|
2/8/05 OIG, Cramer Final
Enclosure 1: Summaries of the OIG Forest Service Firefighting
Safety Program Audit and
the OIG Information Memorandum for the Chief, Forest Service.
A. The OIG Forest Service Firefighting Safety Program Audit
The objectives of the report of OIG's audit of the FS Firefighting Safety
Program issued on
September 23, 2004 were to (1) assess FS management controls to implement
recommendations
that arose from investigative findings, accident prevention plans, and other
information;
(2) assess FS controls to ensure compliance with established firefighting safety
standards; and
(3) compare FS with other wildland firefighting agencies to improve FS safety
practices.
FS has excellent written firefighting safety policies and procedures, and
firefighter units
interviewed by OIG gave very positive reviews of the agency's emphasis on safety
issues in
training and operations. FS has improved its coordination with other wildland
firefighting
organizations by incorporating the National Wildfire Coordinating Group's
interagency
standardized training requirements and has required additional courses for FS
firefighting
personnel.
The audit identified elements of FS firefighting safety programs and management
responsibilities
that require additional attention and improvement. OIG provided recommendations
to further
improve the agency's firefighting programs and suppression activities. The audit
identified four
areas in which the agency could strengthen controls in order to enhance
firefighting safety: (1)
monitoring its ongoing response to prior fire safety recommendations, (2)
maintaining
centralized records to support firefighter qualifications, (3) conducting
administrative
investigations on all serious fire accidents (including non-fatal fires), and
(4) incorporating
firefighting safety standards as critical elements in firefighter performance
evaluations.
As of the date of this document, FS has concurred with or acted on eight of
OIG's nine
recommendations contained in the audit and reached a tentative agreement on the
final
recommendation regarding accident investigations. At present, the FS' planned
response meets
OIG objectives for corrective action. In advance of the 2005 fire season, OIG
will monitor FS
progress in implementing corrective measures to address the management issues
identified in the
OIG audit, the Informational Memorandum described below, and the OIG Cramer Fire
investigation. OIG is currently conducting an audit of the FS' use of private,
contract
firefighting crews. The audit will include a review of factors that may affect
firefighting safety.
B. The OIG Informational Memorandum For the Chief, Forest Service
On September 23, 2004, OIG also provided an Informational Memorandum
(Memorandum) to
the Chief, Forest Service, which examined whether common factors existed in the
three most
recent wildland fires that involved FS fatalities.(1) OIG analyzed previously
published
investigative reports and information (produced by other Federal agencies and a
private
consultant) on the three fires to determine whether there were similarities in
the causal factors for
the deaths that occurred during three wildland fire burnovers.
OIG's objective in performing the additional analysis contained in the
Memorandum was to
provide FS officials and congressional committee leaders with information on
recurring
problems at the three most-recent fires with FS fatalities. The facts and
circumstances of these
three fatal fires demonstrate the arduous and dangerous task faced by FS and
other firefighting
personnel to combat wildland fires. As the number of "mega fires"- high intensity
fires burning
hundreds of thousands of acres - increases in the United States, their
unpredictability and the
specific hazards they pose to individual firefighters are also increasing.
During each of the three
fatal fires in question, FS firefighting supervisors and front-line personnel
were attempting to
control multiple fires, and these fires were in extended attack mode and growing
in complexity.
The growth of the dangers posed by the fires in each incident strained the
availability of FS
resources and required firefighting crews to transition from relatively
independent action to a
more coordinated approach.
The Memorandum concluded that the primary similarity between the three fires was
a failure by
FS fire suppression personnel to follow one or more important fire safety rules
and guidelines
and to exercise acceptable supervision and judgment. In each of these three
fires, certain
firefighters and managers exhibited a lack of situational awareness. (2) The reports
emanating from
the three fires showed that these failures were pervasive, involving almost
every critical aspect of
the suppression effort.
