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Forest Service Fire Organization on
the Salmon-Challis NF & Other Forests
Unreasonable Expectations?
A Systemic Organizational Problem that Impacts Safety?
By Mellie, from TheySaid, 2/8/05
I agree with Rhino when he stated
Cramer is a prime example where a dysfunctional forest placed an
individual in a position where he tried to do his best and became
overwhelmed.
There is a potentially systemic problem in the way the Forest Service
administers fire and aviation. In my opinion, the organization structure
is outdated and fire managers have too much expected of them -- and this
is under the best conditions. I think this problem was a MUCH
BIGGER PROBLEM on the Cramer because of the holes in the fire
organization on the Salmon Challis NF. I doubt the OIG investigators
even have a clue how big a problem it was/is. In my opinion, Jeff and
Shane were victims, as was Allen Hackett. Alan was set up to fall, not
intentionally, but set up by the way the system is organized and the way
a key position was not filled. Too much was expected of him. When push
came to shove and OSHA said "second willful violation", Alan
became the scapegoat. When DOJ threatened jail time and fighting that
was way beyond his financial means, he cut his losses, as most of us
would do.
Let's begin with forest structure, responsibilities, and
chain-of-command. The Forest Service is a marriage of many functions,
one of which is fire. Right now fire is the cash cow -- the way logging
used to be when timber was king. Fire is also the riskiest function --
and therein lies part of the problem. Many other functions are being
centralized within the Forest Service putting additional stress on
Incident Management Teams, but fire is evidently not being considered
for centralization within the FS. To consider alternative structures
apparently threatens power, money, egos, tradition. Line Officer (Forest
Supervisor and District Ranger) control is sacrosanct and defined by
law. I'm just wondering if there's not another better more centralized
way that would let line officers retain control while streamlining
operational structure for safer Fire operation and absolving Line
Officers of threat for litigation.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Some points and issues:
Each National Forest with many districts has a Forest Supervisor at its
head. He/she supervises the District Rangers and the Fire and Aviation
Program (FAM) and is responsible to the Regional Forester. The Forest
Supervisors and District Rangers who "provide oversight" to
the Fire Program usually do not themselves have fire experience. When
the needs of fire and fire safety come in conflict with other needs on
the forest, these non-fire supervisors likely have other priorities and
projects.
I have talked many times about the fire budget (formerly MEL) and
what Congress budgets for fire resources on the forests (ie,
pre-suppression funds). Well, every year Congress designates money for
fire, sometimes increasing the budget incrementally over the budget of
the year before. By the time the money reaches the ground, there have
been rakeoffs at every level of the regional and forest organization.
When I ask about that, I'm told, "Well that's just the way it's
always been. Fire pays the way for many other functions on the forest
like timber used to." This year although money budgeted for fire
was increased, money reaching the ground is even LESS than last year.
But, I've digressed...
Back to structure and chain-of-command. Consider the Fire and
Aviation (FAM) structure on a typical forest (like the Salmon Challis
NF), on which fire is not centralized.
Forests that have an active fire program - with lots of complexity,
including a great deal of seasonal fire and fuels reduction - typically
have the following positions:
- A Forest Fire Management Officer (FFMO, usually referred to as the
Forest Fire Staff Officer, member of the Forest Leadership Team or
FLT),
- an Assistant FMO (Assistant Fire Staff Officer),
- a Fuels Tech (many used to be old Brush Disposal or BD foremen
when timber was king),
- a Fire Planning Specialist who also knows NEPA.
- Each part of the forest, or district has
- A (District) FMO (FMO, Division Chief in CA) and
- an Assistant (District) FMO (DFMO (AFMO, Battalion Chief).
- Each district also has a variety of Module Leaders (Captains):
- Engine Capts (4-6 per district in my
neck'o'the'NorCA'woods), and
- Handcrew Supts including HS Supts.
