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Similarities of Fatality Fires
Observations of Jim Payne
April 2004

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Following is a brief overview of the some of the key similarities of three fatality fires: South Canyon, Thirtymile, and Cramer. Twenty firefighters lost their lives on these fires in the last decade. These similarities are based upon a review of the official fire investigation reports and other public documents. 

Similarities

• Each host fire Unit had experienced previous entrapment and/or fatality fires
• Each Unit was a "consolidated Unit" and/or had poor working relationships with the adjoining Unit
• Severe to extreme drought conditions and a high Haines Index were present
• A multiple fire situation existed, both in the GAC and on the Unit
• There was active fire behavior day and night
• Rapid fire growth unexpected by leadership
• Personnel were working up hill and/or up canyon from the fire
• Multiple day, extended attack operations on a Type 3 fire
• Strategy and tactics: Direct attack with hand crews (two of the three fires involved the aerial delivery of firefighters above the fire.
• Firefighters personal actions did not reflect the fire danger
• Improper application of PPE provided (esp. fire shelters, gloves, fire clothes)
• ICT3 involved in significant managerial and/or personal issues not related to the fire suppression action on the fatality fire (on two of the three fires).
• Numerous leadership failures, as evidenced by:
  • Inadequate briefings of assigned personnel
  • Unsuccessful strategy and tactics not adjusted
  • Spot weather forecasts not requested
  • Lack of fire behavior predictions
  • Confusion on who is in charge
  • Poor management of fatigue
  • Risks un-assessed and/or poorly managed
  • Non-compliance with 10 Standard Firefighting Orders
  • Non-mitigation of applicable Watch Out Situations
  • Need to deploy shelters was unexpected
  • Fire Program Managers with a large span of control re: oversight
  • Poor oversight of the ICT3's strategy and tactics by the FPM and/or AA
  • FPM and/or AA didn't ask for help (deputies, etc.) in a high workload situation
  • Lack of preparedness actions in response to fire season severity and multiple fire situations

jdpayne@cableone.net