OIG analysis of the reports issued on the three fatal fires determined that the
following were the
FS management issues that were common to each fire.
Fire suppression personnel violated all of the "10 Standard Fire Orders" and
failed to
mitigate most of the "18 Watchout Situations. (3)
- Each fire had rapid growth unexpected by management; fire suppression
personnel
employed questionable or improper tactics, and did not adjust their tactics
as necessary.
- Incident Commanders (IC) failed to maintain clear command and control at
critical
points, and key personnel lacked situational awareness.
- FS officials failed to provide adequate oversight and supervision to the
ICs.
If implemented properly, the corrective actions taken by FS in response to the
OIG Firefighting
Safety audit, discussed in the previous section, should help to alleviate the
problems that are
identified in the Informational Memorandum. The FS has also instituted an active
hazard
abatement monitoring process; this is a formal, structured process to monitor
the status of
outstanding recommendations from all investigations, audits, and reviews. If
systematically
utilized, this process could help ensure a more productive management review of,
and
accountability for, the performance of FS fire suppression personnel in the
field.
Footnotes:
1 The three fires were the South Canyon ("Storm King") Fire
(1994), Thirtymile Fire (2001), and the Cramer Fire (2003).
2 Accurately perceiving and assessing the conditions of the fire and the
adequacy of current suppression measures.
3 The 10 Standard Fire Orders" and the "18 Watchout Situations" are provided in
the Appendix to this document.
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
Enclosure 2: The OIG Investigation of the Fatalities Occurring
in the Cramer Fire
OIG's statutory mandate to investigate the Cramer Fire is established by
Public Law 107-203,
enacted on July 24, 2002. (4) It provides:
Sec. 1: "In the case of each fatality of an officer or employee of the
Forest Service that
occurs due to wildfire entrapment or burnover, the Inspector General of the
Department
of Agriculture shall conduct an investigation of the fatality. The
investigation shall not
rely on, and shall be completely independent of, any investigation of the
fatality that is
conducted by the Forest Service."
Sec. 2: "As soon as possible after completing an investigation under
section 1, the
Inspector General of the Department of Agriculture shall submit to Congress
and the
Secretary of Agriculture a report containing the results of the
investigation."
A.
OIG's Investigative Procedures
The day after the fatalities, July 23,2003, OIG initiated its investigation by
dispatching a team of
senior, investigative personnel to the site of the fire in Idaho. Additionally,
Federal investigators
from the Office of Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and FS initiated
their own
investigations on the same day.
OIG Special Agents examined the site of the fatalities and the fire's location.
Over the course of
the next year, OIG Special Agents conducted independent interviews of
individuals relevant to
the investigation, including
- the firefighters involved in fighting the Cramer Fire, employed by both
FS and private
contractors;
- individuals who were involved in firefighting, contracting, training and
equipment
- other personnel on the Forest and in the region who were knowledgeable
of the incident.
Additionally, OIG Special Agents reviewed FS policies and regulations
pertaining to firefighting
safety, tactics, procedures, and training. OIG Special Agents closely
coordinated their efforts
with the U.S.. Attorney for the District of Idaho to evaluate the conduct of FS
employees who
were involved in fighting the Cramer Fire, and participated in a follow-up visit
to the Cramer
Fire site with two Assistant U.S. Attorneys from that office, along with two
senior FS Fire and
Aviation Management officials. The OIG Assistant Special Agent-in-Charge also
met with the
families of the two deceased firefighters and explained OIG's investigative
process and its status.
In order to assist FS officials in their evaluation of various firefighter
safety issues and the
conduct of FS personnel in the Cramer Fire, OIG investigators kept FS regional
and FS Accident
Investigation Team (FSAIT) officials advised of key OIG findings during the
course of the
investigation. OIG also monitored the progress of the FSAIT that conducted the
separate FS
investigation.
Footnote:
4 7 V.S.C[::. 2270, et. seq.