- Can have Fuels Techs at the district level
The Forest FMO or Forest Fire Staff Officer is a critical position, overseeing the whole forest's
fire and aviation program, including each district's fire budget,
planning, training, safety, aviation, etc. Goodness, the
responsibilities are so great I don't know where to start. In addition,
either the FFMO or the Assistant Fire Staff Officer performs duties of the Forest Aviation Officer,
including contracts, CWN and any fleet, even overseeing flights for bug
inspections! Larger aviation programs have a dedicated Forest Aviation
Officer.
The FFMO and Assistant Fire Staff at the forest level work for the Forest Supervisor
who works for the Regional Forester. The District FMO, Assistant Dist. FMO and those on down
the chain who work on the ground work for the District Ranger, NOT for
the FFMO Fire Staff Officer. The District Ranger has congressionally delegated line
authority for all that fire personnel do on a forest. In other words,
the Ranger needs to sign off on it. When there's a large fire on a
forest and an IMT is called in, it works at the discretion of the
Ranger, as well. Legally, when things go wrong on a fire -- under the
current set of rules currently understood by OSHA and OIG/DOJ (10 fire
orders are violated leading to burnover, accident or death on a FS
Managed fire) -- the Ranger is also at civil and/or criminal risk for
some mess-up or oversight on something he or she signed off on that was
required under their job description.
As I mentioned before, today Forest Supervisors and Forest Rangers
usually have no background in fire. In the olden days when things
were simpler and the marriage of functions all pervasive, Supervisors
and Rangers had often fought fire seasonally, worked briefly on a BD
crew or had been Forestry types and done some timber cruising/pile
burning, in other words, they had some woods and fire sense -- sense of
hot slope/cold slope and how fire burned on the land. Not many of those
old dog Rangers/ranger supervisors remain. (Dave Freeland Ranger on the
SQF and Kent Connaughton, R5 Deputy Regional Forester are two wonderful
exceptions who come to mind.) As Lobotomy points out, most Rangers and
Supervisors today are "ologists" and therefore suspect for not
being "fire professionals" when it comes to fire
safety. [Aside: By training in one of my prior lives, I am also an 'ologist;
and everyone in my family is an 'ologist. Nothing against 'ologists, but
they/we have a very different view of the world and a different set of
priorities than is needed if you're working for safety as a fire
professional on the fireground!]
So back to the Cramer Tragedy... On the Salmon-Challis, the Forest
Fire Staff or FFMO position with all its many responsibilities was unfilled
(or there was an acting). Alan
Hackett, Assistant District FMO was trying to fill the District FMO
position (although it's unclear if he was signed off on a FF52). He was
doing District FMO duties, interacting
with the Line Officer (District Ranger), doing the best he could. The
District Ranger had oversight for all people on her district. The Fire
Staff or acting Fire Staff (if there was one) and his superior, his
Forest Supervisor also had responsibilities for overall forest
functioning including oversight via the fire chain-of-command.
Here you have a relatively low totem-pole person - Hackett - just
above Engine Captain or Handcrew Captain in GS rank and experience
trying to fill in wearing too many hats on a dysfunctional forest. Could
he have refused? Who knows? Then came another hat: the Cramer Fire
started. He was
the IC Type 3 with too much else going on at a time when fires were going
gunnysack all over the forest and all over Idaho/Montana. Complexity
rose exponentially.... and then came the tragedy.
What part did having too many responsibilities in several different
mental and physical locations play in Alan's decisions leading to the
tragedy? Seems to me his tragic failure in oversight was more of a
"sin of omission" than a "sin of commission". Human
factors of job overload/too many hats/ too many expectations placed on a
"journeyman" fire supervisor -- rooted in a FS system
I have to say, I'm in accord with Misery Whip who cited the
importance of both human factors and decision making processes in high
complexity organizations and with Rhino who said,
Cramer is a prime example where a dysfunctional forest placed an
individual in a position where he tried to do his best and became
overwhelmed.
Mellie
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