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I have been asked to give input on wildland firefighter safety to the
Fire and Aviation Staff - Safety and Training, Washington Office. First,
let me say I am honored to be able to contribute at this level. The
afternoon of June 26, 1990, as I knelt beside a dead Perryville firefighter,
I made a promise to the best of my ability to help end the needless
fatalities, and alleviate the near misses, by focusing on training and
operations pertinent to these goals.
Throughout my career I have dealt with wildland fire suppression, as
a Hotshot Crew Supervisor, with only minor injuries occurring to those
I have directly supervised. This is primarily because of two reasons,
luck (which cannot be ignored) and basic lessons which I learned from
the exceptional firefighters I have had the opportunity to work with.
Many of the really valuable suppression lessons I learned were prior
to fire shelter requirements.
Subject vs. Objective Hazards
A popular mountaineering test divides the alpinists’ hazards
into two distinct types: subjective, which one has direct control over
(e.g., condition of the equipment, the decision to turn back) and objective
hazards which are inherent to the alpine environment (e.g., avalanches,
rock fall). Objective hazards are a natural part of the environment.
They cannot be eliminated and either one must not go into the environment
where they exist or adhere to a procedure where safety from the hazard
is assured.
Similarly, the wildland firefighter’s hazards are either subjective
or objective. Examples of subjective hazards would be working below
a dozer constructing fireline or the use of improper techniques while
felling a tree. The fireline supervisor has direct control over these
types of hazards.
The wildland fire environment has four basic objectives hazards; lightning,
fire-weakened timber (standing and lying), rolling rocks and entrapment
by running fires. When these hazards exist the options are to not enter
the environment or to adhere to a safe procedure. I feel the key to
this safe procedure is LCES. Although, the following discussion applies
to all objective hazards, we will directly address fire entrapments.
LCES
LCES stands for lookout(s), communication(s), escape routes and safety
zone(s). These are the same items stressed in the FIRE ORDERS and “Watchout”
Situations. I prefer to look at them from a “systems” point
of view, that is, as being interconnected and dependent on each other.
It is not only important to evaluate each one of these items individually
but also together they must be evaluated as a system. For example, the
best safety zone is of no value if your escape route does not offer
you timely access when needed.
A key concept – the LCES system is identified to each firefighter
prior to when it must be used. The nature of wildland fire suppression
dictates continuously evaluating and, when necessary, re-establishing
LCES as time and fire growth progress. I want to take a minute and briefly
review each component and its interconnection with the others.
Lookout(s) or scouts (roving lookouts) need to be
in a position where both the objective hazard and the firefighter (s)
can be seen. Lookouts must be trained to observe the wildland fire environment
and to recognize and anticipate wildland fire behavior changes. Each
situation determines the number of lookouts that are needed. Because
of terrain, cover and fire size one lookout is normally not sufficient.
The whole idea is when the objective hazard becomes a danger the lookout
relays the information to the firefighter so they can reposition to
the safety zone. Actually, each firefighter has the authority to warn
others when they notice an objective hazard which becomes a threat to
safety.
Communications(s) is the vehicle which delivers the
message to the firefighters, alerting of the approaching hazard. As
is stated in current training, communications must be prompt and clear.
Radios are limited and at some point the warning is delivered by word
of mouth. Although more difficult, it is important to maintain promptness
and clearness when communication is by word of mouth.
Incident intelligence (regarding wildland fire environment, fire behavior
and suppression operations) both to and from Incident Management (i.e.
Command & General Staff) is of utmost importance. But I don’t
view this type of communication a normal component of the LCES system.
Entrapment occurs on a fairly site-specific level. Incident intelligence
is really used to alert of hazards (e.g.. “Watchout” situations)
or to select strategical operations. LCES is primarily a Division function:
responsibility should be here.
Escape Routes are the path the firefighter takes from
their current locations, exposed to the danger, to an area free from
danger. Notice that escape routes is used instead of escape route(s).
Unlike the other components, there always must be more than one escape
route available to the firefighter. Battlement Creek 1976 is a good
example of why another route is needed between the firefighter’s
location and a safety zone.
Escape routes are probably the most elusive component of LCES. Their
effectiveness changes continuously. As the firefighter works along the
fire perimeter, fatigue and spatial separation increases the time required
to reach the safety zone. The most common escape route (or part of an
escape route) is the fireline. On indirect or parallel fireline, situations
become compounded. Unless safety zones have been identified ahead, as
well as behind, firefighters retreat may not be possible.
Safety Zone(s) are locations where the threatened
firefighter may find refuge from the danger. Unfortunately shelter deployment
sites have been incorrectly called safety zones. Safety zones should
be conceptualized and planned as a location where no shelter is needed.
This does not intend for the firefighter to hesitate to deploy their
shelter if needed, just if a shelter is deployed the location is not
a tree safety zone. Fireline intensity and safety zone topographic location
determine safety zone effectiveness.
Again, a key concept – the LCES system is identified prior to
when it must be used. That is lookouts must be posted with communications
to each firefighter, and a minimum of two escape routes form the firefighter’s
work location to a safety zone (not a shelter deployment site) every
time the firefighter is working around an objective hazard.
Safety and tactics should not be considered as separate entities. As
with any task safety and technique necessarily should be integrated.
The LCES system should be automatic in any tactical operation where
an objective hazard is or could be present.
LCES is just a re-focusing on the essential elements of the FIRE ORDERS.
The systems view stresses the importance of the components working together.
The LCES system is a result of analyzing fatalities and near misses
for over 20 years of active fireline suppression duties. I believe that
all firefighters should be given an interconnecting view of Lookout(s),
Communications(s), Escape routes and Safety zone(s).