B. Investigative Summary: The Cramer Fire and Efforts to Contain It
On July 19, 2003, a lightning strike started a fire in the Salmon-Challis
National Forest (SCNF).
FS designated it as the "Cramer Fire." The fire was located approximately 25
miles northwest
of Salmon, Idaho. The fire occurred in rocky terrain containing deep gullies and
steep ridges,
making it a difficult area for fire fighting personnel to traverse by foot.
The following day, July 20, a SCNF Fire Management Officer told the North
Fork and Middle
Fork District Ranger that the Cramer Fire was burning in their district. Later
in the day, the
Initial Incident Commander (IIC) of the fire suppression effort conducted a
helicopter
surveillance of the fire. After this flight, the IIC, an Incident Commander (IC)
trainee, and a
5-person fire fighting crew were flown to a helispot located on the east flank
of the fire. This
area was designated "H-l."
By the evening of July 20, the fire had spread approximately three acres
through the sagebrush
and grass near the bottom of the fire and into timber near the top. High
temperatures, low
humidity, and winds gusting from 10-20 miles per hour added to the unfavorable
firefighting
conditions. Rocks and large trees were rolling from the top of the fire into its
middle and lower
sections. The IIC determined that evening that the conditions were too dangerous
for the fire
crew to engage the fire. As a result, the ground crew slept at the fire that
night, while both the
IIC and IC trainee monitored the fire and ensured the safety of the crew.
Throughout the night,
the Cramer Fire continued to spread.
As a result, on Monday, July 21, 2003, the fire had grown to a "Type 3" fire.
FS categorizes
each fire according to its severity and the level of training required to
control it. FS maintains a
trained staff of managers and field personnel to control and extinguish forest
fires and
categorizes them on a scale, which descends from a "Type 1" to a "Type 5," based
upon their
individual knowledge, skills, training, and experience. According to these FS
categories, a Type
1 designation is for ICs considered to have the highest level of skills and
experience, and who are
thereby assigned to handle more complex and challenging fires. A Type 5 IC has
the lowest
level of skills and experience, according to FS, and would be assigned to
control the least
challenging fires. As a result of the Cramer Fire growing to a Type 3 fire, a
new IC with the
requisite training and experience was assigned to lead FS suppression efforts.
The new IC who took command of Cramer Fire suppression efforts on July 21 was
qualified by
FS as a Type 3; the original IIC whom he replaced was categorized as a Type 4.
As a Type 3,
the IC had greater resources available for firefighting, including more
firefighting teams and
aircraft. By mid-afternoon, the IC inserted a firefighting crew at H-1 to assist
the original ground
crew working the east flank of the fire. Additionally, one aerial fire-retardant
drop and several
helicopter water-bucket drops were made in an attempt to control the fire.
However, the winds
picked up and the fire doubled in size causing the IC to pull everyone from the
fire zone. By
evening the fire had spread to 200 acres.
On July 22, 2003, the conditions for firefighting efforts had worsened. The
temperature was
around 100 degrees, humidity was very low, winds were gusting at 10-20 miles an
hour, and
visibility was limited. To make the situation worse, the vegetation was a
mixture of grassland
and timber, thereby making the area highly combustible. During a reconnaissance
flight over the
fire that morning, the Assistant Helitack Foreman (Foreman) and the IC discussed
tactics to
control and contain the fire and selected a new, second helispot. The Foreman,
who worked
directly for the IC, was responsible for evaluating a potential helispot for
safe landing and
takeoff, pointing out to the rappellers the safety routes and safety zones
previously identified by
the IC, instructing the rappellers on their work assignment, and supervising the
actual rappel
operation from the helicopter to the ground.
At approximately 0930 hours, two helitack firefighters, Shane Heath and Jeff
Allen, were taken
via helicopter to be inserted into the new helispot, which was designated as
"H-2." Heath and
Allen were instructed by the Foreman to clear some trees from the area to make
an adequate
helispot at "H-2." The IC then assigned the Foreman to be the helibase manager
at Cove Creek,
several miles away from the Cramer Fire, where he participated in shuttling fire
crews into
"H-l."
