortages in seasonal help every year, I know this isn't popular. But neither is loosing our friends, brothers and sisters on the fire line. Within my own department, I'm proposing an extension to our S130/190 course to include not only the integrated leadership training but in-depth case studies of fatality fires. These are intelligent people coming into the realm of fire. They deserve the opportunity to learn from these fires just as much as you and I. They may even be the ones to help answer the disturbing question of why we keep killing firefighters the same way, time after time.

I know I'm not giving you much in the way of a concrete answer Bob. But that's because this is nothing like teaching someone how to dig line. That's easy. Teaching them to ask questions, be aware of the personnel environment around them and acknowledge the differences between experience levels on a fire is touchy-feely stuff. And we're not so good at that, are we? Help me come up with the answers, all of you.

Mellie, thank you for highlighting some of Kelly Close's material. I know people are reading these postings....we've got to keep the subject in people's minds. And thank you all for letting me rant. Be safe.

Uncle Stick
5/25 Recently we've had a few folks trying to register for the Hot List whose email accounts will refuse all email from anyone who isn't already on a list of "accepted users".  It's fine with me if some folks chose to use that method of filtering their email.  However, we here at the WLF are too busy to personally answer your automated rejection messages.  If this issue if affecting you, please read the newly updated www.wildlandfire.com/news/policy.htm.

Thanks, and thanks to all those busy dispatchers and others keeping us up to date!

Original Ab.

5/25 Rucker's death

www.marinij.com

Someone has to get blamned...

MG

Is the report online anywhere? The CDF spokesman apparently says no comment, the report stands on its own. That may be well and good as a response to the Public, but are trainers folding this incident into "Lessons Learned" for firefighters? On interface fires, we need those lessons learned. Ab.

5/25 Oliver:

Well, you guessed the watershed.....there goes some of my anonymity but
thats alright lol.

Besides USFS and ODF, the Water Bureau's Sandy River Station Crew (the crew
that actually maintains the roads, trails and other infastructure in the
watershed) is trained for Wildland Fire and has responded to and fought
fires in the past. We actually have two large fire engines (regular city
engines, don't know what type they are considered) that they and the
Operating Engineers use to fight fires.

When the two tiny fires that we had last year ignited, I was dispatching
and did my best to coordinate our response with USFS and ODF. We sent one
engine to the scene along with a hand crew and perimeter security for that
area of the Watershed.

While the Water Bureau doesn't have a statutory obligation to fight fires,
we do anyway because we are in alot of trouble if a fire errodes water
quality or shuts down production. Its also the same with security and law
enforcement for Bull Run. We provide it because we can't afford something
happening (that and we NEVER see USFS law enforcement, or the CCSO deputies
that we pay for...)

Anyway, hope that helps with the info you were after.....

noname

5/25 AL:

Although the current regulations require 100' of clearance, CDF policy for this season is to inspect and cite only for the first 30', i.e., if that much is cleared, the property is okayed. However, on the form we use for the inspection, a notice is made of the new regulation so that next year, everyone will be fully aware that at least 100' clearance is required. At least, that's the way it is in the central California units.

Evan
5/25 AL, here's the info on the California law.....

SB 1369

Firebreaks

This law, which modifies existing law, requires persons subject to fire hazards (described in the statute) to remove all brush, flammable vegetation, or combustible growth that is located within 100 feet from the occupied dwelling or occupied structure, or building or structure, as applicable, or to the property line, or at a greater distance if required by state law, or local ordinance, rule, or regulation.

The law authorizes the Director of Forestry and Fire Protection to authorize the removal of vegetation not consistent with these and related requirements. The law also authorizes the Director to place a lien on the building, structure, or grounds for the expense of the removal of that vegetation, as specified.

Additionally, the law requires a special certification upon new construction or rebuilding of an occupied dwelling or occupied structure damaged by fire in a very high fire hazard severity zone to be presented to the insurer providing the construction insurance coverage.

Lobotomy

5/25 I want some input on how different engine companies perform their progressive hoselays. We are running Gansner Packs and have been having some discussion about who does what. What roles are the firefighters taking on? We number our seats, 1-2-3 and have each FF do a specific task. Also, I was curious to how different crews are deploying them. Does the first person with the live reel deploy their pack first, or is another firefighter supposed to take on that job?

I am just curious because I know from experience that all crews are different and I wanted to find out which way seems to work the best.

Thanks---Curious FF
5/25 CDF is in transition from the required 30' clearance to the 100'. This year
you will be RECOMMENDED to clear to 100' but not required, next the 100'
rule will be enforced.

CDF FAE
5/25 Re: Defensible Space in California. New law as of Sept 2004.

www.fire.ca.gov/php/education_publiccode4291.php

SRJS
5/25 the space around the home is 100' or to the property line
Kvtwitt
5/24 Anybody know what is the amount of space CA residents must keep
clear around their homes? Used to be 30'. Is it now officially 100?

AL

5/24 From Firescribe:

Rucker's death led to new precautions
Steve Rucker died in the 2003 firestorm in SoCal, the Cedar Fire.

5/24 Dwight, need a little more information before I can hand out any advice.

Who currently provides protection to the watershed? Local Fire Department, State, USFS or mixture of all three? Municipal lands outside of a city are generally protected by a wildland agency, a fire district or both.

Dwight said:

"At the same time, we were just told that most likely we will not do any fire fighting at all if there is a fire in our area of responsibility, that we would be there too back up our "real" firefighting crew and most likely be providing scene security."