Division Operations
Establishing a Lookout position in the Operations function has its
merits. The Lookout(s) would be assigned directly to the Division Supervisor.
They would have only one responsibility, albeit an important one. Lookouts
keep one eye on the fire and the other on the Division’s firefighters.
Commonly, Weather Watchers, and Field Observers are incorrectly assigned
lookout duties. Division Supervisors should solicit input from these
sources for their decisions, but these positions are in the Planning
sections, not Operations. Lookouts need to be identified prior to tactical
deployment of suppression resources and they need to give their undivided
attention to the Division’s objective hazards and firefighter
locations.
Ideally each crew would establish lookouts in potentially hazardous
situations. But, this requires the ability to identify these situations
and to establish adequate (in amount and location) lookouts for the
situation. Additionally, all too often crew supervisors hesitate to
remove a crewmember from fireline production and assign them the position
of lookout. They do not realize that the assignment of lookouts is not
only their authority but also their responsibility.
Incident Management, thru Operations and Planning, would identify the
operation’s “Watchout” Situations, divisions on which
they are (or could) occur and assign qualified lookouts to the Division
Supervisor.
Span of Control
Span of control depends directly on the quality of resources and their
capabilities. 3-5 subordinates to each supervisor may be sufficient
for a static environment where they is direct access to each subordinate;
but in the active wildland fire environment experienced leadership is
necessary on a tighter ratio. Jerry Monosmith presented solutions via
the geographical breakdown of a division into “segments”.
Crucial to any solution is the definition of “experienced”.
How would you define experienced?
Many reason have been given for the lack of experience including an
organization’s inability for employee retention and insufficient
BASIC supervision skill development.
Downhill/Indirect Firelines
The two situations that firefighters traditionally have found themselves
getting into trouble are downhill and indirect fireline operations.
The lessons learned on the Loop Fire (‘66) developed awareness,
and consequential guidelines, for downhill fireline construction. Since
then downhill operations have been safer; everyone agrees the only one
who works in a chimney is Santa Claus, and he does it in the dead of
winter. Unfortunately, we still have a ways to go (i.e., Battlement
Creek ’76).
Indirect firelines are a different story. In the last half of the 1980’s
all the entrapments have occurred during indirect operations. Extreme
fire behavior with active spotting has put more reliance on indirect
strategies. With indirect fireline the firefighter finds themselves
removed from the best safety zone, the burn, as well as unable to see
the objective hazard.
“Floating Division”
A floating division is the planned division during an indirect operation
that exists initially only on paper (a map). It is not anchored. Wildland
fire suppression tactics stress the importance of beginning construction
at an anchor point (point where there is the least chance of being outflanked).
To safely deploy resources on a “floating” division it is
extremely important that the division is initially anchored and that
the anchor point is also a safety zone. Only then can resources begin
work developing the LCES system as they progress.
The success of the operation depends on the safety of personnel and
the ability to hold the fireline. It is crucial that indirect fireline
location is determined after careful analysis of wildland fire behavior
possibilities including that behavior which will results if the fire
enters the third-dimension (crowning/spotting from both wind-driven
and plume-dominated fires). All too often the full possibilities are
not incorporate in location decisions.
Wildland/Urban Interface
Suppression in the wildland/urban interface presents its own unique
set of problems. The choice of fireline location is often influenced
by the homes which stand between the fire front and a “better”
option. Often the standard tactics of anchoring at the rear (or heel)
and flanking will leave improvements in the path of the wind-driven
fire.
The lack of an ideal fireline location does not in itself constitute
unsafe indirect strategy. The “urgency” of the operation
causes a break down in solid tactics. During interface suppression operations,
maybe more than any operation, the LCES system must be in place.
With the rapid spread rates reached by wind-driven fires only two options
are available. The traditional “anchor and flank” strategy
or the unorthodox protection of improvements and resources as the wildfire
spreads past. The last dictates the necessity for a “defensible
space” around each improvement sufficient to serve also as a safety
zone, a true safety zone. Unless this precaution has been made the risk
to defending the improvement may not be worth the operation.
Judgment Errors
John Dill, head rock climbing rescue ranger in Yosemite NP, recently
made an analysis of errors in judgment made preceding an accident. He
found three reasons which contribute to the accidents; ignorance, casualness
and distraction. After thinking about the firefighter’s environment
and accidents these same reasons were found to correspond. Allow me
to take a moment and help draw the correlations.
Ignorance: Unfortunately, we still have firefighters
and fireline supervisors who still end up in wildland fire situations
that call for skills and knowledge beyond their level of training. I
know it is stressed over and over, but the BASICS, basic wildland fire
behavior, basic suppression skills, need to be learned and reviewed.
Yet many of the entrapments are the result of no lookouts or an insufficient
safety zone, a lack of basics.
Casualness: The rock climber standing at the base
of a couple thousand-foot granite walls in Yosemite is reassured in
their decision to undertake a challenging ascent because of the helicopter
which is poised less than a mile from the proposed ascent. We are doing
the same. The situation is viewed more casually because we have an option
if the tactic fails – our fire shelter.
Another way casualness enters our environment is through the reinforcement
of improper tactics since the fire does not “blowup” while
we are working the fireline the first few, or several times. But then
we find ourselves entrapped because the familiar situation changes and
our reliance on improper tactics just doesn’t work this time.
Distraction: Often I have been told that was it not
for the on-the-job training that was given by a Division Supervisor
the hazard would not have been noticed and tactics would not have been
adjusted. Distraction is a very very real problem for firefighters.
Fatigue and carbon monoxide do not help with the decision making process
either. Fireline personnel should be continually monitoring each other
and remain open to communication and others evaluation of the situation
at hand.
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