Meanwhile, helicopters began shuttling three different firefighting crews to
H-I, located on the
east flank. One crew was comprised of FS employees and the other two crews were
private
crews under contract with FS. A fourth crew, also comprised of contract
firefighters, was
waiting for H-2 to be cleared by helitack firefighters Heath and Allen as a
helicopter-landing
zone.
At approximately 1100 hours and 1230 hours, the Foreman checked with Heath
and Allen
regarding the status of their work at H-2. Heath and Allen said they needed a
little more time,
estimating it would take them an additional 30-45 minutes to complete the
clearing. The
Foreman never asked why it was taking so long for them to clear the half dozen
trees at H-2.
Approximately 4 1/2 hours after Heath and Allen rappelled to H-2, the Foreman
became
concerned.
Throughout the morning and early afternoon of July 22,2003, the fire spread
below H-I on the
east flank of the fire and near the position of H-2 on the west flank. Below
H-2, the fire spread
up and over the ridge where Heath and Allen were working. According to the
statement of the
IC given to the FSAIT (5), no lookout was posted to keep track of the fire where
Heath and Allen
were located.
At approximately 1326 hours, the IC flew a reconnaissance of the fire. He
flew over H-1 and
could not land because of smoke. He spoke to the strike team leader, who
informed the IC that
the three crews had moved to their safety zones. The IC then flew to the west
side of the fire and
observed that the fire had moved beyond the west ridge into a new drainage
called Cache Bar,
which extended up to H-2.
Footnote:
5 Per the advice of his attorney, the Incident Commander declined OIG's request
for an interview
about events at the Cramer Fire.
The IC then flew up to the H-2 area and spoke via radio to Heath and Allen
about their status.
Allen and Heath told the IC that they needed a little more time to complete the
job. The IC did
not inform Allen and Heath of the following material facts: the crews at H-l had
moved to their
safety zones; the IC would probably not use H-2 for crew insertion that day as
originally
planned; and there was new fire spread below them in the Cache Bar drainage.
According to interviews conducted by OIG of the strike team leader, the
Foreman, and other fire
personnel, the spread of fire into the Cache Bar drainage marked a critical
"trigger point" in the
fire's behavior and should have resulted in the IC taking immediate mitigating
action to ensure
Heath and Allen's safety. Among the firefighters on site, however, only the IC
had this vital
information. When the lead plane pilot above the fire discussed the critical
spread of the fire into
the Cache Bar drainage via the radio with the IC, the pilot was unaware that any
rappellers were
still at H-2, and the IC did not mention this fact.
By 1400 hours, the fire on the east flank was such that the ground crews were
ordered to move
away from the fire to their safety zones. The safety zones were areas that had
burned previously.
Shortly after all those ground crews had moved, the fire burned over their
previous position at H-I.
The strike team leader on the Cramer Fire (who was at H-1) directed the
activity of three crews
on the fire, one comprised of FS employees and two contract crews. He observed
several
problems at H-l, which caused him to pull the FS crew and the two contract crews
off the fire.
His reason for pulling the crews was due not to the fire's behavior, but from
his observation that
the contract crews were not following instructions. (6)
In his interview with OIG investigators, the Foreman stated the IC spoke with
him at 1400 hours
about the possibility of not using H-2 that day, even though Heath and Allen had
been inserted
4 1/2 hours previously. The Foreman then stated that the IC was "wishy-washy on
whether he
wanted to use it or not."
Following his conversation with the IC, the Foreman requested that the next
helicopter flight
crew determine whether H-2 was "landable." He advised the Aviation Base Radio
Operator
(ABRO) to check on the status of the firefighters' work on H-2 and advised that
if the helispot
was completed, Heath and Allen were to be pulled from H-2. In contrast to the
IC, the Foreman
and the ABRO were not aware at this time of the fire spread into Cache Bar.