Who are the real firefighting crews you would be backing up or providing security to? Does your municipal water department have firefighting crews? If so does the water department have an Incident Qualification System and are they signers to any agreements with a wildland agency? You used the word "our" firefighting crew so I'm a little confused about the water departments role in wildland fire suppression. If this is the Bull Run watershed the only agencies that have wildland fire suppression responsibilities are ODF, USFS and the local fire department provides protection to improvements within the watershed.

Oliver

5/24 Hi,

Seriously, for the helitack soundtrack it would have to be
"Welcome to the Jungle" by Guns n Roses.

Not so seriously, Rossini's "The Barber of Seville" the part
where Elmer Fud is being chased down by the electric razor
that Bugs Bunny has hypnotized.

Just took the S-212 class, good time of year to do it, Morels
all around, watch your backcut with those hollow trunks.

Quit raining in R6!!!

Firewall
5/24 Ok, I know this has been hashed out before, but....

I'd like to talk to someone who is a single resource
(individual) who is on some type of agreement OTHER
than AD. So, if you are on an EERA, Cooperator,
Personal Services Contract, Etc., and you have the
time, I'd like to talk to you about this item.

Thank You.

HCA

Please ask ab to forward on the email/give you my
address. (Thanks ab!)

5/24 TP,

My first choice would be Wish You Were Here by Pink Floyd.
Second choice would be Metallica... Fuel for Fire.

Oliver

5/24 The Jobs Page and Series 0462 (Forestry Technician) & Series 0455 (Range Technician) jobs pages and Series 0401 ("professional" Biologist) are updated. Ab.

Readers, please note that we have a new sponsor for theysaid - The Supply Cache. Jim Felix was our earliest and has been our website's staunchest supporter throughout the years. Since we began offering classified ads and banners to help cover costs at theysaid, he's been there with his business. His banner has been on the Links page since "Day One" of banner sponsorships. He's also on the Board at the Wildland Firefighter Foundation. I know he believes in the wildland firefighter community, professionalism, networking, connectivity. He walks the walk. Jim, the firefighter and businessman, is a class act, folks. Jim, we appreciate you. Thanks for all you do. The Abs.

5/24 Dwight,

In response to your post on getting into fire, I have only the limited amount of knowledge to what you can do but I thought that I would give you my 2 cents. You may want to talk to the people in charge of fire protection in the area and even more so to the actual ground pounders that actually work on the ground. I assume that it is the forest service since you mention it in your post. Go to the district office and they can direct you a little better. They may be able to assist you in getting the training that you want and possibly help get you on the line as a fire fighter. They would probably also get you into a meeting with the Overhead and see where you can go from there.

hope it helps
HD
5/24 Dwight911,

I run a crew out of Eastern WA. and have run into quite a few folks from
the Hanford Fire Dept. on fires. You may check with them for employment.

CJ
5/24 Hello Ab:

I work for a large municipality in the Northwest. I perform non-sworn patrol duties for the municipal water department, and part of my patrol area is a large watershed located out of town and that is closed to the public. Some of my co-workers and I that patrol the watershed regularly have been selected for Wildland Firefighting training.

I have worked in law enforcement, and have alot of training in allied public safety disciplines, including Hazmat and medical first responder, but I've never had a single class in firefighting of any type, and never really had an interested in it - until now. Now, after doing some reading and spending a good part of the day on your website, I am very intrigued with the thought of Wildland Firefighting.

At the same time, we were just told that most likely we will not do any fire fighting at all if there is a fire in our area of responsibility, that we would be there too back up our "real" firefighting crew and most likely be providing scene security.

While I understand that that function needs to be carried out, and that we are the logical people to do it, I still want to fight the fire! I've never in my life been interested in this line of work, and I know very little about it other than what I've read on this website today.

Here is my problem - I make decent money and have good benefits with the city. I looked at the Forest Service fire jobs and saw that even the "permanent" positions were all seasonal...... and I have a family. The city fire department doesn't get involved with wildland firefighting hardly at all, so that is not a good option.

So....if I want to pursue this further than what little I'll be doing for the city, I'll most likely have to go elsewhere.....I was wondering if anyone has any suggestions they might be willing to share with me.

I have a TON of allied training, but none is in firefighting. I've been through the entire ICS series and am close to completing a degree in Emergency Management. My interest is more being involved in operations and NOT in management.....

Any suggestions or advice anyone could offer I would greatly appreciate.

Dwight911

5/24 TP, for music...

Joe Satriani; Anything off the "Surfin' with the Alien" album.

Stay safe,

mtndv8

TP, if we could find one or more bands willing to do a legal "cover" of some songs to go with video fire clips, which songs would we want? How long should they be? Ab.

5/23 Our mountain community in the foothills west of Denver, Colorado was directly affected by 5 major forest fires in 2002, including the LARGEST fire, Hayman, which ever hit the state of Colorado.

Part of the response to that year is described at www.theflume.com/ in the article titled "Fire fake, training real".

Additional responses have been the formation of Mountain Communities Voluntary Organizations Active in Disasters (www.mcvoad.org) and DSV - Disaster Support Volunteers Inc. (www.disastersupportvolunteers.com).

Perhaps this information may be of interest to readers of They Said It, and maybe they could give us some tips to help us become better prepared. I think information regarding what others are doing is always helpful.

Thank You for all the great information!

jf1acai
5/23 Still Out There As An AD,

Gotta love the "Lions Gate IHC" new name idea! hahaha...ahh
good times at that place when you're doing training in Sac.

FFEric
5/23 Just stumbled on this today, while