Therefore, they did
not convey this information to the two firefighters or suggest that they be
promptly withdrawn.
By 1430 hours, the fire in the Cache Bar drainage had become an active fire
front. The drainage
was west of and below Heath and Allen, who continued to clear the helispot at
H-2, unaware of
the threat on the west slope below them. At approximately 1445 hours, following
lunch, the
Foreman asked if Heath and Allen were back and learned they were still on
H-2. According to
radio log transcripts, at 1447 hours, the IC decided to pull Heath and Allen
from their position.
However the IC conveyed no timely instructions to any subordinate personnel to
implement this
decision. Heath and Allen were not notified at this time of the threat to the
west or ordered to
safety zones.
By approximately 1500 hours, the winds at H-2 had increased, moving the fire
rapidly up-canyon.
As the fire began to cause heavy smoke to blow over H-2, Heath and Allen
themselves
called the helibase and requested they be taken off the helispot. A review of
the handwritten
Helibase log for July 22, 2003, showed that at 1505 hours and again at 1509
hours, Heath and
Allen requested immediate pickup. At 1513, Heath and Allen reported that fire
and smoke was
below them and again asked for immediate pick up. Six minutes later, at 1519
hours, Heath and
Allen contacted the helibase asking the status of the helicopter. The Helibase
log indicates that
at 1520 hours, the helicopter arrived over H-2 but was unable to land due to
heavy smoke. Heath
and Allen then attempted to flee up the ridge on foot. They made it
approximately 75-100 yards
from H-2, before the fire burned over and around H-2, killing Heath and Allen
shortly after their
last radio transmission. The temperature of the fire was estimated to have been
1300-2000°F
when it overtook Heath and Allen.
Numerous attempts were made to locate the firefighters after the burnover.
Two personnel
rappelled below H-2 later in the afternoon and were notified by a helicopter
over the area that it
had located Heath and Allen. They flagged and secured the fatalities site. Two
more personnel
were delivered close to H-2 and the four spent the night near H-2.
On the morning of July 23, 2003, FS personnel assisted the Lemhi County
Sheriff and a deputy
in removing the bodies of Heath and Allen, which were located on a ridge below
Long Tom
Lookout and above Cache Bar on the Snake River. The recovery effort determined
that neither
firefighter's personal fire shelter had been deployed. However, fires studied by
the Missoula
Technology Development Center have shown that under testing, conditions inside a
fire shelter
are not survivable at 1300°F or greater. An autopsy conducted on the body of
Shane Heath
determined that the cause of death was thermal injury secondary to a forest
fire.
Footnote:
6 OIG's investigation determined that the private contracting crews at the
Cramer Fire performed poorly. OIG is
continuing to work with the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Oregon
regarding the investigative findings on
the private crews.
C. Investigative Findings
Documentary and testimonial evidence obtained during the OIG investigation shows
that the
actions/inactions of FS employees and their failure to follow the Standard
Firefighting Orders
and the 18 Watch Out Situations contributed to the Cramer fatalities. The FS
personnel leading
efforts to confine and contain the Cramer Fire displayed poor judgment in, among
other areas,
failing to deploy lookouts; failing to adequately monitor the status of the two
firefighters who
were landed onto a questionable helispot (H-2) and to notify them that the fire
had spread
directly below them; and, finally, failing to order them to a safety zone in a
timely manner. Had
existing FS fire suppression policies and tactics been followed in a prudent
manner, particularly
by the IC, the fatalities of Heath and Allen may have been prevented.
OIG's investigative findings are consistent with those reached by FS from its
investigation.
Based on FS' own "Accident Investigation Factual Report" dated December 19,
2003, FS
determined that the IC and his team violated all of FS' "Standard Firefighting
Orders" as well as
nine of FS' "18 Watch Out Situations" (Appendix). According to the FS report,
the IC and his
team failed in the following: to stay informed on fire weather conditions and
forecast, to identify
the behavior of the fire, to base their actions on the current and expected
behavior of the fire, to
identify adequate escape routes and safety zones, to post lookouts in vantage
points to protect all
team members, to maintain prompt communications with the firefighting team
members, to think
clearly and act decisively, to provide clear instructions and ensure they were
understood, and to
fight the fire aggressively, while providing for safety first.
Additionally, the FS report indicated the decision regarding the placement of
lookouts was not
made in accordance with established FS guidelines. By not establishing
appropriate lookouts,
the IC compromised the safety of crews assigned to H-l and endangered the lives
of Heath and
Allen at H-2.
Furthermore, statements provided to OIG investigators by SCNF personnel who
were involved
in the Cramer Fire, and who had experience working on other fires in the Forest,
criticized the
leadership of the District Ranger for the Northfork/Middlefork Ranger District
where the fire
occurred. While a District Ranger delegates primary authority to the IC to
direct efforts to
confine and contain a Type III fire, the District Ranger has an obligation to
investigate and
potentially act upon credible information he or she receives about problems that
may arise. The
District Ranger has oversight and direct line authority over the IC and fire
suppression operations
occurring at the district level. A number of SCNF personnel who provided
statements to OIG
said their views on firefighting-related matters, both generally and with
respect to events that
occurred at the Cramer Fire, were, in their estimation, often not properly
considered or acted
upon by the District Ranger.
One example is the statements provided separately to OIG and FS investigators
by the SCNF
Aviation Officer, who monitored radio traffic at the Cramer Fire on July
21,2003. The Aviation
Officer said he expressed his strong concerns about the IC's "disorganized"
direction of
suppression efforts at the fire to several FS personnel present in the dispatch
office on July 21,
including the Forest's Fire Operations Staff Officer. (7) The Fire Operations Staff
Officer told
FSAIT interviewers that he conveyed the Aviation Officer's concerns about the
"disorganized"
efforts at the Cramer Fire to the District Ranger. (8) The Aviation Officer stated
that on the
following morning, July 22, he encountered the District Ranger at a meeting and
told her directly
of his concerns about the competency of the IC at the Cramer Fire. The Aviation
Officer said he
advised the District Ranger that the IC had performed poorly the day before and
should be pulled
off the fire.
The District Ranger was interviewed twice by FSAIT investigators. (9) In the
first interview, the
District Ranger said she had no discussions with FS personnel regarding the
Cramer Fire on
Tuesday, July 22. In the second interview, the District Ranger said that on July
22, before the
fatalities occurred, she asked the Aviation Officer what his concerns regarding
the fire were
about and if they pertained to the IC. The District Ranger said the Aviation
Officer responded
that he had concerns about the use of resources (helicopter, firefighting crews)
at the Cramer
Fire, not about the performance of the IC.
The FS' "Management Evaluation Report" on the Cramer Fatalities determined
that there were
nine "Causal Factors" for the fatalities. The first factor listed was,
"Management Oversight was
inadequate." The FS findings supporting this factor include the following
statement: "Once
informed of the (Aviation Officer's) concern, the District Ranger did not follow
up assertively to
assess the suppression situation to determine whether or not problems existed."
Footnotes:
7 Another FS official present, the Fire Center Manager, provided a sworn
statement to OIG corroborating that the
Aviation Officer raised these concerns.
8 Per the advice of his attorney, the Operations Staff Officer declined OIG's
request for an interview on the events at
the Cramer Fire.
9 Per the advice of her attorney, the District Ranger declined OIG's request for
an interview on the events at the
Cramer Fire.
D. The Results of Federal Investigations into the Cramer Fire.
On December 19, 2003, the FSAIT issued its "Accident Investigation Factual
Report" and the
companion "Management Evaluation Report," which documents the FS findings
regarding the
Cramer fire fatalities. On March 26, 2004, OSHA issued its report citing FS for
serious unsafe
or unhealthy working conditions by not providing a place of employment free from
recognized
hazards, which were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical harm.
OSHA
determined that the employees were exposed to the hazards of burns, smoke
inhalation, and
death from fire-related causes. In addition, they cited FS for violating the
"Standard Firefighting
Orders" and 14 of the "18 Watch Out Situations."
In May 2004, FS initiated various administrative actions against six FS
employees relevant to the
Cramer Fire fatalities. None of the six are currently working in the
Salmon-Challis National
Forest. OIG submitted investigative findings to FS in June 2004.
On November 30, 2004, the U.S. Attorney for the District of Idaho announced
that the IC on the
Cramer fire was terminated from his employment with FS and placed on Federal
probation. The
announcement stated that "based upon OIG's investigation," the U.S. Attorney
concluded that the
IC was "negligent in providing proper supervision and safety to the two
firefighters who lost
their lives." The agreement entered into between the U.S. Attorney's Office, the
U.S. Probation
Office, and the IC stipulates that the IC was terminated from FS effective
November 13 and that
he must serve 18 months of Federal probation. If his probation is successfully
completed, the IC
will not be prosecuted.
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
APPENDIX
Background
The original ten "Standard Firefighting Orders" were developed in 1957 by a
task force
commissioned by the USDA-Forest Service Chief Richard E. McArdle. The task force
reviewed
the records of 16 tragedy fires that occurred from 1937 to 1956. The "Standard
Firefighting
Orders" were based in part on the successful "General Orders" used by the United
States Armed
Forces. The "Standard Firefighting Orders" are organized in a deliberate and
sequential way to
be implemented systematically and applied to all fire situations. Shortly after
the "Standard
Firefighting Orders" were incorporated into firefighter training, the "18
Situations That Shout
Watch Out" were developed. These 18 situations are more specific and cautionary
than the
"Standard Fire Orders" and described situations that expand the 10 points of the
Fire Orders. If
firefighters follow the "Standard Firefighting Orders" and are alerted to the
"18 Watch Out
Situations," much of the risk of firefighting can be reduced. (Cited from the
U.S. Forest Service
Website)
STANDARD FIREFIGHTING ORDERS
Fire Behavior
1. Keep informed on fire weather conditions and forecasts.
2. Know what your fire is doing at all times.
3. Base all actions on current and expected behavior of the fire.
Fireland Safety
4. Identify escape routes and make them known.
5. Post lookouts when there is possible danger.
6. Be alert. Keep calm. Think clearly. Act decisively.
Organizational Control
7. Maintain prompt communications with your forces, your supervisor and
adjoining forces.
8. Give clear instructions and insure they are understood.
9. Maintain control of your forces at all times.
If 1-9 are considered, then...
10. Fight fire aggressively, having provided for safety first.
The 10 standard Fire Orders are firm. We Don't Break Them; We Don't Bend
Them. All
firefighters have a Right to a Safe Assignment.
18 WATCH OUT SITUATIONS
1.
Fire not scouted and sized up.
2. In country not seen in daylight.
3 Safety zones and escape routes not identified.
4.Unfamiliar with weather and local factors influencing fire behavior.
5 Uninformed on strategy, tactics, and hazards.
6. Instructions and assignments not clear.
7. No communication link between crewmembers and supervisors.
8. Constructing line without safe anchor point.
9. Building line downhill with fire below,
10l Attempting frontal assault on fire.
11.. Unburned fuel between you and the fire.
12. Cannot see main fire, not in contact with anyone who can.
13. On a hillside where rolling material can ignite fuel below.
14. Weather gets hotter and drier.
15. Wind increases and/or changes direction.
16. Getting frequent spot fires across line.
17. Terrain or fuels make escape to safety zones difficult.
18. Feel like taking a nap near fireline.
| 
